## 1NC

#### **Any affirmative that allows certain immigrants in without opening the boarders is recreating the neoliberal logic that is rooted in all immigration policies – Immigrants are viewed as worthy to come into the country only when it is beneficial for the economy. There cannot be ethical immigration reform until the boarders are open.**

Shivani ’18 (Anis Shivani studied economics at Harvard and is a published author “Immigration Law is by Nature Exclusionary and Racist” These excerpts are from Anis Shivani’s new book called This Is the Only Way to Solve the Immigration “Problem”: The Radical Human Rights Approach That Can Break the Left-Right Stalemate, FEBRUARY 14, 2018 https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/14/immigration-law-is-by-nature-exclusionary-and-racist/)

Neoliberalism is the main cause of the present “illegality.” So-called illegality is purely a self-created bureaucratic problem, which it is convenient for the neoliberal state to address as a criminal matter. It comes in handy because it keeps the lid on demands for democracy across racial lines, and it maintains a permanent underclass without rights, acting as a counterweight against universal fairness in the workplace. So-called illegality is purely a self-created bureaucratic problem, which it is convenient for the neoliberal state to address as a criminal matter. It comes in handy because it keeps the lid on demands for democracy across racial lines, and it maintains a permanent underclass without rights, acting as a counterweight against universal fairness in the workplace. The modern problem of illegality began in 1994, when NAFTA was passed. NAFTA offered a set of advantages to American big business and agriculture, creating tremendous pressure on Mexican small industry and farms and leading to the displacement of millions of workers, many of whom headed north. NAFTA freed capital movement at the same time as it restricted labor movement. So on the one hand, we created dire pressure for migration northward—to call it “push and pull” seems disingenuous, as though referring to inexorable laws of economics—at the same time as we cut off pathways to legal migration. Before the 1990s, we always had a pattern of circular migration from Mexico. Migrants came and went; they didn’t necessarily want to stay for good. Almost thirty million Mexicans entered the country between the start of the Bracero Program and the 1986 immigration law, but most of them went back. But the neoliberal regime made the price of mobility prohibitive. Border controls became so repressive, and the price of reentry so high, that most decided to put down roots. The children of these migrants have become the Dreamers we now so proudly claim are the immigrants worthiest of our compassion. When we wanted cheap agricultural labor we willfully let in large numbers of immigrants whom we did not want to assimilate. And now that the latest phase of globalization has run its course, the Trump regime wants to repatriate these people, long resident in our country, back “home.” We can always crack the wall open a bit when later we need a new burst of cheap labor. Under neoliberalism, we shuffle off unwanted labor to our private detention system, which daily commits horrors on a scale worthy of some of history’s worst nightmares. Our policy preference is to put immigrants in detention for long periods of time before expelling them, so that they become revenue-earners for private prisons. Under Trump we are about to witness a massive resurgence of the private prison industry, which lobbies for criminalization of immigrants.

#### <<INSERT SPECIFIC LINK>>>

#### Capitalism causes resource wars, economic collapses, population crises, ecological degradation, kills value to life, and magnifies structural violence

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 145-147

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on Decembe . r i6, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism:'s The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure-myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage- outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

The alternative is to reject the 1AC in favor of a radical democracy

#### **In Trumps America there is no time for policies that are complicity within the neoliberal order. The alternative creates a conscious revolution by combining the power of hope, critique, and knowledge of political change to challenge fascism in favor of a radical democracy**

Giroux ’18 (Henry A. Giroux currently holds the McMaster University Chair for Scholarship in the Public Interest in the English and Cultural Studies Department and is the Paulo Freire Distinguished Scholar in Critical Pedagogy. “The Ghost of Fascism in the Age of Trump” February 13, 2018, https://truthout.org/articles/the-ghost-of-fascism-in-the-age-of-trump/)

Trump is worse than almost anyone imagined, and while his critics across the ideological spectrum have begun to go after him, they rarely focus on how dangerous he is, hesitant to argue that he is not only the enemy of democracy, but symptomatic of the powerful political, economic and cultural forces shaping the new US fascism. There are some critics who [claim](https://truthout.org/15706) that Trump is simply a weak president whose ineptness is being countered by “a robust democratic culture and set of institutions,” and not much more than a passing moment in history. Others, such as [Wendy Brown](https://truthout.org/15707) and [Nancy Fraser](https://truthout.org/15708), view him as an authoritarian expression of right-wing populism and an outgrowth of neoliberal politics and policies. While many historians, such as Timothy Snyder and Robert O. Paxton, analyze him in terms that echo some elements of a fascist past, some conservatives such as [David Frum](https://truthout.org/15709) view him as a modern-day self-obsessed, emotionally needy demagogue whose assault on democracy needs to be taken seriously, and that whether or not he is a fascist is not as important as what he plans to do with his power. For Frum, there is a real danger that people will retreat into their private worlds, become cynical and enable a slide into a form of tyranny that would become difficult to defeat. Others, like Corey Robin, argue that we overstep a theoretical boundary when comparing Trump directly to Hitler. According to Robin, Trump bears no relationship to Hitler or the policies of the Third Reich. Robin not only dismisses the threat that Trump poses to the values and institutions of democracy, but plays down the growing threat of authoritarianism in the United States. For Robin, Trump has failed to institute many of his policies, and as such, is just a weak politician with little actual power. Not only does Robin focus too much on the person of Trump, but he is relatively silent about the forces that produced him and the danger these proto-fascist social formations now pose to those who are the objects of the administration’s racist, sexist and xenophobic taunts and policies. The ghosts of fascism should terrify us, but most importantly, they should educate us and imbue us with a spirit of civic justice. As Jeffrey C. Isaac [observes](https://truthout.org/15710), whether Trump is a direct replica of the Nazi regime has little relevance compared to the serious challenges he poses; for instance, to the DACA children and their families, the poor, undocumented immigrants and a range of other groups. Moreover, authoritarianism is looming in the air and can be seen in the number of oppressive and regressive policies already put into place by the Trump administration that will have a long-term effect on the United States. These include the $1.5 trillion giveaway in the new tax code, the expansion of the military-industrial complex, the elimination of Obamacare’s individual mandate, the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, and a range of deregulations that will impact negatively on the environment for years to come. In addition, there is the threat of a nuclear war, the disappearance of health care for the most vulnerable, the attack on free speech and the media, and the rise of the punishing state and the increasing criminalization of social problems. As Richard J. Evans, the renowned British historian, [observes](https://truthout.org/15711), “Violence indeed was at the heart of the Nazi enterprise. Every democracy that perishes dies in a different way, because every democracy is situated in specific historical circumstances.” US society has entered a dangerous stage in its history. After 40 years of neoliberalism and systemic racism, many Americans lack a critical language that offers a consistent narrative that enables them to understand gutted wages, lost pensions, widespread uncertainty and collapsing identities due to feeling disposable, the loss of meaningful work and a formative culture steeped in violence, cruelty and an obsession with greed. Moreover, since 9/11, Americans have been bombarded by a culture of fear and consumerism that both dampens their willingness to be critical agents and depoliticizes them. Everyone is now a suspect or a consumer, but hardly a critically engaged citizen. Others are depoliticized because of the ravages of debt, poverty and the daily struggle to survive — problems made all the worse by Trump’s tax and health policies. And while there is no perfect mirror, it has become all the more difficult for many people to recognize how the “[crystalized elements](https://truthout.org/13006)” of totalitarianism have emerged in the shape of an American-style fascism. What has been forgotten by too many intellectuals, critics, educators and politicians is that [fascism is hardly a relic of the past](https://truthout.org/15712) or a static political and ideological system. Trump is not in possession of storm troopers, concentration camps or concocting plans for genocidal acts — at least, not at the moment. But that does not mean that fascism is a moment frozen in history and has no bearing on the present. As Hannah Arendt, Sheldon Wolin and others have taught us, [totalitarian regimes come in many forms](https://truthout.org/15713) and their elements can come together in different configurations. Rather than dismiss the notion that the organizing principles and fluctuating elements of fascism are still with us, a more appropriate response to Trump’s rise to power is to raise questions about what elements of his government signal the emergence of a fascism suited to a contemporary and distinctively US political, economic and cultural landscape. What seems indisputable is that under Trump, democracy has become the enemy of power, politics and finance. Adam Gopnik refutes the notion that Trumpism will simply fade away in the end, and argues that comparisons between the current historical moment and fascism are much needed. He [writes](https://truthout.org/15714): Needless to say, the degradation of public discourse, the acceleration of grotesque lying, the legitimization of hatred and name-calling, are hard to imagine vanishing like the winter snows that Trump thinks climate change is supposed to prevent. The belief that somehow all these things will somehow just go away in a few years’ time does seem not merely unduly optimistic but crazily so. In any case, the trouble isn’t just what the Trumpists may yet do; it is what they are doing now. American history has already been altered by their actions — institutions emptied out, historical continuities destroyed, traditions of decency savaged — in ways that will not be easy to rehabilitate. There is nothing new about the possibility of authoritarianism in a particularly distinctive guise coming to the US. Nor is there a shortage of works illuminating the horrors of fascism. Fiction writers ranging from George Orwell, Sinclair Lewis and Aldous Huxley to Margaret Atwood, Philip K. Dick and Philip Roth have sounded the alarm in often brilliant and insightful terms. Politicians such as Henry Wallace wrote about American fascism, as did a range of theorists, such as Umberto Eco, Arendt and Paxton, who tried to understand its emergence, attractions and effects. What they all had in common was an awareness of the changing nature of tyranny and how it could happen under a diverse set of historical, economic and social circumstances. They also seem to share Philip Roth’s insistence that we all have an obligation to recognize “[the terror of the unforeseen](https://truthout.org/15715)” that hides in the shadows of censorship, makes power invisible and gains in strength in the absence of historical memory. A warning indeed. Trump represents a distinctive and dangerous form of US-bred authoritarianism, but at the same time, he is the outcome of a past that needs to be remembered, analyzed and engaged for the lessons it can teach us about the present. Not only has Trump “[normalized the unspeakable](https://truthout.org/15716)” and in some cases, the unthinkable, he has also forced us to ask questions we have never asked before about capitalism, power, politics, and yes, courage itself. In part, this means recovering a language for politics, civic life, the public good, citizenship and justice that has real substance. One challenge is to confront the horrors of capitalism and its transformation into a form of fascism under Trump. This cannot happen without a revolution in consciousness, one that makes education central to politics. Moreover, as Fredric Jameson has suggested, such a revolution cannot take place by limiting our choices to a fixation on the “[impossible present](https://truthout.org/15717).” Nor can it take place by limiting ourselves to a language of critique and a narrow focus on individual issues. What is needed is also a language of hope and a comprehensive politics that draws from history and imagines a future that does not imitate the present. Under such circumstances, the language of critique and hope can be enlisted to create a broad-based and powerful social movement that both refuses to equate capitalism with democracy and moves toward creating a radical democracy. William Faulkner once remarked that we live with the ghosts of the past, or to be more precise: “The past is never dead. It’s not even past.” However, we are not only living with the ghosts of a dark past; it is also true that the ghosts of history can be critically engaged and transformed into a democratic politics for the future. The Nazi regime is more than a frozen moment in history. It is a warning from the past and a window into the growing threat Trumpism poses to democracy. The ghosts of fascism should terrify us, but most importantly, they should educate us and imbue us with a spirit of civic justice and collective courage in the fight for a substantive and inclusive democracy. The stakes are too high to remain complacent, cynical or simply outraged. A crisis of memory, history, agency and justice has mushroomed and opened up the abyss of a fascist nightmare. Now is the time to talk back, embrace the radical imagination in private and public, and create united mass based coalitions in which the collective dream for a radical democracy becomes a reality. There is no other choice.

## Links

### Generic

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Neoliberalism is the main cause of the present “illegality.” So-called illegality is purely a self-created bureaucratic problem, which it is convenient for the neoliberal state to address as a criminal matter. It comes in handy because it keeps the lid on demands for democracy across racial lines, and it maintains a permanent underclass without rights, acting as a counterweight against universal fairness in the workplace.So-called illegality is purely a self-created bureaucratic problem, which it is convenient for the neoliberal state to address as a criminal matter. It comes in handy because it keeps the lid on demands for democracy across racial lines, and it maintains a permanent underclass without rights, acting as a counterweight against universal fairness in the workplace. The modern problem of illegality began in 1994, when NAFTA was passed. NAFTA offered a set of advantages to American big business and agriculture, creating tremendous pressure on Mexican small industry and farms and leading to the displacement of millions of workers, many of whom headed north. NAFTA freed capital movement at the same time as it restricted labor movement. So on the one hand, we created dire pressure for migration northward—to call it “push and pull” seems disingenuous, as though referring to inexorable laws of economics—at the same time as we cut off pathways to legal migration. Before the 1990s, we always had a pattern of circular migration from Mexico. Migrants came and went; they didn’t necessarily want to stay for good. Almost thirty million Mexicans entered the country between the start of the Bracero Program and the 1986 immigration law, but most of them went back. But the neoliberal regime made the price of mobility prohibitive. Border controls became so repressive, and the price of reentry so high, that most decided to put down roots. The children of these migrants have become the Dreamers we now so proudly claim are the immigrants worthiest of our compassion. When we wanted cheap agricultural labor we willfully let in large numbers of immigrants whom we did not want to assimilate. And now that the latest phase of globalization has run its course, the Trump regime wants to repatriate these people, long resident in our country, back “home.” We can always crack the wall open a bit when later we need a new burst of cheap labor. Under neoliberalism, we shuffle off unwanted labor to our private detention system, which daily commits horrors on a scale worthy of some of history’s worst nightmares. Our policy preference is to put immigrants in detention for long periods of time before expelling them, so that they become revenue-earners for private prisons. Under Trump we are about to witness a massive resurgence of the private prison industry, which lobbies for criminalization of immigrants.

### CIR

#### **Comprehensive immigration reform is a tool used by neoliberalism to further criminalize immigration and militarize the boarder**

Shivani ’18 (Anis Shivani studied economics at Harvard and is a published author “Immigration Law is by Nature Exclusionary and Racist” These excerpts are from Anis Shivani’s new book called This Is the Only Way to Solve the Immigration “Problem”: The Radical Human Rights Approach That Can Break the Left-Right Stalemate, FEBRUARY 14, 2018 https://www.counterpunch.org/2018/02/14/immigration-law-is-by-nature-exclusionary-and-racist/)

In every version it appears, CIR, a favorite prescription of both major political parties, is nothing but a Trojan horse to sneak in and formalize existing inhuman practices. Each CIR bill has been increasingly regressive, starting with the one that actually passed, Ronald Reagan’s 1986 IRCA (Immigration Reform and Control Act).Every CIR attempts three things: 1. It further criminalizes and delegalizes growing categories of people, reducing pathways to citizenship, while offering some sort of legal status to those few who qualify within increasingly narrow boundaries; 2. It seeks to convert immigrants into guest workers to the extent possible, implementing a regime that strays from linear outcomes; and 3. As a bargaining chip to sway restrictionists, who may have problems even with limited forms of legal status, it implements new policing measures to harden the already militarized border. CIR is no solution. The 2006, 2007, and 2013 bills were each more draconian than their predecessors. The last one, under Obama, was much harsher than the ones Bush wanted. Militarization, which already stands at mind-boggling levels, with more than twenty thousand border patrol agents, would have gone up drastically in each CIR bill. To the extent that a wall can exist, it already does. Each time a CIR bill is proposed, its legalization provisions don’t become reality, but its militaristic provisions come true by other means. Ever since the 1970s—with the arrival of Southeast Asian and Caribbean refugees, and the growing visibility of Asians in our population—sharply restrictionist moves have been packaged as CIR. Environmentalist John Tanton has been at the fount of most recent anti-immigrant advocacy. His organization FAIR (Federation for American Immigration Reform), along with associated organizations such as CIS (Center for Immigration Studies) and NumbersUSA, seeks to end legal immigration. CIR bills have moved this goal closer and closer in sight, until Trump can almost smell victory. FAIR and its affiliated organizations are consulted by the press on every policy move, and given equal footing with the vast array of pro-immigrant groups.

### Economy

#### The aff’s solution to economic decline is a liberal intervention to re-stabilize the system

Mészáros 95 (Prof. Emeritus @ Univ. Sussex) [Istvan, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition]

p. 930 THE difficulty is that the ‘moment’ of radical politics is strictly limited by the nature of the crises in question and the temporal determinations of their unfolding. The breach opened up at times of crisis cannot be left open forever and the measures adopted to fill it, from the earliest steps onwards, have their own logic and cumulative impact on subsequent interventions. Furthermore, both the existing socioeconomic structures and their corresponding framework of political institutions tend to act against radical initiatives by their very inertia as soon as the worst moment of the crisis is over and thus it becomes possible to contemplate again ‘the line of least resistance’. And no one can consider ‘radical restructuring’ the line of least resistance, since by its very nature it necessarily involves upheaval and the disconcerting prospect of the unknown. No immediate economic achievement can offer a way out of this dilemma so as to prolong the life-span of revolutionary politics, since such limited economic achievements made within the confines of the old premises — act in the opposite direction by relieving the most pressing crisis symptoms and, as a result, reinforcing the old reproductive mechanism shaken by the crisis. As history amply testifies, at the first sign of ‘recovery’, politics is pushed back Into its traditional role of helping to sustain and enforce the given socio-economic determinations. The claimed ‘recovery’ itself reached on the basis of the ‘well tried economic motivations’, acts as the self-evident ideological justification for reverting to the subservient, routine role of politics, in harmony with the dominant institutional framework. Thus, radical politics can only accelerate its own demise (and thereby shorten, instead of extending as it should, the favourable ‘moment’ of major political intervention) if it consents to define its own scope in terms of limited economic targets which are in fact necessarily dictated by the established socioeconomic structure in crisis.

### Growth

#### **The affirmative justifies itself based off of its contribution to economic growth transforming immigrants into human capital- this creates a cycle of human sacrifice in the name of economic prosperity**

Brown ’16 (Wendy Brown Professor at U.C. Berkeley, teaches in political science and critical theory “Sacrificial Citizenship: Neoliberalism, Human Capital, and Austerity Politics,” *Constellations*, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2016, p. 3-14,)

In short, at the same time that links between the state, finance, and corporate capital are intensified, concerted action by workers, consumers, and citizens is all but eliminated in fact, in political discourse, and in the elite and popular political imagination. And when consumer, worker, and citizen organizations are defanged by the law, these forms of identity and the antagonism they represent soon dissolve, generating that “transformation of the soul” Margaret Thatcher identified as fundamental to the success of the neoliberal project. These kinds of legal decisions combined with the neutralizing strategies of governance aim at this effect, replacing such identities with that of human capital. Conversion of the worker, the consumer, the activist citizen — all entities capable of linking together into a social force — into isolated bits of self-investing human capital both makes them more governable and integrates them into a project: economic growth, to which they may potentially be sacrificed. The conversion breaks down barriers to this governance and integration; it also abets both. To grasp how and why this occurs, however, we must return to the general problematic of neoliberal governance formations and consider in particular two of its component parts, devolution and responsibilization. Devolution, Responsibilization and Shared Sacrifice Neoliberalism's economization of the political, its jettisoning of the very idea of the social, and its displacement of politics by governance diminishes all significant venues for active citizenship. One can see these three forces combined in the metrics by which the costs of higher education are now appraised — on the one hand, in terms of the investment by consumers in their own economic future, on the other hand in terms of the investment by the state in its economic future. These metrics occlude the historical concern of higher education with developing or renewing citizens, knowledge, civilization, culture, or the public's capacity to govern itself. Another example of compressing democratic citizenship and democratic justice into economic purposes can be seen in President Obama's 2013 “State of the Union” address, delivered shortly after his re-election. In a speech soaring with calls for social justice and ecological renewal, each item in what many pundits saw as a revived progressive agenda was expressly legitimated by its contribution to economic growth. Thus, while Obama argued on behalf of Medicare, tax reform, immigration reform, an end to Washington bickering and brinksmanship, raising the minimum wage, fighting sex discrimination and domestic violence, and increased government investment in science and technology research, clean energy, home ownership, education, each cause was framed in terms of its contribution to economic growth or American competitiveness. “A growing economy that creates good, middle-class jobs — that must be the North Star that guides our efforts,” Obama declared.23 “Every day,” he intoned midway through the speech, “we must ask ourselves three questions as a nation.” And what were these questions whose answers would constitute supervenient guides to law and policy formation, and to collective and individual conduct in the world's oldest democracy and most dominant nation? How do we attract more jobs to our shores? How do we equip our people with the skills needed to do those jobs? And how do we make sure that hard work leads to a decent living?24 Success in these three areas, Obama promised, would in turn yield the ultimate goal of the nation and the government stewarding it: broad-based growth for the economy as a whole. This framing weighs all policy issues, including justice and planetary survival, according to their GDP-generating capacities. Indeed, if one item on Obama's progressive agenda turns out to deter (or even fail to stimulate) growth, it would apparently have to get scratched from the program. This framing also reduces citizenship to participation in national growth and thus to political passivity, continuous with (if more subtle than) G.W. Bush's infamous encomium to “shop, fly, and spend” as consummate acts of patriotism in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. From a governance perspective, where what is prized is teamwork in achieving the goal of growth rather than contestation and deliberation about norms, there is no place for agitated or agonistic citizenship. Nor is there a place for citizen expression bound to interest groups and ad hoc mobilizations, both of which are treated as failures of buy-in or consensus-building. However, while neoliberal political rationality administered through governance eliminates the last classical republican traces of citizenship formulated as public engagement, it retains even as it transforms the idea of citizen sacrifice. If citizen virtue is reworked as responsibilized entrepreneurialism, it is also reworked as the “shared sacrifice” potentially required for a healthy or troubled but above all a flexible economy. Such sacrifice may range from suffering the direct effects of job outsourcing, furloughs or pay and benefits cuts, to suffering the indirect effects of stagflation, credit crunches, liquidity or currency crises. It may be shared widely as the curtailed state investment in education; it may be suffered individually as a “last-hired, first-fired” phenomenon; or, as is most often the case, it may be suffered disproportionately by a weak group or class, as is the case with furloughs or reduced government services. Whatever the case, active citizenship is slimmed to tending oneself as responsibilized human capital, while sacrificial citizenship expands to include anything related to the health of a firm or nation, or again, the health of the nation as firm. This slimming and expansion are facilitated through the neoliberal supplanting of democratic political values and discourse with governance, that consensus model of order that integrates all into a supervenient project. Recall that governance replaces law with guidelines related to project goals, conflicting class positions with “stakeholders,” class consciousness with team consciousness, and political or normative challenges with a focus on the technical and the practical. It is through such replacements and the reduction of national political purpose to economic survival and growth that, for example, tax-paying workers become an acceptable revenue source for the bailouts of investment banks managed by billionaires. This is also what legitimates slashing public employee salaries and pensions or hiking student tuition in response to finance capital meltdowns, state fiscal crises, and regressive tax policy. In short, neoliberal governance converts the classically modern image of the nation comprising diverse concerns, issues, interests, and points of power to the nation on the model of Walmart where managers are “team leaders,” workers are “junior associates,” and consumers are “guests” — each is integrated into the smooth functioning of the whole and bound to the single end of economic prosperity defined in terms of investment climate and growth.

### Hegemony

#### The US uses the economy and international organizations to spread neoliberalism.

Grocott and Grady 14 (Chris Grocott and Jo Grady, University of Leicester, “Naked abroad: The continuing imperialism of free trade”, Capital & Class, Vol.38(3), pg. 552, 2014, ProQuest research Library)

British investors and the British government were keen to promote informal empire over formal domination, because it was cheaper to effect. Informal control was an advantageous and economical alternative method of securing the frontiers of the expanding economy. A similar form of US informal imperialism can be seen in the contemporary period. As we shall see, US capitalism, through a variety of supra-national bodies (such as the IMF and WB, which it dominates) and through its own diplomatic initiatives, has exercised considerably more informal control across the globe than did British imperialism. US informal power does not just represent economic control (characterised by access to, and control over, markets) but also the ability to extend neoliberal ideological hegemony (Duménil and Lévy 2010: 7-10). It is Duménil and Lévy (2004, 2010, 2012) who have come closest to our analysis when they refer to neoliberalism as ‘a class hegemony and a global dominance of the USA’ (2010: 7). They argue that ‘neoliberal globalisation’ is forced onto non-Western countries, often through economic violence, and with detrimental consequences to the indigenous populations of those countries. By exploring the globalising aspects of neoliberalism in the light of the concept of informal imperialism, a Marxian understanding of imperialism, understood as the operation of capitalism overseas, emerges. Since 1945, the USA has sought to incorporate regions across the globe into its expanding economy by fiercely protecting already established markets (particularly against anti-free-market ideologies); by cracking open reluctant markets through economic aggression (sometimes via joint action with the WB and WTO); and through the establishment of sympathetic governments containing sufficient numbers of collaborators. The USA’s ability to assert informal power globally rested on the post-war reconstruction, which it led, and which signalled a shift in the imperial world order by curtailing Britain’s informal imperial power. One significant symptom of this was that the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944 made the dollar the dominant global currency, unseating sterling as the prime international exchange currency (Harvey 2005: 10). Furthermore, the US Treasury rejected outright a proposal made by Lord Keynes that was designed to prevent the accumulation of impossible-to-service trade deficits in developing countries. This put the USA in a situation in which it was free to generate its own, considerable, surpluses. Separate to Bretton Woods, supra-national organisations have played a significant part in establishing US global influence. The Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was established to administer Marshall Aid loans from the US to European countries. The Council of Europe also emerged from this process, developing alongside and becoming a part of the machinery of the European Union. It acted to tie continental European countries into the economic dominance of the USA (Lloyd 1993: 274–5). (Notably, the Soviet Union rejected Marshall Aid.) Finally, supra-national organisations have also become increasingly important in promoting neoliberal economic orthodoxy. The foundation of the IMF and the World Bank (WB) and their subsequent domination by the USA ensured that countries looking for financial assistance conformed to US financial orthodoxy. Later, in the 1990s, US neoliberal orthodoxy found its greatest expression in the IMF’s Washington Consensus, which laid down the criteria upon which emergency loans made to struggling nations would be issued. ‘Washington Consensus’ was a term first used in 1989 by the influential US economist John Williamson. It comprised a set of ten economic policy prescriptions, central to any ‘standard’ reform package offered to countries in need of an IMF or WB loan. Amongst other things, these prescriptions included trade liberalisation, tax reform, fiscal policy discipline, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and liberalisation of inward foreign investment. In short, therefore, the Washington Consensus reflected the acceptance of neoliberal values in the USA, and its adoption by the IMF and WB was evidence that these institutions were being used to promote and extend neoliberal ideology for Western capitalists. In addition to the above, the USA has used its economic and military power to reincorporate areas which, perhaps because of political and ideological changes at the periphery, had moved away from US influence. Space precludes an exhaustive study of acts of US informal imperialism since the Second World War. Nevertheless, two useful and typical examples are explored: first, the overthrow in 1954 of the government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala (see also the links drawn out by Huberman [2004]); and second, the 1970s economic neoliberalisation of the Southern Cone states (Chile, Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil), with specific reference to Chile. Furthermore, both are interesting not least because in their original essay, Robinson and Gallagher considered 19th-century British informal imperialism in Latin America.

#### Hegemony is capitalist centralization---no turns, never has resolved competition

Foster 03 (John, editor, Monthly Review. July/August, 1-14)

Imperialism, however, continued to evolve beyond this classic phase, which ended with the Second World War and subsequent decolonization movement, and in the 1950s and 1960s a later phase presented its own historically specific characteristics. The most important of these was the United States replacing British hegemony over the capitalist world economy. The other was the existence of the Soviet Union, creating space for revolutionary movements in the third world, and helping to bring the leading capitalist powers into a Cold War military affiance reinforcing U.S. hegemony. The United States utilized its hegemonic position to establish the Bretton Woods institutions-the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank-with the intention of consolidating the economic control exercised by the center states, and the United States in particular, over the periphery and hence the entire world market. In Magdoff's conception, the existence of U.S. hegemony did not bring to an end the competition between capitalist states. Hegemony was always understood by realistic analysts as historically transitory despite the constant references to the "American century." The uneven development of capitalism meant continual interimperialist rivalry, even if somewhat hidden at times. "Antagonism between unevenly developing Industrial centers," he wrote, "~s the hub of the imperialist wheel" (p. 16). U S militarism which in this analysis went hand in hand with its imperial role, was not simply or even mainly a product of the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union, by which it was conditioned. Militarism had deeper roots in the need of the United States, as the hegemonic power of the capitalist world economy to keep the doors open for foreign investment by resorting to force, if necessary. At the same time, the United States was employing its power where possible to advance the needs of its own corporations-as for example in Latin America where its dominance was unquestioned by other great powers. Not only did the United States exercise this military role on numerous occasions throughout the periphery in the post-Second World War period, but during that period it was also able to justify this as part of the fight against Communism. Miliitarism, associated with this role as global hegemon and affiance-leader, came to permeate all aspects of accumulation in the United States, so that the term "military-industrial complex," introduced by Eisenhower in his departing speech as president, was an understatement. Already in his day there was no major center of accumulation in the United States that was not also a major center of military production. Military production helped prop up the entire economic edifice in the United States, and was a factor holding off economic stagnation.

### Refugees

#### Offering asylum or refugee status to certain groups confers political visibility and potential onto some populations at the expense of other --- both maintain and expand the juridical control of global migration on behalf of the US

**McKinnon 9** (Sara L. McKinnon, Associate Professor of Rhetoric, Politics, and Culture at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2009, “Citizenship and the Performance of Credibility: Audiencing Gender-based Asylum Seekers in U.S. Immigration Courts,” *Text and Performance Quarterly*, 29:3, 205-221, DOI: 10.1080/10462930903017182)

Based on the 1980 Refugee Act, a person has the right to enter the United States if she/ he has been politically persecuted in his/her home country, and then to claim asylum and not be deported from the state until the claim is evaluated and decided. An asylum officer first examines this claim in a non-adversarial process and if the officer cannot make a decision, or if numerous other legal issues arise,1 the claim then moves to the immigration court system as a defensive asylum case. Once in the courts, asylum seekers must prove that they are refugees based on the 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ definition of a refugee as ‘‘a person outside of his or her own country with a well-founded fear of future persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a social group’’ (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). Furthermore, because the claimants seek political asylum they must also demonstrate that they experienced politically motivated persecution (Shuman and Bohmer). The primary role of judges in these cases is to make sure that the experiences or fears cited as persecution actually count as such under the political asylum protocol. They do this first by evaluating the evidence regarding the politically oppressive context, and then by interpreting the claimant’s credibility\*making a judgment of a claimant’s performance of her/his story and emotionality that leads to an assessment of whether the stated persecution actually happened (Cohen; Melloy; Ruppel). The right to read credibility is not a controversial component of the immigration judicial system, as all major court processes in the United States provide similar power to judges. However, some asylum claimants have less ground to cover in performing credibly before court officials. These are individuals whose experiences of persecution fit into the more concrete categories of race, religion, and nationality enumerated in the definition of refugee (Cohen; Melloy; Musalo). Claimants also embody ethos when the conflict or persecution they flee is well publicized and documented in international and national media (Coutin). Additionally, asylum seekers who fit the normatively desired identities for citizen-subjects because of their race, gender, sexual orientation, education, linguistic fluency, or political clout are more easily recognized as viable political refugees and potential future citizens (Berlant; Bhabha; Ong Flexible Citizenship). Asylum seekers who do not fit these categories not only struggle to demonstrate the political nature of their claims, but they also struggle in being ‘‘audienced’’ as subjects who speak truthfully about their experiences and who deserve political refuge. As of late, credibility in asylum cases has become complicated due to shifts in law that give greater discretionary power to immigration judges in deciding asylum cases solely on the basis of perceived credibility (Fletcher; Melloy). The problem these changes create is that judges increasingly use credibility to evaluate and determine asylum cases while paying less consideration to the actualities of the claim itself. This emphasis on style over content in audiencing asylum claims surely assists immigration judges in expediting their review of cases; the consequence, however, is that the possibility of asylum, of legal protection, increasingly depends on asylum seekers’ ability to cite repetitively the conventions of cultural/linguistic fluency, rationality, and embodied affect that, as this analysis will show, serve as judges’ standards for a proper performance of credibility in the asylum context. As suggested above, these conventions are not impartial, as they are constituted via racist, sexist, classist, and nationalist discourses that favor certain subjects even before they speak in the courtroom. Despite the ways in which globalization has led to mass migrations and displacements of peoples, the standards for performing citizenship remain stagnant in the United States.

### Visas (Generic)

#### **Visas are a way for the government to keep borders closed while make exceptions for who they deem are worthy based off of their ability to participate within the economy**

Shachar & Hirschl ’13 (Ayelet Shachar, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, & Ran Hirschl, Dept. of Political Science, University of Toronto, “Recruiting "Super Talent:" The New World of Selective Migration Regimes” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Winter 2013)

A core theoretical insight to be drawn from our discussion is that the debate about migration and globalization can no longer pivot around the open versus closed borders dichotomy. This is because all countries simultaneously engage in both opening and closing their borders, but they do so selectively-in our context, by indicating quite sharply who they desire to bring in (those with extraordinary talent) and by erecting higher and higher legal walls to block those deemed "unwanted" or "too different."'120 In this stratified international mobility market, membership goods, including the promise of a "green card" (or "blue card" in the EU), are subtly turned into instruments for gaining a relative advantage in a competitive inter-jurisdictional scramble for brainpower. In this race, no country is an island, and none wants to be left behind. 1 21 This is part of a larger transition. Instead of aiming to act as passive gatekeepers, governments increasingly set their goals toward picking winners.' 22 Through giving priority in the visa line to those "with brains, talent and special skills,"' 23 countries entangled in the global race for talent are seeking to boost their relative advantage and enhance their international prestige in a rapidly changing world. Much like monarchs, dynasties, and empires of past days that encouraged the cross-border recruitment of talent in order to bring into their respective jurisdictions the best artists, architects, musicians, scholars, poets, and innovators; governments today place special emphasis on the ability to draw human capital and agile prowess, as demonstrated by the individual narratives and legal categories we recounted in the previous pages. This frenzy of law and policy innovation stands in tension with the predictions of postnationalists and others who have repeatedly told us that the retreat of the regulatory state and the demise of its ability to devise and implement control over migration and borders (whether acting alone or in concert with local or regional partners) is imminent. The conventional wisdom is that extant borders are, or soon will be, traversed with the greatest of ease, to the extent that they will become all but meaningless, serving merely as archaic relics of a bygone era. As a corollary, it is argued that states are "losing control" over their regulatory authority to define who to include and who to exclude in the current age of globalization. 1 24 The domestic and comparative legal examples explored in our study challenge this linear and unidirectional story, revealing instead a far more dynamic and complex reality of multiple governmental, professional, and private actors actively engaged in a strategic and competitive scramble to lure and attract extraordinary talent across borders in a world of regulated mobility. It is here that managed and targeted migration programs play a significant role. On the ground and around the world, countries are reinventing and reinvigorating their entry and selection criteria in profound ways, in the process revising their outlook and responding to changed conditions in a more competitive environment. This has led immigration agencies (operating primarily, but not only, at the national level) to design recruitment policies that extend across borders, while engaging in inter-jurisdictional competition with other talent-recruiting countries. For both established and newly emerging centers of excellence, rapid changes in the landscape of skilled migration increase the pressure to engage in proactive recruitment of the "best crop" of what is perceived to be a relatively finite pool of potential migrants with abundant skills and talent. The reason is as simple as it is powerful. Unlike other factors of production, talent is distinct in that it is encapsulated in individuals. In other words, it is the human in "human capital" that makes it a unique and much-coveted factor of production and quality of life multiplier in the new knowledge economy, and that makes its accretion sufficiently dear so as to permit the selective stretching and bending of a country's otherwise strict admission and membership rules. Whether real or merely perceived, a perception of scarcity-of exuberant demand and systemic under-supply-further fuels the flames of the global race for talent. The next lesson to be learned from the examination of the new world of selective migration regimes is that the voluminous migration and globalization literature has too quickly dismissed the interests and actions of states as key actors in the international migration market. The literature has lost sight of instances of interdependent causality and inter-jurisdictional competition, as well as the prestige and dominance effects of attracting extraordinary talent-the very policies at the core of our analysis. Moving beyond familiar economic-centered explanations that look primarily to push-pull factors, short-term skills gaps and business cycles, our discussion has highlighted the importance of "bringing the state back" into the analysis. 125 This shift in perspective helps provide a more coherent explanation that accounts for the timing and the wellspring of production of complex laws and public policies that seek to encourage the immigration of extraordinary talent. If anything, the patterns of proactive recruitment of the so-called "best and brightest" acutely emphasize not only the privileged position that the new brand of savoir-faire globetrotting professionals hold in today's global race for talent (they are perceived to "know where they are wanted")126, but also the surprisingly creative ability of immigration officials and policymakers to re-adjust legal categories. This is often done through adjusting the minute technical details of targeted migration programs in response to competitive alterations or counter-measures adopted by other credible competitors in the global talent hunt. Once the highly-skilled begin to vote with their feet, the pressure on recruiting nations to provide them attractive settlement packages increases. 127 This leads us to our last point. Perhaps the most distinctive aspect of the rise of selective migration policies is the willingness by nations to go so far as to exploit the most sacrosanct resource under their control: the distribution of membership goods, including the valuable "prize" of citizenship. 128 Nations are increasingly using membership as a recruitment tool by offering fast-tracked access and other incentives to lure extraordinary talent as part of their effort to stock up on human capital while increasing their relative advantage and international reputation. The actual and symbolic benefits of luring super talent-be they the prospect of Olympic gold or the international laurels that come with winning a Nobel Prize or Fields medal-appear to be significant enough to warrant these new approaches.

#### The 1AC is an example of “Olympic Citizenry” – it creates a label of who is a desirable citizen and who isn’t by equating desirableness to potentiality of growth

Shachar & Hirschl ’13 (Ayelet Shachar, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, & Ran Hirschl, Dept. of Political Science, University of Toronto, “Recruiting "Super Talent:" The New World of Selective Migration Regimes” Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies Winter 2013)

The desire to be great, to make a lasting mark, is as old as civilization itself. Today, it is no longer measured exclusively by the size of a nation's armed forces, the height of its pyramids, the luxury of its palaces, or even the wealth of its natural resources. Governments in high-income countries and emerging economies alike have come to subscribe to the view that something else is required in order to secure a position in the pantheon of excellence: it is the ability to draw human capital, to become an "IQ magnet," that counts.' In this article, we develop an account of the significance-both practical and conceptual--of the rise of talent-centered selective migration regimes, exploring their innovative streak as well as the weighty ethical and legal puzzles they raise. 2 Just as they introduce restrictions on most other categories of entrants, 3 governments are proactively "picking winners" who are fast-tracked to citizenship based on their skills, innovation, and potential contribution to the country's stature, economic growth, and international reputation.4 From the wealthy and highly educated, to top scientists, elite athletes, world-class artists, and successful entrepreneurs and innovators, a citizenship-for-talent exchange-what we might call Olympic citizenship-is on the rise. Recent years have seen the proliferation of competitive and selective migration regimes that are tuned to facilitate the admission and retention of the "best and the brightest," a term of art regularly used by policymakers from London to Singapore, Ottawa to Brussels, to mention but a few examples. As the demand for highly-skilled migrants has intensified, a global race for talent has emerged. Across the world, countries are trying to outbid one another to attract migrants with extraordinary talent. They are promoting strategic citizenship grants, whereby membership is invested in exceptionally talented individuals with the expectation of a return. Legal strategies play a significant role in today's global race for talent by turning national goals onto actionable plans, and cogently manifesting the strategic interactions among the key contenders in today's fierce inter-jurisdictional competition for the best and brightest. These developments, which have received only scant attention in the literature despite their prevalence in the real world of law and policy, are the vanguard for larger changes relating to the ways in which countries are willing to redraw their membership boundaries in order to gain the presumed benefits associated with attracting an increasingly important subgroup of highly mobile professionals: those with super-talent, the cr6me de la creme of highly-skilled migrants.5 Just like the space race during the Cold War, Olympic citizenship-today's fast-paced arms race to recruit the world's most creative and brightest minds-represents the frontier of a new era: the upsurge of a more calculated approach to citizenship, whereby both sending and receiving countries place a premium on individuals with extraordinary ability and treat it as a basis for access to and eventual membership in the body politic. These emergent patterns represent a significant shift in the understanding of citizenship-turning an institution steeped in notions of equality, identity, and perhaps even sacrifice, into a recruitment tool used to bolster a nation's standing relative to its competitors. Countries entangled in the global race for talent are seeking to boost their relative advantage, positioning themselves as centers of excellence and gateways of innovation in a rapidly changing world. The significance of this new reality-the opportunities it creates and the risks it poses--remains largely unnoticed and under-theorized in the literature.6

### Visas (H-1B)

#### The H-1 B Visa is a neoliberal creation that exploits workers

**Lasker ‘09 (**John Lasker, freelance journalist from Ohio. He has written for Wired, Christian Science Monitor, Agence France-Press and the Buffalo News, “[How Tech Giants Outsource Labor on American Soil”,](file:///Users/mistytippets/Dropbox/Debate/AppData/Local/Temp/How%20Tech%20Giants%20Outsource%20Labor%20on%20American%20Soil%E2%80%9D%2C) <http://www.towardfreedom.com/labor/1803-how-tech-giants-outsource-labor-on-american-soil>)

In this case, corporate power, channeled through high-paid lobbyists and fat campaign contributions, strong-armed elected officials into passing laws that surreptitiously squash the labor rights of both US citizens and foreign workers alike. How these IT companies got away with this begins with a US visa named the H-1b. The visa was created in the early 1990s so US companies could hire foreign nationals with college degrees for up to six years of service. Foreigners began to apply en masse, and now, nearly two decades later, 600,000 are working in the country via the H-1b. According to Gene A. Nelson, who wrote An American Scam: How Special Interests Undermine National Security with Endless 'Techie' Gluts, it was Microsoft founder Bill Gates who pushed and paid Washington the greatest to pass the H-1b visa law. Gates accomplished this by perpetuating a myth that America was facing a looming shortage of IT pros, scientists and engineers. Gates' myth, states Nelson, earned Microsoft an extra $73 billion in profits between 1991 to 2005. Nearly all Microsoft H-1bs are paid a salary that's far below the prevailing wage for their position and skill. Some critics estimate that out of the 600,000 H-1bs in the US, a third are being used by IT companies for cheap labor. "The H-1b benefits many of the economic elite at the expense of the middle class," wrote Nelson. "The resultant labor gluts (caused by the H-1b) depresses wages and benefits, enhancing employer profitability." Essentially, the H-1b visa is another corporate-government neoliberal creation to undermine the wages and rights of the working class, both citizen and non-citizen alike. In the end, it's not an issue of foreign workers taking Americans' jobs, but of corporations being allowed to undercut the workforce by pressuring the government into applying policies that hurt workers for the benefit of the corporate elite. According to the National Science Foundation, over 600,000 science and engineering degrees are granted annually by American universities. Yet the US produces only 120,000 science and engineering jobs per year, and much less of late. Now add those numbers to the annual influx of 85,000 H-1bs (the annual allowed cap) and the NSF believes half a million Americans are losing their jobs to cheap foreign technical labor, while another half million Americans waste their science and engineering degrees.

## Impact

### Extinction

#### Capitalism causes extinction---internal contradictions erupt in imperialism, nuclear war, and ecocide

Foster ‘5 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Naked Imperialism," Monthly Review, Vol. 57 No. 4, 2005

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. **Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system**. Yet, **ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic**. In present world circumstances, **when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible.** As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[**W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet**—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, **but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction**. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “**The United States** has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and **remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons**—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” **The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other** (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) **has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue**.

#### Capitalism leads to resource wars, economic collapses, population crises, ecological degradation, kills value to life, and magnifies structural violence

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 145-147

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on Decembe . r i6, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism:'s The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven. For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure-myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage- outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope. In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

### Ecocide

#### Ecocide is an inevitable crisis of capital---claims of local changes and tech fixes ignore social totality underlying all interactions

Mészáros, 15

(István Mészáros is a Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. “The Necessity of Social Control” <http://monthlyreview.org/books/pb5380/>)

1.2 Capitalism and Ecological Destruction A DECADE AGO THE Walt Rostows of this world were still confidently preaching the universal adoption of the American pattern of “high mass-consumption” within the space of one single century. They could not be bothered with making the elementary, but of course necessary, calculations that would show them that in the event of the universalization of that pattern—not to mention the economic, social and political absurdity of such an idea—the ecological resources of our planet would be exhausted well before the end of that century several times over. After all, in those days top politicians and their Brain Trusts did not ride on the bandwagon of ecology but in the sterilized space-capsules of astronautical and military fancy. Nothing seemed in those days too big, too far, and too difficult to those who believed—or wanted us to believe—in the religion of technological omnipotence and of a Space Odyssey around the corner. Many things have changed in this short decade. The arrogance of military power suffered some severe defeats not only in Vietnam but also in Cuba and in other parts of the American hemisphere. International power relations have undergone some significant changes, with the immense development of China and Japan in the first place, exposing to ridicule the nicely streamlined calculations of escalation experts who now have to invent not only an entirely new type of multiple-player chess game but also the kind of creatures willing to play it, for want of real-life takers. The “affluent society” turned out to be the society of suffocating effluence, and the allegedly omnipotent technology failed to cope even with the invasion of rats in the depressing slums of black ghettos. Nor did the religion of Space Odyssey fare any better, notwithstanding the astronomical sums invested in it: even the learned Dr. Werner von Braun himself had to link up the latest version of his irresistible “yearning for the stars” with the prosaic bandwagon of pollution (so far, it seems, without much success). “The God that failed” in the image of technological omnipotence is now revarnished and shown around again under the umbrella of universal ecological concern. Ten years ago ecology could be safely ignored or dismissed as totally irrelevant. Today it must be grotesquely misrepresented and one-sidedly exaggerated so that people— sufficiently impressed by the cataclysmic tone of ecological sermons—can be successfully diverted from their burning social and political problems. Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans (especially Latin Americans) should not multiply at pleasure— not even at God’s pleasure, if they are Roman Catholics—for lack of restraint might result in “intolerable ecological strains.” That is, in plain words, it might even endanger the prevailing social relation of forces, the rule of capital. Similarly, people should forget all about the astronomical expenditure on armaments and accept sizeable cuts in their standard of living, in order to meet the costs of “environmental rehabilitation”: that is, in plain words, the costs of keeping the established system of expanding waste production well oiled. Not to mention the additional bonus of making people at large pay for, under the pretext of “human survival,” the survival of a socioeconomic system that now has to cope with deficiencies arising from growing international competition and from an increasing shift in favor of the parasitic sectors within its own structure of production. THAT CAPITALISM DE ALS this way—namely its own way—with ecology, should not surprise us in the least: it would be nothing short of a miracle if it did not. Yet the exploitation of this issue for the benefit of “the modern industrial state”—to use a nice phrase of Professor Galbraith’s—does not mean that we can afford to ignore it. For the problem itself is real enough, whatever use is made of it today. Indeed, it has been real for quite some time, though of course, for reasons inherent in the necessity of capitalist growth, few have taken any notice of it. Marx, however— and this should sound incredible only to those who have repeatedly buried him as an “irretrievably irrelevant ideologist of nineteenth-century stamp”—had tackled the issue, within the dimensions of its true social-economic significance, more than one hundred and twenty-five years ago. Criticizing the abstract and idealist rhetoric with which Feuerbach assessed the relationship between man and nature, Marx wrote: Feuerbach . . . always takes refuge in external nature, and moreover in nature which has not yet been subdued by men. But every new invention, every new advance made by industry, detaches another piece from this domain, so that the ground which produces examples illustrating such Feuerbachian propositions is steadily shrinking. The “essence” of the fish is its “existence,” water—to go no further than this one proposition. The “essence” of the freshwater fish is the water of a river. But the latter ceases to be the “essence” of the fish and is no longer a suitable medium of existence as soon as the river is made to serve industry, as soon as it is polluted by dyes and other waste products and navigated by steamboats, or as soon as its water is diverted into canals where simple drainage can deprive the fish of its medium of existence.6 This is how Marx approached the matter in the early 1840s. Needless to say, he categorically rejected the suggestion that such developments are inevitably inherent in the “human predicament” and that, consequently, the problem is how to accommodate ourselves7 to them in everyday life. He already fully realized then that a radical restructuring of the prevailing mode of human interchange and control is the necessary prerequisite to an effective control over the forces of nature that are brought into motion in a blind and ultimately self-destructive fashion precisely by the prevailing, alienated and reified mode of human interchange and control. Small wonder, then, that to present-day apologists of the established system of control his prophetic diagnosis is nothing but “parochial anachronism.” TO SAY THAT “THE COSTS of cleaning up our environment must be met in the end by the community” is both an obvious platitude and a characteristic evasion, although the politicians who sermonize about it seem to believe to have discovered the philosopher’s stone. Of course it is always the community of producers who meet the cost of everything. But the fact that it always must meet the costs does not mean in the least that it always can do so. Indeed, given the prevailing mode of alienated social control, we can be sure that it will not be able to meet them. Furthermore, to suggest that the already prohibitive costs should be met by “consciously putting aside a certain proportion of the resources derived from extra growth”—at a time of nil growth coupled with rising unemployment and rising inflation—is worse than Feuerbach’s empty rhetoric. Not to mention the additional problems necessarily inherent in increased capitalistic growth. And to add that “but this time growth will be controlled growth” is completely beside the point. For the issue is not whether we produce under some control, but under what kind of control; since our present state of affairs has been produced under the iron-fisted control of capital that is envisaged, by our politicians, to remain the fundamental regulating force of our life also in the future. And, finally, to say that “science and technology can solve all our problems in the long run” is much worse than believing in witchcraft; for it tendentiously ignores the devastating social embeddedness of present-day science and technology. In this respect, too, the issue is not whether we use science and technology for solving our problems—for obviously we must—but whether we succeed in radically changing their direction, which is at present narrowly determined and circumscribed by the selfperpetuating needs of profit maximization. These are the main reasons why we cannot help being rather skeptical about the present-day institutionalization of these concerns. Mountains are in labor and a mouse is born: the super-institutions of ecological oversight turn out to be rather more modest in their achievements than in their rhetoric of self-justification: namely Ministries for the Protection of Middle-Class Amenities.

### Inequality

#### Neolib causes radical polarization in income inequality

Fieldman, PhD, 11 (Glenn, Environmental Studies Associate Prof @ San Francisco State University, Program Coordinator & Advisor for ESSJ Concentration, “Neoliberalism, the production of vulnerability and the hobbled state: Systemic barriers to climate adaptation”, 6/9/11, Accessed 6/22/16, *Climate and Development, 3:2*, p. 165)

‘Inequality’ seems an inadequate descriptor for the global income and asset distribution of the neoliberal era. ‘Radical polarization’ might better indicate the size of the income gap between the richest and poorest fifths of the world’s population, which according to UN figures has widened at an accelerating pace in recent years. In 1960, the gap was 30:1; by 1998 it had widened to 78:1; by 2004 it was over 100:1. The pattern is replicated within countries: ‘the top 1 per cent of Americans now [2007] earn more than the bottom 95 per cent (up from 90 per cent just a year earlier)’. Asset concentration is a similar story: citing UN figures for 2006, Porritt says that globally, the top 10 per cent own 85 per cent of private wealth, while the bottom 50 per cent own 1 per cent. For developing countries, the UN estimates that the top 1 per cent of households own between 70 and 90 per cent of private wealth, while in the developed UK, the top 1 per cent own 25 per cent; and the bottom 50 per cent own 6 per cent (Porritt, 2007)

## Extensions

### Alt Solvency

#### We need a new political imaginary that can reawaken radical alternatives to combat the permanent state of warfare that neoliberalism engenders.

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In the current historical moment, the language of indiscriminate revenge and lawlessness seems to be winning the day. This is a discourse unconscious of its own dangerous refusal to acknowledge the important role that democratic values and social justice must play to achieve a truly unified response and to prevent the further killing of innocent people, regardless of their religion, culture, and place of occupancy in the world. Authoritarianism in this context encounters little resistance in its efforts to turn politics "into a criminal system and keeps working toward the expansion of the realm of pure violence, where its advancement can proceed unhindered."69 The greatest struggle faced by the American public is not terrorism, but a struggle on behalf of justice, freedom, and democracy for all of the citizens of the globe. This is not going to take place, as President Obama's policies will tragically affirm, by shutting down democracy, eliminating its most cherished rights and freedoms, and deriding communities of dissent.

American society is broken, corrupted by the financial elite, and addicted to violence and a culture of permanent war. The commanding institutions of American life have lost their sense of public mission, just as leadership at all levels of government is being stripped of any viable democratic vision. The United States is now governed by an economic and social orthodoxy informed by the dictates of religious and political extremists. Reform efforts that include the established political parties have resulted in nothing but regression, or forms of accommodation that serve to normalize the new authoritarianism and its war on terrorism. Politics has to be thought anew and must be informed by a powerful vision matched by durable organizations that include young people, unions, workers, diverse social movements, artists, intellectuals, and others. In part, this means [END PAGE 42] reawakening the radical imagination so as to address the intensifying crisis of history and agency, and engage the emotional and ethical registers of fear and human suffering. To fight the neoliberal counterrevolution, social movements need to create new public spaces along with a new language for enabling people to relate the self to public life, social responsibility, and the demands of global citizenship.

Instead of viewing the current crisis as a total break with the past that has nothing to learn from history, it is crucial for the American public to begin to understand how the past might be useful in addressing what it means to live in a democracy at a time when democracy is viewed as nothing more than a hindrance to the wishes and interests of the new extremists who now control the American government. The anti-democratic forces that define American history cannot be forgotten in the fog of political and cultural amnesia. State violence and terrorism have a long history in the United States, both in its foreign and domestic policies, and ignoring this dark period of history means that nothing will be learned from the legacy of a politics that has indulged authoritarian ideologies and embraced violence as a central measure of power, national identity, and patriotism.70

At stake here is the need to establish an alternative vision of a genuinely democratic society and a global order that prioritizes the safeguarding of basic civil liberties and human rights. Any struggle against terrorism must begin with the pledge on the part of the United States that it will work in conjunction with international organizations, especially the United Nations; that it will refuse to engage in any military operations that might target civilians; and that it will rethink those aspects of its foreign policy that have allied it with repressive nations in which democratic liberties and civilian lives are under siege. Once again, the United States has a long history of supporting terrorist groups, upholding authoritarian regimes, and imposing atrocities and barbarous acts of violence on others-the more recent and well-known being Abu Ghraib, the torture dungeons of CIA-controlled black sites, the Predator and Reaper drone strikes "on at least eight wedding parties," and the brutalizing murders committed by the twelve-member '"kill team ' that hunted Afghans 'for [END PAGE 43] sport.'" 71 Crimes overlooked will be repeated and intensified, just as public memory is rendered a liability in the discourse of revenge, demonization, and extreme violence.

The political left in the United States is too fractured and needs to develop a more comprehensive understanding of politics, oppression, and struggles as well as a discourse that rises to the level of ethical assessment and accountability. Against the new authoritarianism and its ever-evolving forms of terror, progressives of all stripes need an inspiring and energizing politics that embraces coalition building, rejects the notion that capitalism equals democracy, and challenges the stolid vocabulary of embodied incapacity stripped of any sense of risk, hope, and possibility. If the struggle against the war on terrorism, militarization, and neoliberalization is to have any chance of success, it is crucial for a loyal and dedicated left to embrace a commitment to economic and social justice, understanding the educative nature of politics, and the need to build a sustainable political formation outside of the established parties.72

The United States is in a new historical conjuncture, and as difficult as it is to admit, it is a conjuncture that shares more with the legacies of totalitarianism than with America's often misguided understanding of democracy. Under the merging of the surveillance state, warfare state, and the harsh regime of neoliberalism, we are witnessing the death of the old system of social welfare supports and the emergence of a new society marked by the heavy hand of the national security state. For the American public, this has meant not only the depoliticization of public discourse and a pervasive culture of fear, but extreme inequities in wealth, power, and income, and a new mode of governance now firmly controlled by the major corporations, banks, and financial elite. This is a politics in which there is no room for democracy, and no room for reformism. The time has come to name the current historical moment as representative of the "dark times" that Hannah Arendt warned us against. We must begin to transform politics at a systemic level through social movements in which the promise of a radical democracy can be reimagined in the midst of determined, collective struggles. The war on terrorism has morphed into [END PAGE 44] a new form of authoritarianism that imposes its own brand of terror and whose real enemy is not terrorism at all, but democracy itself.

#### Critical pedagogy comes first—analyzing the role of intellectual violence in subject formation is a prerequisite for connecting our research practices to non-violent social change. The aff’s repetition of political dogma does nothing to reverse the oncoming tide of fascism.

Henry GIROUX 16, English and Cultural Studies, McMaster University, AND Brad Evans, Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol [“Imagination warfare: targeting youths on the everyday battlefields of the 21st century,” *Social Identities*, Vol. 22, No. 3, 2016, p. 230-246, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

We need to learn to live with violence less through the modality of the sacred than through the critical lens of the profane. By this we mean that we need to appreciate our violent histories and how our subjectivities have been formed through a history of physical bloodshed. This requires more of a willingness to interrogate violence in a variety of registers (ranging from the historical and concrete to the abstract and symbolic) than it does a bending to discourses of fate and normalization. We need to acknowledge our own shameful compromises with the varied forces of violence. And we need to accept that intellectualism shares an intimate relationship with violence both in its complicity with violence and as an act of violence. There is an echo of the pornographic here not in the ethical detachment that now accompanies the spectacles of violence to which we are forced witness. We need then to reject what Leo Lowenthal has called the imperative to believe that ‘thinking becomes a stupid crime' (Lowenthal, 1987, pp. 181–1982). This does not require a return to the language of the Benjamin idea of ‘divine violence' as a pure expression of force regardless of its contestable claims to non-violent violence (Benjamin, 1986, pp. 277–300). We prefer instead to deploy the often abused term ‘critical pedagogy' as a meaningful political counter to vicissitudes of intellectual violence.

Intellectuals are continually forced to make choices (sometimes against our better judgments). The truth of course is that there are no clear lines drawn in the sand neatly separating what is left from what is right. And yet as Paolo Freire insisted, one is invariably drawn into an entire history of struggle the moment our critical ideas are expressed as force and put out into the public realm to the disruption of orthodox thinking. There is however a clear warning from history: our intellectual allegiances should be less concerned with ideological dogmatism. There is, after all, no one more micro-fascist or intellectually violent than the authenticating militant whose self-imposed vanguardism compels allegiance through unquestioning loyalty and political purity. To the charges here that critical pedagogy merely masks a retreat into cultural relativism, we may counter that there is no reciprocal relationship with that which doesn't respect difference while at the same time recognizing that pedagogy is an act of intervention. Pedagogy always represents a commitment to the future, and it remains the task of educators to make sure that the future points the way to a more socially just world, a world in which the discourses of critique and possibility in conjunction with the values of freedom, and equality function to alter, as part of a broader democratic project, the grounds upon which life is lived. This is hardly a prescription for either relativism or political indoctrination, but it is a project that gives education its most valued purpose and meaning, which in part is ‘to encourage human agency, not mold it in the manner of Pygmalion' (Aronowitz, 1998, p. 7).

Instead of accepting the role of the compromised intellectual as embodied in the likes of Levy and Ferguson, there is an urgent need for public intellectuals in the academy, art world, business sphere, media, and other cultural apparatuses to move from negation to hope. Now more than ever we need reasons to believe in this world. This places renewed emphasis on forms of critical pedagogy that enable citizens to reclaim their voices, speak out, exhibit ethical outrage and create the social movements, tactics, and public spheres that will reverse the growing tide of political fascism on all sides. Such intellectuals are essential to any viable notion of democracy, even as social well-being depends on a continuous effort to raise disquieting questions and challenges, use knowledge and analytical skills to address important social problems, alleviate human suffering where possible, and redirect resources back to individuals and communities who cannot survive and flourish without them. Engaged public intellectuals are especially needed at a time when it is necessary to resist the call to violence and its normalization through repetition.

Under the present circumstances, it is time to remind ourselves that critical ideas are a matter of critical importance. Those public spheres in which critical thought is nurtured provide the minimal conditions for people to become worldly, take hold of important social issues and alleviate human suffering as the means of making more equitable and just societies. Ideas are not empty gestures and they do more than express a free-floating idealism. Ideas provide a crucial foundation for assessing the limits and strengths of our senses of individual and collective agency and what it might mean to exercise civic courage in order to not merely live in the world, but to shape it in light of democratic ideals that would make it a better place for everyone. Critical ideas and the technologies, institutions and public spheres that enable them matter because they offer us the opportunity to think and act otherwise, challenge common sense, cross over into new lines of inquiry and take positions without standing still – in short, to become border crossers who refuse the silos that isolate and determine the future of thought. Some intellectuals refute the values of criticality. They don't engage in debates; they simply offer already rehearsed positions in which unsubstantiated opinion and sustained argument collapse into each other. It is time then for critical thinkers with a public interest to make pedagogy central to any viable notion of politics. It is time to initiate a cultural campaign in which the positive virtues of radical criticality can be reclaimed, courage to tell the truth be defended, and where learning is connected to social change. Our task in short is to demand a return of the political as a matter of critical urgency.

A global system that inflicts violence on young people all over the world cannot be supported. As Michael Lerner has argued, not only must the iniquitous and dangerous structural conditions for economic, political, and cultural violence be eliminated, but the subjective and psychological underpinnings of a hateful fundamentalism must be addressed and challenged through a public pedagogy that emphasizes an ethos of trust, compassion, care, solidarity, and justice – the opposite of the self-serving survival of the fittest ethos that now dominates the political landscape. Young people cannot inherit a future marked by fear, militarism, suicide bombers and a world in which the very idea of democracy has been emptied of any substantive meaning. Or if they do, then the destructive forces of nihilism and resentment will have truly have won the political argument. Creating alternative futures requires serious and sustained investment in arresting the cycle of violence, imagining better futures and styles for living amongst the world of peoples. It is to destroy the image of a violently fated world we have created for ourselves by taking pedagogy and education seriously, harnessing the power of imagination and equipping global youths with the confidence that the world can be transformed for the better.

### Alt Solves Visas

#### **The alternative is a pre-requisite to the affirmative – only with a critical analysis of the H1-B visa program can there be an ethical policy that doesn’t exploit immigrant labor** **Tannock ‘9** (Stuart Tannock “White-collar imperialisms: the H-1B debate in America, Social Semiotics” 2009, 19:3, 311-327)

In the wake of 11 September 2001, renewed attention has been given to the matter of American imperialism, from all sides of the political spectrum (Foster 2005). Much of this attention, however, has focused on the brutal and devastating forms of US military engagement and occupation overseas in Iraq and Afghanistan; little has been said of the more mundane, enduring and embedded forms of imperialism that continue to shape the everyday common-sense of American citizens and leaders alike. Imperial language, as Young (2005) notes, has two faces and shows up not just in the ugly and overtly racist ideologies of American national supremacy and infallibility, but in apparently more ‘‘benign,’’ ‘‘nurturing’’ and ‘‘reassuring’’ rhetoric as well the political rhetoric of welcoming and embracing immigrants to America, promoting and supporting skill, education and the growth of the knowledge economy, and the attractively clean, new economy fantasies of a comfortable and secure white-collar future for all Americans. The H-1B debate takes on its symbolic importance because it crystallizes conflicts and concerns within America about preserving and extending US power, privilege and prerogative. It is true, as H-1B critics argue, that there are many local reforms that could be made in the H-1B program that would better protect immigrant and labor rights. But the core issues at the heart of the H-1B debate can only be resolved by stepping back to examine critically the underlying -and shared -imperialist assumptions and agendas of H-1B combatants, in order to build a globally progressive, equitable and anti-imperialist labor and education politics in America today. On the pro-side of the H-1B debate, it is essential to recognize that it is not just those who espouse an anti-immigrant stance, but also those embracing an ostensibly pro-immigrant position, who may be promoting an inequitable and reactionary domestic and global political agenda. Challenging the imperialism of those in America who are happy to cream the world’s ‘‘best and brightest’’ in order to perpetuate US global hegemony should not lead to a demand for a closed-border Social Semiotics 323 immigration policy. It should, however, lead to an open critique of the grotesque inequality in control over global wealth that underlies the global flows of migration to the United States, and a refusal of any politics that seeks to perpetuate this inequality. It should lead to critique and rejection of the kinds of work that many high-skilled immigrants are asked to perform in America to help it maintain and extend its neo-liberal form of empire America’s massive militaryindustrial complex, for example, has long been heavily staffed by skilled immigrant labor. As immigrant rights advocates in the United States argue, it should lead to a critique of US military and economic interventions overseas that displace millions off their land, out of their jobs and homes, and into the rapidly expanding migration streams to the United States and other countries (Bacon 2008). It should lead to a discussion of how best to resolve the growing problem of a global brain-drain of which the United States remains the primary beneficiary and an insistence that national immigration policy be based not just on domestic but global considerations and responsibilities. Perhaps, too, it should lead to a critique of discrimination between high-skilled and low-skilled migrants in immigration policy: for not only can such education-based discrimination be argued to be unjust in its own right; it also provides a key mechanism through which the United States is able to engage in its selfish and selective global trawl for talent (Tannock 2009b, 2008). On the anti-H-1B side, it is imperative that progressive labor and education critics in America look beyond easy critiques of the open bigotry of the Lou Dobbs, John Tantons and Tom Tancredos of this world (Fernandes 2007). Yes, it is important to condemn the racism of these individuals, who oppose the H-1B and other immigration programs in the United States. But the more difficult, yet vital, critique is to recognize that, in many ways, these are only the most coarse and vulgar expressions of a racist imperialism that lies at the heart of virtually all labor and education development policy in contemporary America. The dominant knowledge economy vision in the country holds that the way for Americans to prosper and get ahead is to invest in higher education, become a magnet economy for attracting the lion’s share of the world’s high-skill, high-wage jobs, while letting lesser forms of employment flow inexorably to the foreign-born, whether in America or overseas. Challenging this form of imperialism should involve critiquing and rejecting domestic discrimination that consigns immigrants to second-tier forms of employment and second-class protections and rights. It should involve rejecting forms of high-skill employment that lead to the impoverishment and subordination of other peoples overseas the white-collar jobs that are at the heart of running America’s neo-liberal empire (CervantesGautschi 2007). Finally, it should lead to the questioning and rejection of a knowledge economy vision that views education, knowledge and skill primarily as vehicles and tools for ensuring the superiority, privileging and domination of one select group of individuals over all others.

### AT---Neolib Sustainable

#### Neoliberal capitalism is unsustainable

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Several crises of contemporary capitalism have reached or are reaching dangerous tipping points. They are rooted in a path of destructive and unsustainable development. They include extreme wealth and social inequality, job loss and dislocation from automation, and the existential threat posed by the ecological crisis. These interconnected crises are impacting everything and must be addressed together. And they can be. But standing in the way are Trump, the GOP and extreme right, and their main support base: monopoly-finance capital, the fossil fuel industry, and the military-industrial complex. Their agenda is intensifying these crises and must be defeated. This underscores the urgency to build the broadest resistance movement and radically elevate the fight for unity of our multi-racial, male-female, LGBTQ, immigrant and native-born working class and people. This is central to guarantee the working class emerges as leader of the entire movement to break the extreme right political stranglehold and open the way for the challenging, contested, and complex transition to a just, peaceful, eco-socialist society.

#### Capitalism is crises prone---collapse is inevitable

Li ’13 Minqi Li, “The 21st Century: Is There An Alternative (to Socialism)?” Science & Society: Vol. 77, January 2013, No. 1, pp. 10-43, doi: 10.1521/siso.2013.77.1.10

Over the past one and a half century, the long-term tendency towards rising wage, taxation, and environmental costs seem to have accelerated. The rising wage and taxation costs have reflected the long-term challenges from the “anti-systemic movements” (social democracy, national liberation movements, and “communism”), which forced the system’s ruling elites to make major concessions in the mid-20th century. The rising environmental costs have resulted from the relentless capital accumulation, which has greatly accelerated the depletion of the natural resources and the degradation of the global environment (Wallerstein, 2003, 57-66). As a result, the capitalist world system has been under great pressure to accelerate the pace of global industrial relocation. This has led to the dramatic expansion of the geographic zone of semi-periphery over the past quarter of a century. Most importantly, China and India, by serving as the centers of the latest round of global industrial relocation, have joined the rank of the semi-periphery. China’s per capita GDP has by now risen to about one-seventh of the US level and India could reach a similar relative level in about a decade. Given the enormous size of the Chinese and Indian population, then by around 2020, the world semi-periphery (defined as the geographical areas with per capita GDP around one-fifth of the level in the most advanced capitalist state) would have expanded to include about 60 percent of the world population. Can the capitalist world system survive such a massive expansion of the semi-periphery? With the massive expansion of the semi-periphery, there will inevitably be a major redistribution of the world surplus value. As less of the world surplus value is concentrated in the core, it will become increasingly difficult for the core states to finance capital accumulation in the leading industries. The core states will also have growing difficulty to maintain a large pool of “cadres”, the system’s skilled and managerial labor force or the “middle class”. Already, virtually all core capitalist countries are now confronted with insurmountable fiscal crises. Fiscal crisis, in essence, is the sign that capitalism in the core zone can no longer simultaneously provide favorable conditions of capitalist accumulation while maintaining “social peace” (that is, to secure the political loyalty of the middle classes) at home. It is widely recognized that the US hegemonic power is in irreversible decline, both in the sense that the relative economic position of the United States has been falling in the capitalist world system and in the more important sense that the United States is less willing and less able to regulate the system for the system’s long-term, common interest. The current expansion of the semi-periphery has obviously accelerated the decline of the US hegemonic power. More ominously for the capitalist world system, the great expansion of the semi-periphery has also made it much less likely and even impossible for a new hegemonic power to emerge by dramatically increasing the number of states that is relevant in the system-wide politics. This is shown by the expansion of the most high-profiled global policy making body from the so-called “G7” group to the so-called “G20” group. The capitalist world system is an inter-state system. The arrangement of the inter-state system is necessary for maintaining a balance of power between the state and capital in terms that are favorable for capital accumulation. However, the system also has a fatal flaw. As the system does not have a “world government”, there is no effective mechanism to secure and promote the system’s long-term, common interest (such as global peace, global macroeconomic management, construction of global social compromise, and global environmental management) and unrestrained inter-state competition could lead to the system’s self-destruction. Historically, the capitalist world system has relied upon the periodic hegemonic powers (the Netherlands in the 17th century, the United Kingdom in the 19th century, and the United States in the 20th century) as a proxy for the world government to regulate the system’s long-term, common interest. With the massive expansion of the semi-periphery, this historical mechanism required for the normal functioning of the capitalist world system begins to break down (Li 2008, 113-138).

### AT---Growth Inevitable

#### Large-scale economic growth is a historical aberration, and it’s decidedly non-linear

Korowicz ’11 David Korowicz, physicist & human-systems ecologist at Feasta & independent consultant, “On the cusp of collapse: complexity, energy, and the globalised economy,” Fleeing Vesuvius, 10/8/2011, http://fleeingvesuvius.org/2011/10/08/on-the-cusp-of-collapse-complexity-energy-and-the-globalised-economy/

We have come to regard continued economic growth as normal, part of the natural order of things. Recessions are viewed as an aberration caused by human and institutional weakness, the resumption of economic growth being only a matter of time. However, **in historical terms, economic growth is a recent phenomenon.** Angus **Maddison has estimated that Gross World Product** (GWP) **grew 0.32% per annum between 1500 and 1820; 0.94% (1820-1870); 2.12% (1870-1913); 1.82% (1913-1950); 4.9% (1950-1973); 3.17% (1973-2003), and 2.25% (1820-2003**). [3] We tend to see global economic growth in terms of change. We can observe it through increasing energy and resource flows, population, material wealth, complexity and, as a general proxy, GWP. This can be viewed from another angle. We could say that **the globalising growth economy has experienced a remarkably stable phase for the last 150 years**. For example**, it did not grow linearly by any percentage rate for any time, decline exponentially, oscillate periodically, or swing chaotically. What we see is a tendency to compound growth of a few percent per annum, with fluctuations around a very narrow band. At this growth rate, the system could evolve, unsurprisingly, at a rate to which we could adapt. The sensitivity felt by governments and society in general to very small changes in GDP growth shows that our systems have adapted to a narrow range of variation. Moving outside that range can provoke major stresses**. Of course small differences in aggregate exponential growth have major effects over time, but here we are concentrating upon the stability issue only. **The growth process itself has many push-pull drivers: in human behaviour; in population growth; in the need to maintain existing infrastructure and wealth against entropic decay; in the need to employ those displaced by technology; in the response to new problems; and in the need to service debt that forms the basis of our economic system**.

### AT---Growth Resilient

#### The global economy has some resiliencies but isn’t systemically concrete

Korowicz ’11 David Korowicz, physicist & human-systems ecologist at Feasta & independent consultant, “On the cusp of collapse: complexity, energy, and the globalised economy,” Fleeing Vesuvius, 10/8/2011, http://fleeingvesuvius.org/2011/10/08/on-the-cusp-of-collapse-complexity-energy-and-the-globalised-economy/

One of the great virtues of the global economy is that while factories may fail and links in a supply-chain break, the economy can quickly adapt by fulfilling its needs elsewhere or finding substitutes. **This is a measure of the resilience within the globalised economy and is a natural feature of a de-localised and networked complex adaptive system. But it is true only within a certain context. There are common platforms or ‘hub infrastructure’ that maintain the operation of the global economy and the operational fabric as a whole, and the collapse of such hubs is likely to induce systemic failure. Principal among these are the monetary and financial system, accessible energy flows, transport infrastructure, economies of scale and the integrated infrastructures of information technology and electricity**.

### AT---Human Nature

#### Human nature doesn’t make cap inev

Mészáros, 15

(István Mészáros is a Hungarian Marxist philosopher, and Professor Emeritus at the University of Sussex. “The Necessity of Social Control” <http://monthlyreview.org/books/pb5380/>) Henge

Naturally, the capital system did not arise from some mythical predestination, nor indeed out of the positive determinations and self-fulfilling requirements of socalled human nature. In fact, the latter happens to be as a rule circularly defined by the philosophers and political economists who adopt the standpoint of capital. They depict the world in terms of the value-imposing characteristics of the capitalist socioeconomic system, which in turn is supposed to have been “naturally” derived from “egotistic human nature” itself. Yet, no matter how powerful might be the influence of the ideologies that postulate capital’s origin and continued domination in such terms, neither the beginning nor the forceful persistence of this mode of social metabolic control can be made intelligible on the ground of an arbitrarily postulated and historically insurmountable natural necessity, not to mention the mythology of humanity’s predestination to an inescapably capitalist existence. And even if we consider human nature with its objectively given characteristics, as opposed to the just mentioned circular determination of capitalist values by a tendentiously projected “human nature” and vice versa, even that would be of no help to those who try to hypostatize the ahistorical origin and absolute permanence of the capital system on its basis. For real human nature is itself inherently historical and thus by no means suitable for arbitrarily freezing the dynamics of actual socioeconomic development so as to suit the convenience of capital’s mode of social metabolic reproduction. History, it goes without saying even if it is often tendentiously ignored, does not deserve its name unless it is conceived as open-ended in both directions, toward the past no less than in the direction of the future. Significantly, those who want to close off the irrepressible dynamics of historical development toward the future end up with the necessity of doing the same thing also in the direction of the past, otherwise they would not be able to complete the required ideological circle. And this is true by no means only of minor theories conceived from the standpoint of capital but also of the outstanding representatives of this approach, like Hegel. For the monumental scheme of the German philosopher—the consciously pursued task of gaining the necessary insight into what he unambiguously calls “the true Theodicaea, the justification of God in History”29—claims to put before the reader the grand design of the World Spirit’s timelessly self-anticipating self-realization. It is telling that this grand a priori design, which must be closed off toward the future, culminates in the Hegelian philosophy of history at a stage that happens to be none other than the dominance of capitalist and imperialist Europe, described as “absolutely the end of history.” And since the historical movement must also be closed off in the direction of the past in order to remain perversely consistent to its ideological ground of future-denying determination, the claimed “true Theodicaea” as a whole must be depicted by Hegel as a supra-historical process of disclosing—as we have seen in chapter 1 of Beyond Capital—the “eternally present.” The present of the World Spirit which “always has been,” and can only be properly understood if it is mirrored, in the words of Hegel himself, by the philosophical embodiment of the “dialectical circle.”

### AT---Innovation

#### Growth breeds systemic complexity which reduces marginal returns and restricts innovation

Korowicz ’11 David Korowicz, physicist & human-systems ecologist at Feasta & independent consultant, “On the cusp of collapse: complexity, energy, and the globalised economy,” Fleeing Vesuvius, 10/8/2011, http://fleeingvesuvius.org/2011/10/08/on-the-cusp-of-collapse-complexity-energy-and-the-globalised-economy/

**Complexity can be measured in several ways — as the number of connections between people and institutions, the intensity of hierarchical networks, the number of distinct products produced and the extent of the supply-chain networks required to produce them, the number of specialised occupations, the amount of effort required to manage systems, the amount of information available and the energy flows required to maintain them. By all these measures, economic growth has been associated with increasing complexity**. [4] As a species, **we had to become problem solvers to meet our basic needs, deal with status anxiety and respond to the new challenges presented by a dynamic environment**. The problem to be solved could be simple such as getting a bus or buying bread; or it could be complex, such as developing an economy’s energy infrastructure. **We tend to exploit the easiest and least costly solutions first. We pick the lowest hanging fruit or the easiest extractable oil first. As problems are solved new ones tend to require more effort and complex solutions. A solution is framed within a network of constraints. One of the system constraints is set by the operational fabric, comprising the given conditions at any time and place which support system wide functionality. For modern developed economies this includes functioning markets, financing, monetary stability, operational supply-chains, transport, digital infrastructure, command and control, health services, research and development infrastructure, institutions of trust and socio-political stability. It is what we casually assume does and will exist, and which provides the structural foundation for any project we wish to develop. Our solutions are also limited by knowledge and culture, and by the available energetic, material, and economic resources available to us.** The formation of solutions is also shaped by the interactions with the myriad other interacting agents such as people, businesses and institutions. **These add to the dynamic complexity of the environment in which the solution is formed, and thus the growing complexity is likely to be reinforced as elements co-evolve together.** As a result, the process of **economic growth and complexity has been self-reinforcing**. The growth in the size of the networks of exchange, the operational fabric and economic efficiencies all provided a basis for further growth. **Growing complexity provided the foundation for developing even more complex integration.** In aggregate, as the operational fabric evolves in complexity it provides the basis to build more complex solutions. The net **benefits of increasing complexity are subject to declining marginal returns** — in other words, **the benefit of rising complexity is eventually outweighed by its cost. A major cost is environmental destruction and resource depletion. There is also the cost of complexity itself. We can see this in the costs of managing more complex systems, and the increasing cost of the research and development process**. [5] **When increased complexity begins to have a net cost, then responding to new problems arising by further increasing complexity may be no longer viable. An economy becomes locked into established processes and infrastructures, but can no longer respond to shocks or adapt to change. For the historian Joseph Tainter, this is the context in which earlier civilisations have collapsed**. [6]

### AT---Self Correcting

#### Growth intrinsically can’t solve itself – every expansion of capital by necessity becomes the justification for further expansion. Even if some can remove themselves from exploitation, someone else will always be ready to take their place.

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 41-3

The depth of Marx’s insight should be appreciated: **capital is quantitative in its core, and imposes the regime of quantity upon the world: this is a ‘necessity’ for capital**. But capital is equivalently intolerant of necessity; **it constantly seeks to go beyond the limits that it itself has imposed, and so can neither rest nor find equilibrium**: it is irremediably self-contradictory. **Every quantitative increase becomes a new boundary, which is immediately transformed into a new barrier. The boundary/barrier ensemble then becomes the site of new value and the potential for new capital formation,** which then becomes another boundary/barrier, and so forth and on into infinity — at least in the logical schemata of capital. Small wonder that the society formed on the basis of producing for the sake of capital before all else is restlessly dynamic, that it introduces new forms of wealth, and continually makes the past forms obsolete, that it is obsessed with change and acquisition — and that it is a disaster for ecologies. Since each boundary/barrier is a site for commodity formation, **this becomes the prescription for the ‘generalized commodity production’ that is one of capital’s hallmarks**. Needless to say, the process does not occur neatly, as though capitalists sat around and selected their spots for new commodities. To some degree, of course, they do — imagine network ex­ecutives trying to develop new sitcoms, or the auto manufacturers a new line of four-wheel drives. But the more interesting examples are those where the **unplanned** and more or less spontaneous **actions of the system create novel conjunctures, which are then seized upon as new places for profitable activity.** The prospects, dear to capitalists, of making businesses out of trading pollution credits or the pharmaceutical industry’s search for new antibiotics to meet the new diseases unleashed by ecological destabilization itself are examples of this kind. **The constant creation of anxieties and needs by the restless movement of the system is constantly funnelled into the circuits of new commodity activity.** Does capitalism create an isolated, anxiety-ridden self whose survival requires being placed upon a market? Well, then, capital will also step in to create commodities to service this tensely narcissistic state of being — articles of fashion and image, with technologies to service these and a cultural apparatus to go along — in the case of fashion, say a whole range of magazines, photographic studios, advertising agencies, public relations firms, psychotherapies, etc, etc. **Capital’s regime of profitability is one of permanent instability and restlessness**. Even in the ruling class, no one ‘rules’ without perpetually proving himself, and the CEO must not only produce profit but more importantly, increase the rate of profit, or be swiftly tossed aside. One cannot rest content with the given, but must constantly try to expand it. **Growth is simply equated with survival as a capitalist, for anyone who fails to grow will simply disappear, his assets acquired by another. No matter how much one has, one never really has anything**: everything must be proved to exist anew the next day. Hence that well-known trait of the bourgeoisie: no matter how rich they become, they always need to become richer. **All the fabulous ‘growth’ of the last decade has not, by one iota, reduced the drive to accumulate still more, nor can it ever so long as capital reigns**. The sense of having and possessing dominates all others, precisely because its reality can never be secured. Strictly speaking, **individuals can step off this wheel — make their fortune and retire** to raise polo ponies or cabbages. **But they cease thereby being personifications of capital, and others immediately step forward to take their role**.

### AT---Perm

#### Perm’s co-opted---causes extinction

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 2-5

The fable provides an intriguing persp ective on freedom and autonomy. The golem has no freedom: it is the rabbi who brings it to life and sentences it to death. Yet by returning the creature to earth, the rabbi holds the golem accountable for the destruction it wrought despite not being free. This is the basic premis e of this book. We are not free, yet we are autonomous. We are constrained by the historical circumstances into which we are born, along with the institutions and structures that contain us. Nonetheless, each and every one of us also participates in and thereby confirms the legitimacy of those selfsame institutions and structures that dominate us, along with the violence they sustain.3 In this way, we are both the rabbi creator and the creature creation. Insofar as we are socially constituted, we are constrained by the historical and institutional forces that construct us. As political agents, we realize our autonomy as we interrupt and contest the historical and institutional conditions that regulate and organize the frames of reference through which we think and act. This structure of rupture and continuity is the modern narrative par excellence. Fredric Jameson neatly summarizes the narrative condition of modernity as the dialectic between the modality of rupture that inaugurates a new period and the definition of that new period in turn by continuity.4 The ironical outcome, as I describe it in the pages that follow, is that despite the narrative category driving change in the modern world, everything continues to stay the same-perhaps because what this narrative produces is a virulent strain of amnesia. Every change or historical rupture contains within it the dialectical narrative structure of modernity such that the New and the period it launches into existence are mere ritual. What persists is the condition of violence embedded in neoliberal capitalism as it robs each and every one of us (other species and ecosystems included) of a future. The narrative of modernity and the optimistic feeling of newness it generates are merely a distraction. Distractions such as decarbonizing the free-market economy, buying carbon offsets, handing out contraceptives to poor women in developing countries, drinking tap water in place of bottled water, changing personal eating habits, installing green roofs on city hall, and expressing moral outrage at British Petroleum (BP) for the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, although well meaning, are merely symptomatic of the uselessness of free-market "solutions" to environmental change. Indeed, such widespread distraction leads to denial. With the proclamation of the twenty- first century to be the era of climate change, the Trojan horse of neoliberal restructuring entered the political arena of climate change talks and policy, and a more virulent strain of capital accumulation began . For this reason, delegates from the African nations, with the support of the Group of 77 (developing countries), walked out of the 2009 United Nations (UN) climate talks in Copenhagen, accusing rich countries of dragging their heels on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and destroying the mechanism through which this reduction can be achieved-the Ky oto Protocol. In the absence of an internationally birfding agreement on emissions reductions, all individual actions taken to reduce emissions-a flat global carbon tax, recycling, hyb rid cars, carbon offsets, a few solar panels here and there, and so on-are mere theatrics. In this book, I argue that underpinning the massive environmental changes happening around the world, of which climate change is an important factor, is an unchanging socioeconomic condition (neoliberal capitalism), and the magnitude of this situation is that of a political crisis. So, at the risk of extending my literary license too far, it is fair to say that the human race is currently in the middle of an earth-shattering historical moment. Glaciers in the Himalayas, Andes, Rockies, and Alps are receding. The social impact of environmental change is now acute, with the International Organization for Migration predicting there will be approximately two hundred million environmental refugees by 2050, with estimates expecting as many as up to one billion.5 We are poised between needing to radically transform how we live and becoming extinct. Modern (postindustrial) society inaugurated what geologists refer to as the ''Anthropocene age;' when human activities began to drive environmental change, replacing the Holocene, which for the previous ten thousand years was the era when the earth regulated the environment. 6 Since then people have been pumping GHGs into the atmosphere at a faster rate than the earth can reabsorb them. If we remain on our current course of global GHG emissions, the earth's average climate will rise 3°C by the end of the twenty-first century (with a 2 to 4.5° probable range of uncertainty) . The warmer the world gets, the less effectively the earth's biological systems can absorb carbon. The more the earth's climate heats up, the more carbon dioxide (C02) plants and soils will release; this fe edback loop will further increase climate heating. When carbon feedback is factored into the climate equation, climate models predict that the rise in average climate temperature will be 6°C by 2100 (with a 4 to 8°C probable range of uncertainty) .7 For this reason, even if emissions were reduced from now on by approximately 3 percent annually, there is only a fifty-fifty chance that we can stay within the 2°C benchmark set by the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 2007. However, given that in 2010 the world's annual growth rate of atmospheric carbon was the largest in a decade, bringing the world's C02 concentrations to 389.6 parts per million (ppm) and pushing concentrations to 39 percent higher than what they were in 1750 at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution (approximately 278 ppm), and that there is no sign of growth slowing, then even the fifty-fifty window of opportunity not to exceed 2°C warming is quickly closing. If we continue at the current rate of GHG emissions growth, we will be on course for a devastating scenario.8 We need to change course now.9 Climate change poses several environmental problems, many of which now have a clear focus. The scientific problem: How can the high amounts of C02 in the atmosphere causing the earth's climate to change be lowered to 350 ppm? The economic problem: How can the economy be decarbonized while addressing global economic disparities? The social problem: How can human societies change their climate-altering behaviors and adapt to changes in climate?10 The cultural problem: How can commodity culture be reigned in? The problem policymakers face: What regulations can be introduced to inhibit environmental degradation, promote GHG reductions, and assist the people, species, and ecosystems most vulnerable to environmental change? The political problem is less clear, however, perhaps because of its philosophical implications. Political philosophy examines how these questions are dealt with and the assumptions upon which they are premised. It studies the myriad ways in which individuals, corporations, the world's leaders, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and communities respond to climate change and the larger issue of environmental change characteristic of the Anthropocene age. More important, political philosophy considers how these responses reinforce social and economic structures of power. In light of this consideration, how do we make the dramatic and necessary changes needed to adapt equitably to environmental change without the economically powerful claiming ownership over the collective impetus and goals that this historical juncture presents? By drawing attention to the political problem of equality in the context of environmental change, I need to stress that I am not a market Luddite; rather, I am critical of the neoliberal paradigm of economic activity that advances deregulation, competition, individualism, and privatization, all the while rolling back on social services and producing widespread inequities and uneven patterns of development and social prosperity. I am also not intending to make negotiable the "non-negotiable planetary preconditions that humanity needs to respect in order to avoid the risk of deleterious or even catastrophic environmental change at continental to global scales:'11 Indeed, my argument is that by focusing too much on free-market solutions to the detriment of the world's most vulnerable (the poor, other species, ecosystems, and future generations), we make these preconditions negotiable: the free market is left to negotiate our future for us.

#### Perm fractures universality and destroys agency

Parr ’13 Adrian Parr, The Wrath of Capital, 2013, p. 5-6

The contradiction of capitalism is that it is an uncompromising structure of negotiation. It ruthlessly absorbs sociohistorical limits and the challenges these limits pose to capital, placing them in the service of further capital accumulation. Neoliberalism is an exclusive system premised upon the logic of property rights and the expansion of these rights, all the while maintaining that the free market is self-regulating, sufficiently and efficiently working to establish individual and collective well-being. In reality, however, socioeconomic disparities have become more acute the world over, and the world's "common wealth;' as David Bollier and later Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri note, has been increasingly privatized.12 In 2010, the financial wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals (with investable assets of $1 to $50 million or more [all money amounts are in U.S. dollars] ) surpassed the 2007 pre-financial crisis peak, growing 9.7 percent and reaching $42.7 trillion. Also in 2010 the global population of high-networth individuals grew 8.3 percent to 10.9 million.13 In 2010, the global population was 6.9 billion, of whom there were l,ooo billionaires; 80,000 ultra-high-net-worth individuals with average wealth exceeding $50 million; 3 billion with an average wealth of $10,000, of which 1.1 billion owned less than $1,000; and 2.5 billion who were reportedly "unbanked'' (without a bank account and thus living on the margins of the formal financial system) .14 In a world where financial advantage brings with it political benefits, these figures attest to the weak position the majority of the world occupies in the arena of environmental and climate change politics. Neoliberal capitalism ameliorates the threat posed by environmental change by taking control of the collective call it issues forth, splintering the collective into a disparate and confusing array of individual choices competing with one another over how best to solve the crisis. Through this process of competition, the collective nature of the crisis is restructured and privatized, then put to work for the production and circulation of capital as the average wealth of the world's high-net-worth individuals grows at the expense of the maj ority of the world living in abject poverty. Advocating that the free market can solve debilitating environmental changes and the climate crisis is not a political response to these problems; it is merely a political ghost emptied of its collective aspirations

### AT---Poverty

#### Cap maximizes wealth centralization---key internal link to poverty

Wolff ’11 Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “Capitalism and Poverty,” MR Zine, 11/10/2011, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/wolff111011.html

Deepening poverty has multiple causes, but the capitalist economic system is major among them. First, **capitalism's periodic crises always increase poverty, and the current crisis is no exception**. More precisely, **how capitalist corporations operate, in or out of crisis, regularly reproduces poverty. At the top of every corporation, its major shareholders** (15-20 or fewer) **own controlling blocs of shares. They select a board of directors** -- usually 15-20 individuals -- **who run the corporation. These two tiny groups make all the key decisions: what, how, and where to produce and what to do with the profits.** Poverty is one result of this capitalist type of enterprise organization. For example, **corporate decisions generally aim to lower the number of workers or their wages or both. They automate, export** (outsource) jobs, **and replace higher-paid workers by recruiting** domestic and foreign **substitutes willing to work for less**. These normal corporate actions generate rising poverty as the other side of rising profits. When poverty and its miseries "remain always with us," workers tend to accept what employers dish out to avoid losing jobs and falling into poverty. **Another major corporate goal is to control politics. Wherever all citizens can vote, workers' interests might prevail over those of directors and shareholders in elections. To prevent that, corporations devote portions of their revenues to finance politicians, parties, mass media, and "think tanks." Their goal is to "shape public opinion" and control what government does**. They do not want Washington's crisis-driven budget deficits and national debts to be overcome by big tax increases on corporations and the rich. Instead public discussion and politicians' actions are kept focused chiefly on cutting social programs for the majority. Corporate goals include providing high and rising salaries, stock options, and bonuses to top executives and rising dividends and share prices to shareholders. **The less paid to the workers who actually produce what corporations sell, the more corporate revenue goes to satisfy directors, top managers, and major shareholders.** Corporations also raise profits regularly by increasing prices and/or cutting production costs (often by compromising output quality). **Higher priced and poorer-quality goods are sold mostly to working people. This** too **pushes them toward poverty just like lower wages and benefits and government service cuts.**

#### Poverty’s systemically understated under capitalism

Wolff ’11 Richard D. Wolff, Professor of Economics Emeritus, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and currently a Visiting Professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University in New York, “Capitalism and Poverty,” MR Zine, 11/10/2011, http://mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2011/wolff111011.html

The US Census Bureau recently reported what most Americans already knew. **Poverty is deepening. The gap between rich and poor is growing.** Slippage soon into the ranks of the poor now confronts tens of millions of Americans who long thought of themselves as securely "middle class." **The reality is worse than the Census Bureau reports**. Consider that the Bureau's poverty line in 2010 for a family of four was $22,314. Families of four making more than that were not counted as poor. That poverty line works out to $15 per day per person for everything: food, clothing, housing, medical care, transportation, education, and so on. **If you have more than $15 per day per person in your household to pay for everything each person needs, the Bureau does not count you as part of this country's poverty problem**. So **the real number of** US **citizens** living **in poverty** -- more reasonably defined -- **is much larger** today than the 46.2 million reported by the Census Bureau. It is thus much higher **than** the **15.1 per cent** of our people the Bureau sees as poor. **Conservatively estimated, about one in four Americans already lives in real poverty.** **Another one in four is or should be worried about joining them soon. Long-lasting and high unemployment now drains away income from families and friends of the unemployed who have used up savings as well as unemployment insurance. As city, state, and local governments cut services and supports, people will have to divert money to offset part of those cuts. When Medicare and if Social Security benefits are cut, millions will be spending more to help elderly parents**. Finally, **poverty looms for those with jobs as** (1) **wages are cut or fail to keep up with rising prices, and** (2) **benefits -- especially pensions and medical insurance -- are reduced.**

### AT---Transition Wars

#### Once the transition is underway, autonomous communities act together in resistance to capital – capitalism will be on the ropes, faced with resistance on an unprecedented scale

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 236-38

If such events as O’Connor envisions were to come to pass, they would not yet be ecosocialism, but they would form a kind of self-generative and non-linear dialectic that can rapidly accelerate the motion toward eco­socialism. After all, it is the ‘tens of thousands of local and regional experiments and practices’ who would have had to join with communities of activation to make this possible, and whose power would be accordingly magnified by it. And being magnified, the Zapatistas, and the Gaviotistas, and the Indymedia centres that connect them, and the politicized collectives of farmers from around the world, and the teacher’s associations, and the ecologically radicalized fractions of the labour movement, and the little Bruderhof-like manufacturing collectives making ecologically sane products with the aid of local credit unions, and **all the ten thousand locally origin­ating but universally striving community formations** — all **would come together in solidarity to make such an event, and**, in its aftermath, **to press for further transformation**. There is no point in predicting a scenario according to which this will expand, beyond the condition that it occur in the context of capital’s in­capability of regulating the ecological crisis. At some time within this span, the communities arising from the process may be imagined to grow to a point of relative autonomy such that they can begin providing material support for activists, with bases of operation and — in the case of those considerable number of communities producing food, wool, hemp, solar technology and so on — the actual means of subsistence for people engaged in revolutionary struggle. It must also be presumed — a large but feasible order that these people will have developed the spiritual and psychological strength enabling them to go forward. For there should be no mistake: the struggle for ecosocialism is no technical or voluntaristic process, but a radical transforming of self as well as world to link up in ever-widening and deepening solidarity Here is where post-patriarchal values will come forward, radicalizing human being itself for the struggle. Now the movement of events is self-sustaining, rapid and dramatic. **Communities of place and of praxis increasingly coalesce to form miniature societies, and these enter into relations with others** both inside and outside the national boundary. Capital may be expected to respond with heightened efforts at repression. A heroic phase begins, with much sacrifice. The awe­some might of **the capital system now encounters a set of factors it has never dealt with before:**  • **The forces against it are both numerous and dispersed**. • **They operate with changed needs, and on the basis of a kind of production capable of sustaining itself** with small inputs and labour-intensive technologies; and they have secure bases and ‘safe houses’ in the intentional communities of resistance, now extending across national boundaries. • Their many allies in the interstices of the mainstream society are capable of forming support groups and ‘underground railroads’. • As with all successful forms of revolutionary protest, **the oppositional forces are capable of shutting down normal production** through strikes, boycotts, and mass actions. • **The forces of capital have lost confidence, and are further undermined by support for the revolution** within the alternative parties and their various niches in the state. This extends to armies and police. When the first of these lays down their arms and joins the revolution, the turning point is reached. **The behaviour of the revolutionaries is spiritually superior, and the examples they set are given credibility and persuasiveness by the brute facts of the crisis and the gathering realization that what is at stake here is not so much the redistribution of wealth as the sustenance of life itself.** Thus it could be that in an increasingly hectic period, millions of people take to the streets, and join together in global solidarity — with each other, with the communities of resistance, and with their comrades in other nations — bringing normal social activity to a halt, petitioning the state and refusing to take ‘no’ for an answer, and driving capital into ever smaller pens. **With defections mounting and the irreducible fact all around that the people demand a new beginning in order to save the planetary ecology, the state apparatus passes into new hands**, the expropriators are expropriated, **and the 500-year regime of capital falls**.

#### The transition away from capitalist society doesn’t entail the violence described in your cheesy impact turns – the first step toward change is a radical rejection of reformist half-steps that only buy time for capital.

Kovel ‘2 Joel Kovel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard College, 2002, The Enemy of Nature, p. 167-69

**Do we call**, then, **for the immediate abolition of money, wage labour and commodity exchanges**, along with all market relations and businesses? **Absolutely not: measures of this sort** recapitulate the Pol Pot or Stalinist solution, and they ride as heavily over humanity and nature as did slavery. They **are forms of violence** that tear apart ecosystems human and natural alike. **An ecocentric people will not need to repress the accumulation of capital because such a people will be free from exploitation**, and the drive to accumulate will not arise from the ground of freely associated labour. The problem is to get to that ground, in the course of which present ways of production need to be traversed and transformed and not knocked over. But first it must be envisioned. **To create that vision, a radical rejection of capitalist ways is necessary**. We should reject, therefore, the phoney tolerance espoused by green economics toward preserving a ‘diversity’ that gives a substantial role to capitalist firms. One might as well try to raise weasels and chickens in the same pen. **In this real world, all forms of capital**, **including the oxymoronic ‘natural capital’ that is supposed to rescue us, are swiftly caught up in the flood-tide of accumulation.** My intention is not at all to disparage the virtue of **a small economic or community unit**. Quite the contrary: as we shall explore in the last chapter, small-size enterprises are an essential part of the path towards an ecological society, as well as the building blocks of that society There is a question, rather, about perspective: whether the small units are to be capitalist or socialist in orientation, and whether they are seen as ends in themselves or integrated with a more universal vision. For both of these sets of choices, I would argue for the latter position: the units **need to be consistently anti-capitalist, and** they need **to exist in a dialectic with the whole of things**. For human beings are not rodents, who live in burrows. Nor are we insects, creatures who thrive at a small scale, because of which they cannot use skeletons or lungs, or any of the organs necessary for larger organisms. Humans are, by nature, large, expansive, universalizing creatures. We need different degrees of realization to express our being, grandeur as well as intimacy, the large grain as well as the fine. We need the equivalent of skeletons to support us, and specialized organs to meet our species’ needs. Thus I should think that in an ecologically realized world there would exist significant sectors of large-scale activity, for example, rail and communica­tions systems and power grids, just as world cities would flourish as sites of universality. I hope I may be forgiven for insisting that New York, Paris, London and Tokyo not be taken down in an ecological society, but more fully realized; and that the nightmare cities of global capital the Jakartas and Mexico Citys — will be restored to similar states of being. This restoration in its many forms comes back to the question of the emancipation of labour, and not just waged labour, but all compulsive forms of our creativity, including most definitely the alienation of women’s house­hold work, and the stifling of children in schools. The fact is that **the great bulk of humankind are throttled in their humanity**, and overcoming this is far more significant than any tinkering from above with a corrupt economy. This truth is either lost on the ecological economists or mystified out of existence. **Any sense of real people, and real popular struggle, are abstracted from** mandarin texts such as An Introduction to **Ecological Economics**. Yes, **the authors** do **call for** a ‘living democracy’, which is certainly a good thing. But life is struggle, especially in a class society where antagonisms are built into the social process. Yet for Ecological Economics, living democracy is **‘a** broad **process to discuss and achieve consensus on** these **important issues**. This is distinct from the polemic and divisive political process that seems to hold sway in many countries today’ Thus we need ‘to engage all members of society in a substantive dialogue about the future they desire and the policies and instruments necessary to bring it about’.25 The image evoked is like one of the official murals that decorate post offices in which the European settlers/invaders are solemnly greeted by the Indians to deliberate on matters of mutual concern. **Where sweatshops re-impose slavery within the capitalist system while untold millions of people in the middle are consigned to mall culture and the rat race, consensus is not exactly an illuminating term, and some divisive polemics**, well-chosen and coupled with proper action, **can do a great deal of good. False reconciliation is not the path out of a world as unjust as this. The demand for justice is the pivot about which labour will be emancipated**; it must also be a foundation of overcoming the ecological crisis.

### AT: You Cause Trump

#### This mindset just produces more Trumps

Brown 17—Professor of Political Science at the University of California Berkeley (Wendy Brown 4/25/17, “Interview – Wendy Brown,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2017/04/25/interview/>, Accessed 5/26/17,)

*Recently, post-structuralism has been charged with having significantly contributed to the post-truth world and enabling the rise of figures like Donald Trump. How can critical theory be made attractive to people who reject the premises of post-structuralism?*

It is very funny to imagine that post-structuralism was so powerful and influential that it produced Donald Trump’s orientation towards truth. I wish it were true that post-structuralism had that much power, as we actually could have produced a better world and it would have nothing to do with a post-truth world. What’s really being said here? Those people who never liked or fully understood these challenges to foundational truths –– have now found a correspondence between the unsettling of truth’s foundation at the philosophical level and the lack of interest in facticity among a certain current of politicians and journalists. Correspondence is not a very interesting claim unless you can figure out why that correspondence might be there.

I’m still enough of a Marxist to understand post-structuralism as having emerged when the foundations of polities, economies, societies and their truths were beginning to shake. The gold standard was floating (as currencies were no longer tied to anything secure); authenticity was coming into question in popular and mainstream culture; religion had been rendered not as absolute truth but as a private, relatively arbitrary choice; and the economy as a whole was becoming increasingly detached from products and production. Post-structuralism emerged within an order in which truth is already unmoored in all kinds of spaces and places. Poststructuralism articulates this at a philosophical level. However, to me one of the most important political implications that come out of post-structuralism is this: the truths that organize human societies are determined by human beings. Their foundation cannot be sought in God, nature, or tradition, or history. And if they are going to be democratic truths, then they must come from human deliberation. Poststructuralist insight into the humanly fashioned character of governing truths does not mean it’s impossible to settle how we ought to live together. It simply means that a crucial part of democracy is determining this together, deliberately and intentionally.

This leaves one matter untouched, which is the question of factual truth. Is climate change real or is it bogus? What about scientific facticity? Post-structuralist thought never argued against facticity; rather, it argues that facts are always discursively organized and interpreted. Post-structuralists (such as Derrida, Foucault and others) never claimed that everything was simply invented. Their claim is a more important and interesting one: human beings cannot simply name truth without doing so through language, and language is not just descriptive or nominative, but always interpretive. We describe climate change or narrate an experience in a particular way; we include and omit, we frame and we emphasize; we metaphorize and compare. All of this makes post-structuralist accounts of truth extremely important to our moment. Because what post-structuralism helps us to do is to show how certain truths come to govern and how others are dispatched; how truth is generated and produced, and how facts are interpreted. Nothing could be more important right now.

# Aff Answers

### No Root Cause

#### Capitalism’s not the root cause of anything

Larrivee ‘10— PF ECONOMICS AT MOUNT ST MARY’S UNIVERSITY – MASTERS FROM THE HARVARD KENNEDY SCHOOL AND PHD IN ECONOMICS FROM WISCONSIN, 10 [JOHN, A FRAMEWORK FOR THE MORAL ANALYSIS OF MARKETS, 10/1, <http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf>]

 The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have also been problematic in other systems and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

### Permutation

#### Perm do both --- policy analysis key

James Ferguson 11, Professor of Anthropology at Stanford, “The Uses of Neoliberalism”, Antipode, Vol. 41, No. S1, pp 166–184

If we are seeking, as this special issue of Antipode aspires to do, to link our critical analyses to the world of grounded political struggle—not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it—then there is much to be said for focusing, as I have here, on mundane, real- world debates around policy and politics, even if doing so inevitably puts us on the compromised and reformist terrain of the possible, rather than the seductive high ground of revolutionary ideals and utopian desires. But I would also insist that there is more at stake in the examples I have discussed here than simply a slightly better way to ameliorate the miseries of the chronically poor, or a technically superior method for relieving the suffering of famine victims.¶ My point in discussing the South African BIG campaign, for instance, is not really to argue for its implementation. There is much in the campaign that is appealing, to be sure. But one can just as easily identify a series of worries that would bring the whole proposal into doubt. Does not, for instance, the decoupling of the question of assistance from the issue of labor, and the associated valorization of the “informal”, help provide a kind of alibi for the failures of the South African regime to pursue policies that would do more to create jobs? Would not the creation of a basic income benefit tied to national citizenship simply exacerbate the vicious xenophobia that already divides the South African poor,¶ in a context where many of the poorest are not citizens, and would thus not be eligible for the BIG? Perhaps even more fundamentally, is the idea of basic income really capable of commanding the mass support that alone could make it a central pillar of a new approach to distribution? The record to date gives powerful reasons to doubt it. So far, the technocrats’ dreams of relieving poverty through efficient cash transfers have attracted little support from actual poor people, who seem to find that vision a bit pale and washed out, compared with the vivid (if vague) populist promises of jobs and personalistic social inclusion long offered by the ANC patronage machine, and lately personified by Jacob Zuma (Ferguson forthcoming).¶ My real interest in the policy proposals discussed here, in fact, has little to do with the narrow policy questions to which they seek to provide answers. For what is most significant, for my purposes, is not whether or not these are good policies, but the way that they illustrate a process through which specific governmental devices and modes of reasoning that we have become used to associating with a very particular (and conservative) political agenda (“neoliberalism”) may be in the process of being peeled away from that agenda, and put to very different uses. Any progressive who takes seriously the challenge I pointed to at the start of this essay, the challenge of developing new progressive arts of government, ought to find this turn of events of considerable interest.¶ As Steven Collier (2005) has recently pointed out, it is important to question the assumption that there is, or must be, a neat or automatic fit between a hegemonic “neoliberal” political-economic project (however that might be characterized), on the one hand, and specific “neoliberal” techniques, on the other. Close attention to particular techniques (such as the use of quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand) in particular settings (in Collier’s case, fiscal and budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia) shows that the relationship between the technical and the political-economic “is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in much critical geographical work”, and that neoliberal technical mechanisms are in fact “deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms” (2005:2).¶ As I suggested in referencing the role of statistics and techniques for pooling risk in the creation of social democratic welfare states, social technologies need not have any essential or eternal loyalty to the political formations within which they were first developed. Insurance rationality at the end of the nineteenth century had no essential vocation to provide security and solidarity to the working class; it was turned to that purpose (in some substantial measure) because it was available, in the right place at the right time, to be appropriated for that use. Specific ways of solving or posing governmental problems, specific institutional and intellectual mechanisms, can be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways, to accomplish different social ends. With social, as with any other sort of technology, it is not the machines or the mechanisms that decide what they will be used to do.¶ Foucault (2008:94) concluded his discussion of socialist government- ality by insisting that the answers to the Left’s governmental problems require not yet another search through our sacred texts, but a process of conceptual and institutional innovation. “[I]f there is a really socialist governmentality, then it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. It must be invented”. But invention in the domain of governmental technique is rarely something worked up out of whole cloth. More often, it involves a kind of bricolage (Le ́vi- Strauss 1966), a piecing together of something new out of scavenged parts originally intended for some other purpose. As we pursue such a process of improvisatory invention, we might begin by making an inventory of the parts available for such tinkering, keeping all the while an open mind about how different mechanisms might be put to work, and what kinds of purposes they might serve. If we can go beyond seeing in “neoliberalism” an evil essence or an automatic unity, and instead learn to see a field of specific governmental techniques, we may be surprised to find that some of them can be repurposed, and put to work in the service of political projects very different from those usually associated with that word. If so, we may find that the cabinet of governmental arts available to us is a bit less bare than first appeared, and that some rather useful little mechanisms may be nearer to hand than we thought.

### Neolib Sustainable

#### Neolib is sustainable and inevitable---no alt

Jones 11—Owen, Masters at Oxford, named one of the Daily Telegraph's 'Top 100 Most Influential People on the Left' for 2011, author of "Chavs: The Demonization of the Working Class", The Independent, UK, "Owen Jones: Protest without politics will change nothing", 2011, www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/owen-jones-protest-without-politics-will-change-nothing-2373612.html

My first experience of police kettling was aged 16. It was May Day 2001, and the anti-globalisation movement was at its peak. The turn-of-the-century anti-capitalist movement feels largely forgotten today, but it was a big deal at the time. To a left-wing teenager growing up in an age of unchallenged neo-liberal triumphalism, just to have "anti-capitalism" flash up in the headlines was thrilling. Thousands of apparently unstoppable protesters chased the world's rulers from IMF to World Bank summits – from Seattle to Prague to Genoa – and the authorities were rattled.¶ Today, as protesters in nearly a thousand cities across the world follow the example set by the Occupy Wall Street protests, it's worth pondering what happened to the anti-globalisation movement. Its activists did not lack passion or determination. But they did lack a coherent alternative to the neo-liberal project. With no clear political direction, the movement was easily swept away by the jingoism and turmoil that followed 9/11, just two months after Genoa.¶ Don't get me wrong: the Occupy movement is a glimmer of sanity amid today's economic madness. By descending on the West's financial epicentres, it reminds us of how a crisis caused by the banks (a sentence that needs to be repeated until it becomes a cliché) has been cynically transformed into a crisis of public spending. The founding statement of Occupy London puts it succinctly: "We refuse to pay for the banks' crisis." The Occupiers direct their fire at the top 1 per cent, and rightly so – as US billionaire Warren Buffett confessed: "There's class warfare, all right, but it's my class, the rich class, that's making war, and we're winning."¶ The Occupy movement has provoked fury from senior US Republicans such as Presidential contender Herman Cain who – predictably – labelled it "anti-American". They're right to be worried: those camping outside banks threaten to refocus attention on the real villains, and to act as a catalyst for wider dissent. But a coherent alternative to the tottering global economic order remains, it seems, as distant as ever. ¶ Neo-liberalism crashes around, half-dead, with no-one to administer the killer blow.¶ There's always a presumption that a crisis of capitalism is good news for the left. Yet in the Great Depression, fascism consumed much of Europe. The economic crisis of the 1970s did lead to a resurgence of radicalism on both left and right. But, spearheaded by Thatcherism and Reaganism, the New Right definitively crushed its opposition in the 1980s.This time round, there doesn't even seem to be an alternative for the right to defeat. That's not the fault of the protesters. In truth, the left has never recovered from being virtually smothered out of existence. It was the victim of a perfect storm: the rise of the New Right; neo-liberal globalisation; and the repeated defeats suffered by the trade union movement.¶ But, above all, it was the aftermath of the collapse of Communism that did for the left. As US neo-conservative Midge Decter triumphantly put it: "It's time to say: We've won. Goodbye." From the British Labour Party to the African National Congress, left-wing movements across the world hurtled to the right in an almost synchronised fashion. It was as though the left wing of the global political spectrum had been sliced off. That's why, although we live in an age of revolt, there remains no left to give it direction and purpose

### Neolib Checks War

#### Neolib solves war --- world is getting better now

Yevgeniy Feyman 14, Manhattan Institute Fellow, "The Golden Age Is Now", May 23, www.city-journal.org/2014/bc0523yf.html

Bjørn Lomborg is well-known as a climate “skeptic.” He has frequently voiced concerns that money spent battling climate change could shift scarce resources away from more urgent global problems, such as malaria and HIV/AIDS. But the most recent book by the self-proclaimed “skeptical environmentalist” does more than just voice concern; it attempts to evaluate the damage caused by a variety of problems—from climate change to malnutrition to war—and project future costs related to these same issues. In How Much Have Global Problems Cost the World?, Lomborg and a group of economists conclude that, with a few exceptions, the world is richer, freer, healthier, and smarter than it’s ever been. These gains have coincided with the near-universal rejection of statism and the flourishing of capitalist principles. At a time when political figures such as New York City mayor Bill de Blasio and religious leaders such as Pope Francis frequently remind us about the evils of unfettered capitalism, this is a worthwhile message.¶ The doubling of human life expectancy is one of the most remarkable achievements of the past century. Consider, Lomborg writes, that “the twentieth century saw life expectancy rise by about 3 months for every calendar year.” The average child in 1900 could expect to live to just 32 years old; now that same child should make it to 70. This increase came during a century when worldwide economic output, driven by the spread of capitalism and freedom, grew by more than 4,000 percent. These gains occurred in developed and developing countries alike; among men and women; and even in a sense among children, as child mortality plummeted.¶ Why are we living so much longer? Massive improvements in public health certainly played an important role. The World Health Organization’s global vaccination efforts essentially eradicated smallpox. But this would have been impossible without the innovative methods of vaccine preservation developed in the private sector by British scientist Leslie Collier. Oral rehydration therapies and antibiotics have also been instrumental in reducing child mortality. Simply put, technological progress is the key to these gains—and market economies have liberated, and rewarded, technological innovation.¶ People are not just living longer, but better—sometimes with government’s help, and sometimes despite it. Even people in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America are better educated and better fed than ever before. Hundreds of thousands of children who would have died during previous eras due to malnutrition are alive today. Here, we can thank massive advancements in agricultural production unleashed by the free market. In the 1960s, privately funded agricultural researchers bred new, high-yield strains of corn, wheat, and various other crops thanks to advances in molecular genetics. Globalization helped spread these technologies to developing countries, which used them not only to feed their people, but also to become export powerhouses. This so-called “green revolution” reinforced both the educational progress (properly nourished children tend to learn more) and the life-expectancy gains (better nutrition leads to better health) of the twentieth century. These children live in a world with fewer armed conflicts, netting what the authors call a “peace dividend.” Globalization and trade liberalization have surely contributed to this more peaceful world (on aggregate). An interdependent global economy makes war costly.¶ Of course, problems remain. As Lomborg points out, most foreign aid likely does little to boost economic welfare, yet hundreds of billions of dollars in “development assistance” continue to flow every year from developed countries to the developing world. Moreover, climate change is widely projected to intensify in the second half of the twenty-first century, and will carry with it a significant economic cost. But those familiar with the prior work of the “skeptical environmentalist” understand that ameliorating these effects over time could prove wasteful. Lomborg notes that the latest research on climate change estimates a net cost of 0.2 to 2 percent of GDP from 2055 to 2080. The same report points out that in 2030, mitigation costs may be as high as 4 percent of GDP. Perhaps directing mitigation funding to other priorities—curing AIDS for instance—would be a better use of the resources.¶ Lomborg’s main message? Ignore those pining for the “good old days.” Thanks to the immense gains of the past century, there has never been a better time to be alive.

#### Neoliberalism checks war—interdependence

**Griswold 6** director of the Center for Trade Policy Studies at the Cato Institute [Daniel T. Griswold, , 2006 CATO Institute, Peace on earth? Try free trade among men, <http://www.freetrade.org/node/282>)]

First, **trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication** such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. **With trade comes** more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and **more exposure to new ideas**. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, **as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out**. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, **globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources**. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home.

### Cap Solves Poverty

#### Cap solves poverty

Meltzer 11 (Allan H, Professor of Political Economy at Carnegie Mellon, “Why Capitalism?”, 1/1, http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1581&context=tepper&sei-redir=1)

Growth and Progress After World War II, and especially after 1960, the developed countries led by the United States worked to raise growth rates in poor countries of the world. There were two experiments. The former Soviet Union and its fellow Communist countries controlled property and directed resource use according to plans developed by a central bureaucracy. Capitalist countries relied on opening to the international market and to resource allocation based on market demand and individual choice. The results are clear. **Capitalism and the market system proved much more effective at development and poverty reduction** than planning systems whether as in India by a democratically chosen government or by an authoritarian regime as in the Soviet Union or China. **There is not a single example of sustained successful growth under traditional Communism.** The contrast was clear at the end of the 1980s in comparison between North and South Korea, East and West Germany, and China compared to the Chinese Diasporas in Asia. The Indian government tried to apply the socialist principles taught to many of its leaders at the London School of Economics. **There can be no better recognition of the failure of these alternatives to capitalism and the market system than their abandonment by their practitioners**. India, China, and most of the former Communist countries opened their economies. China and others joined the world trading system. China and India permitted and even encouraged private ownership of resources including capital. **The result was a dramatic reduction in poverty**. Many more people improved their living standards than in fifty years of development under government planning, regulation and resource allocation. **Capitalism and the market proved far better than the state at reducing poverty and raising living standards**. Critics of capitalism turned to other reasons for opposition. Margaret Thatcher described their reaction to her success at reforming the British economy, increasing productivity and reducing inflation. “Deprived for the moment at least of the opportunity to chastise the Government and blame free enterprise capitalism for failing to create jobs and raise living standards, the left turned their attention to non-economic issues. The idea that the state was the engine of economic progress was discredited—and even more so as the failures of communism became more widely known. But was the price of capitalist prosperity too high? Was it not resulting in gross and 10offensive materialism, traffic congestion and pollution? … [W]as not the ‘quality of life’ being threatened? “I found all this misguided and hypocritical. If socialism had produced economic success the same critics would have been celebrating in the streets.”

### Free Market Good

#### Free markets are good and is the only ethical economic system – 10 warrants

Dorfman Ph.D. 16 (Jeffrey, professor of economics at The University of Georgia, contributor to Forbes, “Ten Free Market Economic Reasons To Be Thankful”, Forbes, 11/23/16, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffreydorfman/2016/11/23/ten-free-market-economic-reasons-to-be-thankful/#42d94af06db7>)

For all the criticism that has been heaped upon free market economics for the supposed harmful effects of economic inequality, for not producing the socially desirable outcomes of some social justice warriors, free market economics has been the most powerful, nonreligious force for good in the history of the world. Free market economics has lifted billions of people worldwide out of poverty in the past two generations alone. It has brought consumers an embarrassment of riches worth of product variety. It rewards talented people for talents that dictators or central planners would never have even thought to exploit. This column reviews ten great reasons to be very thankful for the wonders of free market economics.

1. Median income is really rising

Claims of stagnant middle class wages generally rely on either the use of very flawed data rather than official government statistics, or misuse of government statistics. As the Manhattan Institute’s Scott Winship has repeatedly shown, properly measured incomes have risen rather steadily with labor productivity, as would be expected. Using data from the Current Population Survey and the Congressional Budget Office, Winship shows that from 1967 to 2009 median household income rose by more than $20,000. Given that median income growth was slowly positive since 2009 until growing rapidly in 2015, the $20,000 gain has increased since 2009, so that when more updated data are released, the cumulative gain since 1967 will be more like $22,000 for the median household. These rising wages are thanks to a free labor market where employers have to compete for workers by offering competitive wages.

2. Free trade saves us trillions

While free trade is currently a losing issue politically, the economic reality is that allowing the free market to extend past national boundaries allows people in both trading partners to increase the benefits of free markets. By exploiting more differences in comparative advantage and the differences in tastes, preferences, resources, and talents worldwide, American consumers save hundreds of billions of dollars per year on the goods we purchase. In addition, we gain variety in our purchases, such as the ability of buy fresh fruit in the winter. Yes, some workers may temporarily lose jobs and see wages rise more slowly thanks to the increased competition trade brings, but on average we save much more in lower prices than we lose in lower wages.

3. Free markets know what we want

Free markets miraculously supply almost all our wants without an obvious mechanism that lets them know what to make and where to deliver it. Through the wonder of the infamous invisible hand, we vote with our dollars every day by how we spend our money and the market continually adjusts to meet those needs as efficiently and inexpensively as possible. The average supermarket, for example, contains 50,000 different items for sale and has an inventory control system and supply chain so responsive to consumer demand that on any given day 99.8 percent or more of those items are there waiting for you to buy them.

4. Innovators are rewarded, consumers benefit

Economic rewards to innovators encourage businesses to invent things consumers don’t even know we need. Nobody knew she needed an iPhone, Velcro, Post-It notes, blind-spot warning systems, or fitness trackers until somebody invented them. More innovations than we can recall proved to be things that we didn’t need and those innovators did not receive an economic reward. However, the rewards to those who correctly guess the mood of enough consumers are sufficient to make many of them rich. This encourages innovation and enriches consumers by much more than any financial rewards to the innovators themselves.

5. Failed businesses are punished, economic growth accelerated

Economic judgments also put out of business those making things consumers don’t want. This is a benefit of free markets because when a business disappears it frees up resources to be redeployed to the production of things society values more highly. This is exactly what the government frequently gets wrong when it bails out failing businesses under the mistaken pretext of protecting jobs. Bailing out failing companies traps resources and capital in a low growth sector that could have been more profitably used in higher growth areas of the economy. In other words, stopping business failures slows down economic growth; let them die and watch new businesses rise from the ashes.

6. Free markets match buyers and sellers

Free markets automatically pair up sellers and buyers. In a free market system, producers rarely have to know, find, or ever meet the sellers of their products. Retailers stand between producers and consumers. Banks stand between savers and borrowers. Stockbrokers and real estate agents serve to match up those who want to sell and buy shares of stock or a piece of property. Because some money can be made through performing these matchmaking services, a free market allows customers to find the products they want without finding the people making those products. This greatly lowers the transaction costs for both buyers and sellers, making markets more efficient. The internet has only accelerated the benefits gained in this regard, shrinking transaction costs ever further.

7. Competition keeps prices low

Competition among competing businesses keeps prices low. Inflation is mostly a problem in the industries with the most government involvement (e.g., healthcare, education) while industries that have more free market competition find businesses reluctant to raise prices and always looking for cost efficiencies to gain an advantage over those competitors. Just think about prices for computers, food, and clothes to realize the gains consumers capture from robust competition in a free market.

8. Price signals work

Price signals tell people and businesses where to allocate their skills and efforts. A nursing shortage is signaled to the labor market through employers advertising higher wages for nurses, hopefully leading more people to go into that profession. High demand for a popular product will lead businesses to bid higher to get a share of the limited supply, encouraging producers to make more. Similarly, falling prices and wages tell producers and workers what products and fields some of them should abandon. When you think about how rarely the store is out of the item you want or has a huge overstock lingering on the shelves for months on end, you realize how well price signals in a free market work.

9. Freedom

Free markets let you choose what work you want to do, who to work for, where to shop, what to buy. Without free markets, some government agency or benevolent dictator would have to match workers with jobs, producers with retailers, and retailers with customers. Without free markets, you have no free choice. Thus, when we restrict free markets with government regulations, people lose freedom: over what work to do, where and when to shop, what to buy. Free markets, in contrast to government-controlled ones, let over one hundred million workers choose from thousands of professions and three hundred million consumers choose from millions of goods and services for sale every day.

10. Free markets make things work

Think about sectors of our society where things are not working: many government agencies (like the DMV), healthcare, transportation systems, and K-12 education, for example. Those areas are where we have the fewest markets and the most government intervention. If you want low prices and high quality, keep government out of the way and let free markets work. America’s K-12 public education system which has virtually no freedom of choice consistently scores in the middle-of-the-pack internationally. Yet, our higher education system, where consumers can choose the college they want to attend, is universally rated as the best in the world.

So this year as we gather with family and friends to celebrate Thanksgiving, give thanks for the food, for family and friends, for all the things you are truly grateful for. Among those things should be free economic markets. Because without free markets, much of the rest of what we are thankful for would be missing.

### Policy Action Key

#### Demanding specific, practical policy reforms is the only way to achieve scaled and durable change – strategic and skillful political engagement is necessary to solve structural racial violence

**Liu 14** [Eric Liu, “Time to turn protests into change,” CNN, December 4, 2014, <http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/03/opinion/liu-meaning-ferguson-protests>]

More than a week after the grand jury's decision in Ferguson, protests continue nationwide. On campuses, in malls, on streets and in stadiums, Americans young and old are voicing their anger about the non-indictments in the deaths of Michael Brown and now Eric Garner in New York -- and about the rigged system that makes such results all too common. This proliferation of protests is good. But it's not good enough. First, let's reflect a bit on why it's good. Anytime Americans start seeing themselves as more than mere consumers or spectators -- rather, as citizens and participants -- something healthy is happening. That's especially true when people are willing to flex their citizen muscles during the start of peak shopping season. So seeing protesters from Seattle to New York engage in civil disobedience on Black Friday was heartening. Did all the walk-outs and "die-ins" inconvenience some shoppers and deal-seekers? Sure. The post-Ferguson moment demands, at a bare minimum, that we all raise our sights beyond one-day sale tags. But while the protests are promising and necessary, they are also insufficient. A deeper phase of work is needed. And here all of America can learn from what's already been happening in Missouri. The media has tended to focus on the most eye-catching conflict -- either daytime marches with famous activists, or nighttime rioting after the grand jury decision. But off-camera, people on the ground in and around this community have been doing something simple and difficult. They've been moving from protest to power. Faith groups and grassroots organizers like Communities Creating Opportunity and the Organization for Black Struggle have, since this summer, been engaging people in Ferguson to organize and advocate for reforms, to register, to vote, to understand the makeup and the methods of the city council and the state legislature. In short, to do politics. This may seem unsatisfying to some, even irrelevant. The members of the millennial generation who are driving so many of the protests today are idealistic and networked -- but also exceedingly cynical about traditional politics and government. And young African-Americans who are most often subjected to arbitrary abuses by the criminal justice system have the most reason to be mistrustful of the larger political machinery that begat that system. But what the grassroots organizers in Ferguson teach us is that there is no avoiding politics. Indeed, there is no way to achieve any scaled and durable reform without stepping into the arena of government, policy, politics, and elections. A change in city council representation can lead to a change in how truly representative one's police force is. A well-coordinated campaign to let elected officials know you are part of a collective with voice, clout, savvy, and votes can lead to a change in attitude among those elected -- and then to changes in policy. What this requires is an understanding of the institutions that govern how we govern ourselves. What it requires is literacy in civic power. This is why the organization I run, Citizen University, is working with partners around the country to teach people about the skills and systems of power. And it's why everyone, left or right -- and especially those living on the front lines of racial disparity and violent inequity -- must learn how to read and to write power. Wherever you live, ask yourself: Could I teach someone what the activists in Ferguson are teaching people now? Could I teach them how my city makes policy, how politicians respond to public pressure, how to navigate the rules of voting, how to make votes cancel out money? All around the world, from Tahrir Square a few years ago to Hong Kong today, we see young people caught up in what one journalist called "the euphoria of defiance." Alas, in most of those situations, we also see what happens when protesters are unable to convert civil disobedience into civil self-rule. That requires strategy. It requires organization. It requires patient instruction in citizenship. Fifty-nine years ago this week, Rosa Parks made a heroic choice not to sit at the back of the bus. But what her story teaches us is this: Heroes are what happens when a moment calls forth people well prepared by institutions. Parks did not arrive randomly at that occasion on that bus. She had been groomed by an ecosystem of civil rights groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, trained at places like the Highlander Folk School. She had understood her choice -- her immovable defiance -- to be part of a larger story and a methodical strategy for the attainment of power. This is what unsung but undaunted citizen organizers and educators are doing in Ferguson today. They've moved past "Hands Up, Don't Shoot" gestures. They are getting hands-on about changing their community. And so should we all. That's how we can make this a season of powerful citizenship.

### Alt Fails

#### Alt doesn’t create a movement – neolib entrenched

Comaroff, 2011 (September, John, Harold H. Swift Distinguished Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, “The End of Neoliberalism? “What Is Left of the Left,” p. 142-146)

While the world economic crisis of 2008–2009 might have killed off neoliber- alism as a global ideological project—patently, in the noun form—it is highly likely to leave the capillaries of the beast, less Leviathan than Great White Shark, largely intact. Indeed, the “meltdown” and its aftermath may see the planet less, not more, open to alternatives to the neoliberal tendency, albeit with significant “corrections” as some economists were already calling them more than a year back. I am reminded here, simultaneously, of Reinhart Koselleck and the Manchester School of Anthropology in Central Africa. Koselleck, in his study of the Enlightenment and the pathogenesis of modern society, drew attention to the dialectics of crisis, critique, and correction; for its part, the Manchester School demonstrated the capacity of cycles of rupture and their repair to reproduce social systems and the order of values on which they are predicated (see, for example, Gluckman 2004; Turner 1996). Crisis, self-evidently, is always reproductive. But it frequently is. As Mike Davis (1995) once noted, “apocalypse” is often absorbed quickly into the history of the everyday, a process he describes as the “dialectic of ordinary disaster.” As talk has grown of “green shoots” sprouting in the wake of the economic devastation of the past two years or so, there have been signs of both crisis-driven critique in pursuit of “correction” and a return to the “ordinary.” Discourses of correction have come from both liberal and conservative sources. In a special edition of Harper’s in 2008, James Galbraith, Joseph Stiglitz, and others—most of them with impeccable liberal credentials—suggested a range of strategies to ensure that capitalism might reemerge relatively unscathed. They prescribed cures such as reforming the tax system, banning stock options as incentives, bringing into line the self-interest of the banking sector with those of the economy and society at large, and finding regulatory means to harness both the risk-laden excesses of the finance industry and the tendency to favor short-run profiteering over longer- term wealth production. Only one contributor to the debate, Eric Janszen— ironically, a venture capitalist—took a more radical line. He argued for a return to industrial capitalism, pointing out that all recent bubbles and busts are owed to government creating conditions for mammoth, “metastasiz[ing]” markets in financial speculation. Janszen apart, these efforts to “save capitalism” were symptomatic of a rush of similar liberal writings on the topic. Few of them—the notable exception being Gillian Tett’s extraordinary Fool’s Gold (2009)—delved deeply into the archaeol- ogy of the crisis itself or, more generally, into the inner workings of a global political economy whose complexity has increased exponentially over the past couple of decades. As a result, most have sought solutions along its outer surfaces. They have posited adjustments that might limit the material excesses of the neo- liberal tendency and, in particular, the market instabilities and conflicts of interest to which those excesses give rise. This, itself, is a function of the pervasive prac- tice of explaining all economic processes these days by recourse to one or another kind of utilitarian theory, which is why the four causes of the apocalypse, as John Lanchester (2009) has pointed out, are almost invariably taken to be “greed, stu- pidity, government, and the banks,” not anything in the structure of contemporary capitalism itself. The pursuit of explanations and panaceas in such terms, as we might expect, has its parallel on the Right, most notably perhaps in Richard Posner’s A Failure of Capitalism (2009), a salvo from the Halls of Friedmania. Note that Posner did not title the book “the failure”—using a definite article—but merely “a failure.” Posner, predictably and—in light of Tett’s account—spuriously, argues that individuals in the finance industry acted rationally in the years before the crisis. That crisis, in his view a fully fledged “depression,” is blamed, again predictably, on bad government and ill-considered, perfectible forms of deregu- lation. His “corrections,” though, belong to the same genus as those proffered by liberal economists: establish new forms of regulation that reduce the conflict between the rational self-interest of economic actors and the commonweal—the invisible old hand here, of course, being the economist of invisible hands, Adam Smith. In the final analysis, from this vantage, the point is to perfect free market economies by establishing the regulatory environment most conducive to a suc- cessfully deregulated world. In the meantime—and this is where the “dialectic of the ordinary” becomes salient—for all the talk of the urgent need for “correction,” we have seen a tangible return to business as usual, even bad-faith business. This is in spite of the fact that deeper crises appear inevitable, that employment statistics are worsening, that rates of poverty and inequality are rapidly rising, and so on. The buzzword in the City of London, in late June 2009, was “BAB”: “bonuses are back.” And, with them, the forms of finance capital from which they emanate. As Jonathan Freedland (2009), also commenting on Britain, wrote, “Nine months ago”—in 2008—“the financial crisis seemed certain to bring a revolution in our economy. . . . Change had to be on the way.” But now “look what has happened. . . . [Just] when the world seemed ready to bury the neoliberal regime . . . we have returned to [its ways and means].” In sum, despite the stream of assertions during 2010 that the crisis would have deep transformative effects, putting an end to the “neoliberal regime,” most indicators suggest otherwise. For one thing, the massive infusions of money into the banking industry and mega-business on the part of national governments have occurred without the regulatory initiatives that were promised to follow. Yet again, public funds are being diverted into the private sector, underscoring the fact that capital continues to take its profits but not shoulder its losses, a curious, perverse denouement to the rise of Ulrich Beck’s Risk Society (1992). To be sure, state intervention in the U.S. economy after 2008 has never pointed in the direction of a “New New Deal,” as some Panglossian commentators on the Left thought it might. Just the reverse. It has been intended to save the corporate world, not secure civil society or ordinary citizens from the predations of the market; the pledge of measures that might protect those citizens immiserated by the crash, measures never substantial to begin with, has gone largely unrealized. We are plainly not witnessing a return to social democracy, let alone the genesis of a new age of nationalization; note, in this respect, how many of the nation-states of the global North are moving (further) to the right. Which may be why there have been so few legislative enactments anywhere promulgated to curb the practices that sparked the meltdown in the first place: per contra, while market forces have made it harder to negotiate toxic assets and to take some of the more extravagant gambles in the business of finance, the investment industry is widely reported not merely to have returned to its old ways, but to be inventing new “products” without palpable constraint. The derivatives trade, it seems, is rising again. So, too, are the ramparts around “economic liberalism.” A recent article in The Economist (2009) argues that, notwithstanding “the biggest economic calamity in 80 years . . . the free-market paradigm . . . deserves a robust defence.” These are not the only signs that the capillaries of the neoliberal tendency and the “free-market paradigm” continue to embrace us. There are many others. Some are obvious, like the continuing dominance of the corporate sector: its relative immunity from most legal challenge, even when its enterprises violate the being, bodies, belongings, or bioenvironment of ordinary citizens; its enjoyment of favor- able taxation regimes and, increasingly, the use of laws of eminent domain to expand its horizons; the protection of its physical, financial, and intellectual prop- erty, sometimes by recourse to police violence, as an ostensible function of the collective good; its capacity to influence the disposition of the public treasury and public policy and, reciprocally, to have insurgent action directed against it pros- ecuted as common crime—for example, in mass protests against the privatization of such “natural” assets as water and land. Other signs are less obvious, like the growing hegemony of legal orders, founded on constitutions of distinctly neolib- eral design, that favor individual rights over collective well-being; that limit the responsibility of government to protect or provision its citizens; that tend to criminalize race, poverty, and counterpolitics, in part by outlawing the salience of social cause or consequence; that subject what were once everyday democratic processes to the finality of judicial action, thereby juridifying politics to the exclu- sion of other forms of social action; that displace the “hot” sovereignty of the people into the “cold” sovereignty of the law; and that treat all citizens as rational, self-interested, rights-bearing actors and the world as a community of contract. (For more on neoliberal constitutionalism, see, for example, Schneiderman [2000] and Comaroff and Comaroff [2006].) I could go on in this vein. To do so, however, would be to risk stating the obvi- ous. But allow me one observation. Perhaps the most significant capillaries of the neoliberal that remain with us have to do with the state and governance. Foucauldians would prefer “governmentality” here; they have a point. Broadly speaking, neoliberal etatism seems to be surviving well, even strengthening, in most places. As Foucault explained in The Birth of Biopolitics (2008), the rise of neoliberalism—his use of the noun—marked a radical transformation: whereas before, the state, among its various bureaucratic operations, “monitored” the work- ings of the economy, its “organizing principle” is now the market. Government actually has become business. And nation-states have become holding companies in and for themselves. In the upshot, the categorical distinction between politics and economics, that classical liberal fiction, is largely erased. Effective gover- nance, in turn, is measured with reference to asset management, to the attraction of enterprise, to the facilitation of the entrepreneurial activities of the citizen as homo economicus, and to the capacity to foster the accumulation—but not the redistribution—of wealth. Under these conditions, heads of state begin to resemble, and often actually are, CEOs who treat the population as a body of shareholders; vide the likes of Silvio Berlusconi, who explicitly speaks of Italy as a company, or Dmitri Medvedev, head of Gazprom, Russia’s mightiest business and a major instrument of the country’s foreign policy. There is a more profound point here. Once upon a time, antineoliberal theory posited an opposition between the state and the free market, arguing that the antidote to the latter lay in the active inter- vention of the former. But the opposition is false, just another piece of the detri- tus of the modern history of capital. As states become mega-corporations (Kremlin, Inc.; Britain, PLC; South Africa, Pty Ltd.; Dubai, Inc.)—all of them, incidentally, branded and legally incorporated—they become inextricably part of the workings of the market and, hence, no longer an “outside,” an antidote, or an antithesis from which to rethink or reconstruct “the neoliberal paradigm.” This, in part, is why government is increasingly reduced to an exercise in the technical management of capital, why ideologically founded politics appear dead, replaced by the politics of interest and entitlement and identity—three counterpoints of a single triangle. And this is why the capillaries of neoliberal governance seem so firmly entrenched in the cartography of our everyday lives, there to remain for the foreseeable future—to the degree that any future is foreseeable.

#### Reject their lens of neoliberalism. Starting with “neoliberalism” encourages fake radicalism, oversimplification, and greater levels of cooptation than positive and pragmatic politics.

-Ad hoc policies of neoliberalism also originate from Leftist movements for greater autonomy

-Sustainability politics also emerged during this time, but the neolib K ignores those and lumps them all together

-Ignores positive action that doesn’t conform to a romantic view of rebellion (i.e. the plan)

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3. There is no such thing as neoliberalism! The blind-spot in theories of neoliberalism—whether neo-Marxist and Foucauldian—comes with trying to account for how top-down initiatives ‘take’ in everyday situations. So perhaps the best thing to do is to stop thinking of “neoliberalism” as a coherent “hegemonic” project altogether. For all its apparent critical force, the vocabulary of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” in fact provides a double consolation for leftist academics: it supplies us with plentiful opportunities for unveiling the real workings of hegemonic ideologies in a characteristic gesture of revelation; and in so doing, it invites us to align our own professional roles with the activities of various actors “out there”, who are always framed as engaging in resistance or contestation. The conceptualization of “neoliberalism” as a “hegemonic” project does not need refining by adding a splash of Foucault. Perhaps we should try to do without the concept of “neoliberalism” altogether, because it might actually compound rather than aid in the task of figuring out how the world works and how it changes. One reason for this is that, between an overly economistic derivation of political economy and an overly statist rendition of governmentality, stories about “neoliberalism” manage to reduce the understanding of social relations to a residual effect of hegemonic projects and/or governmental programmes of rule (see Clarke, 2004a). Stories about “neoliberalism” pay little attention to the pro-active role of socio-cultural processes in provoking changes in modes of governance, policy, and regulation. Consider the example of the restructuring of public services such as health care, education, and criminal justice in the UK over the last two or three decades. This can easily be thought of in terms of a “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”, and certainly one dimension of this process has been a form of anti-statism that has rhetorically contrasted market provision against the rigidities of the state. But in fact these ongoing changes in the terms of public-policy debate involve a combination of different factors that add up to a much more dispersed populist reorientation in policy, politics, and culture. These factors include changing consumer expectations, involving shifts in expectations towards public entitlements which follow from the generalization of consumerism; the decline of deference, involving shifts in conventions and hierarchies of taste, trust, access, and expertise; and the refusals of the subordinated, referring to the emergence of anti-paternalist attitudes found in, for example, women’s health movements or anti-psychiatry movements. They include also the development of the politics of difference, involving the emergence of discourses of institutional discrimination based on gender, sexuality, race, and disability. This has disrupted the ways in which welfare agencies think about inequality, helping to generate the emergence of contested inequalities, in which policies aimed at addressing inequalities of class and income develop an ever more expansive dynamic of expectation that public services should address other kinds of inequality as well (see Clarke, 2004b J. Clark, Dissolving the public realm? The logics and limits of neo-liberalism, Journal of Social Policy 33 (2004), pp. 27–48.Clarke, 2004b). None of these populist tendencies is simply an expression of a singular “hegemonic” project of “neoliberalization”. They are effects of much longer rhythms of socio-cultural change that emanate from the bottom-up. It seems just as plausible to suppose that what we have come to recognise as “hegemonic neoliberalism” is a muddled set of ad hoc, opportunistic accommodations to these unstable dynamics of social change as it is to think of it as the outcome of highly coherent political-ideological projects. Processes of privatization, market liberalization, and de-regulation have often followed an ironic pattern in so far as they have been triggered by citizens’ movements arguing from the left of the political spectrum against the rigidities of statist forms of social policy and welfare provision in the name of greater autonomy, equality, and participation (e.g. Horwitz, 1989). The political re-alignments of the last three or four decades cannot therefore be adequately understood in terms of a straightforward shift from the left to the right, from values of collectivism to values of individualism, or as a re-imposition of class power. The emergence and generalization of this populist ethos has much longer, deeper, and wider roots than those ascribed to “hegemonic neoliberalism”. And it also points towards the extent to which easily the most widely resonant political rationality in the world today is not right-wing market liberalism at all, but is, rather, the polyvalent discourse of “democracy” (see Barnett and Low, 2004). Recent theories of “neoliberalism” have retreated from the appreciation of the long-term rhythms of socio-cultural change, which Stuart Hall once developed in his influential account of Thatcherism as a variant of authoritarian populism. Instead, they favour elite-focused analyses of state bureaucracies, policy networks, and the like. One consequence of the residualization of the social is that theories of “neoliberalism” have great difficulty accounting for, or indeed even in recognizing, new forms of “individualized collective-action” (Marchetti, 2003) that have emerged in tandem with the apparent ascendancy of “neoliberal hegemony”: environmental politics and the politics of sustainability; new forms of consumer activism oriented by an ethics of assistance and global solidarity; the identity politics of sexuality related to demands for changes in modes of health care provision, and so on (see Norris, 2002). All of these might be thought of as variants of what we might want to call bottom-up governmentality. This refers to the notion that non-state and non-corporate actors are also engaged in trying to govern various fields of activity, both by acting on the conduct and contexts of ordinary everyday life, but also by acting on the conduct of state and corporate actors as well. Rose (1999, pp. 281–284) hints at the outlines of such an analysis, at the very end of his paradigmatic account of governmentality, but investigation of this phenomenon is poorly developed at present. Instead, the trouble-free amalgamation of Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of “neoliberalism” sets up a simplistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of subversion (see Sedgwick, 2003, pp. 11–12). And clinging to this image only makes it all the more difficult to acknowledge the possibility of positive political action that does not conform to a romanticized picture of rebellion, contestation, or protest against domination (see Touraine, 2001). Theories of “neoliberalism” are unable to recognize the emergence of new and innovative forms of individualized collective action because their critical imagination turns on a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collectivism, the private and the public. The radical academic discourse of “neoliberalism” frames the relationship between collective action and individualism simplistically as an opposition between the good and the bad. In confirming a narrow account of liberalism, understood primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice, there is a peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism. By obliterating the political origins of modern liberalism—understood as answering the problem of how to live freely in societies divided by interminable conflicts of value, interest, and faith—the discourse of “neoliberalism” reiterates a longer problem for radical academic theory of being unable to account for its own normative priorities in a compelling way. And by denigrating the value of individualism as just an ideological ploy by the right, the pejorative vocabulary of “neoliberalism” invites us to take solace in an image of collective decision-making as a practically and normatively unproblematic procedure. The recurrent problem for theories of “neoliberalism” and “neoliberalization” is their two-dimensional view of both political power and of geographical space. They can only account for the relationship between top-down initiatives and bottom-up developments by recourse to the language of centres, peripheries, diffusion, and contingent realizations; and by displacing the conceptualization of social relations with a flurry of implied subject-effects. The turn to an overly systematized theory of governmentality, derived from Foucault, only compounds the theoretical limitations of economistic conceptualizations of “neoliberalism”. The task for social theory today remains a quite classical one, namely to try to specify “the recurrent causal processes that govern the intersections between abstract, centrally promoted plans and social life on the small scale” (Tilly, 2003, p. 345). Neither neoliberalism-as-hegemony nor neoliberalism-as-governmentality is really able to help in this task, not least because both invest in a deeply embedded picture of subject-formation as a process of “getting-at” ordinary people in order to make them believe in things against their best interests. With respect to the problem of accounting for how “hegemonic” projects of “neoliberalism” win wider consensual legitimacy, Foucault’s ideas on governmentality seem to promise an account of how people come to acquire what Ivison (1997) calls the “freedom to be formed and normed”. Over time, Foucault’s own work moved steadily away from an emphasis on the forming-and-norming end of this formulation towards an emphasis on the freedom end. This shift was itself a reflection of the realization that the circularities of poststructuralist theories of subjectivity can only be broken by developing an account of the active receptivity of people to being directed. But, in the last instance, neither the story of neoliberalism-as-hegemony or of neoliberalism-as-governmentality can account for the forms of receptivity, pro-activity, and generativity that might help to explain how the rhythms of the everyday are able to produce effects on macro-scale processes, and vice versa. So, rather than finding convenient synergies between what are already closely related theoretical traditions, perhaps it is better to keep open those tiresome debates about the degree of coherence between them, at the same time as trying to broaden the horizons of our theoretical curiosity a little more widely.

### Critique Fails

#### Without a defense of a specific course of action to be taken, you’ll never be the radical that the system needs because you just bind the revolution inside of a book. Instead, the 1AC only recreates the system they critique

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In the language of my machine-oriented ontology or onticology, we would say that we only ever encounter local manifestations of hyperobjects, local events or appearances of hyperobjects, and never the hyperobject as such. Hyperobjects as such are purely virtual or withdrawn. They can’t be directly touched. And what’s worse, contrary to Locke’s principle of individuation whereby an individual is individuated by virtue of its location in a particular place and at a particular time, hyperobjects are without a site or place. They are, as Morton says, non-local. This, then, is a central problem, for how do you combat something that is everywhere and nowhere? How do you engage something that is non-local? If an army is over there I can readily target it. If a particular munitions factor is over here, then I can readily target it. But how do we target something that is non-local and that is incorporeal? This is the problem with occupying an abstraction. Second, contemporary capitalism is massively redundant. This, I think, is what Wark is getting at when he speaks of contemporary power as “vectoral”. Under what Wark calls “vector power”, we have configurations of power where attacks at one site have very little impact insofar as flows can simply be re-channeled through another set of nodes in the network. Like a hydra, you cut off one head only to have another head appear in its place. The head can never be cut off once and for all because there is no single head. The crisis of contemporary politics is thus the crisis of the erasure of site. In the age of hyperobjects, we come to dwell in a world where there is no clear site of political antagonism and therefore no real sense of how and where to engage. Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it never escapes the burrows of academic journals, and conferences, and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives. So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else. Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko [wrote a wonderful and hilarious post](http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/the-practical-know-how-of-humanities-academics/) on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about.

### Util

#### Evaluate consequences for your decision—any other framing opens up the possibility for worse forms of violence

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As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one's intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics--as opposed to religion--pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with "good" may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of "good" that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one's goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### Extinction is worst possible impact—we must have existence to have any other value

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All attempts to listen to nature are social constructions-except one. Even the most radical postmodernist must acknowledge the distinction between physical existence and non-existence. As I have said, postmodernists accept that there is a physical substratum to the phenomenal world even if they argue about the different meanings we ascribe to it. This acknowledgment of physical existence is crucial. We can't ascribe meaning to that which doesn't appear. What doesn't exist can manifest no character. Put differently, yes, the postmodernist should rightly worry about interpreting nature's expressions. And all of us should be wary of those who claim to speak on nature's behalf (including environmentalists who do that). But we need not doubt the simple idea that a prerequisite of expression is existence. This in turn suggests that preserving the nonhuman world-in all its diverse embodiments-must be seen by eco-critics as a fundamental good. Eco-critics must be supporters, in some fashion, of environmental preservation. Postmodernists reject the idea of a universal good. They rightly acknowledge the difficulty of identifying a common value given the multiple contexts of our value-producing activity. In fact, if there is one thing they vehemently scorn, it is the idea that there can be a value that stands above the individual contexts of human experience. Such a value would present itself as a metanarrative and, as Jean-François Lyotard has explained, postmodernism is characterized fundamentally by its "incredulity toward meta-narratives." Nonetheless, I can't see how postmodern critics can do otherwise than accept the value of preserving the nonhuman world. The nonhuman is the extreme "other"; it stands in contradistinction to humans as a species. In understanding the constructed quality of human experience and the dangers of reification, postmodernism inherently advances an ethic of respecting the "other." At the very least, respect must involve ensuring that the "other" actually continues to exist. In our day and age, this requires us to take responsibility for protecting the actuality of the nonhuman. Instead, however, we are running roughshod over the earth's diversity of plants, animals, and ecosystems. Postmodern critics should find this particularly disturbing. If they don't, they deny their own intellectual insights and compromise their fundamental moral commitment.