# Resolved: Japan should revise Article 9 of its Constitution to develop offensive military capabilities.

#### Overview:

After World War II ended, the US occupied Japan, and it imposed a new democratic constitution on the country. Included in this new constitution was Article 9, which committed Japan to pacifism and renounced war. As a result, Japan’s military (called the Self Defense Forces or SDF) is incredibly limited, and it is not allowed to engage in offensive actions. In order to ensure that Japan had more robust military protection, it signed the US-Japan Security Treaty. This treaty allowed the US to establish and maintain military bases within Japan, and it promises that the US will defend Japan. Thus, the US has many military bases in Japan that it operates today, most of which are located in Okinawa. If Japan was constitutionally allowed to have a more active military, such an agreement would not need to exist.

Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made amending the constitution to revise Article 9 a priority. However, he was not able to achieve this before he stepped down in December, 2021. His successor, Yoshida Suga, has also pushed for such a change.

The debate around revising Article 9 centers primarily on international relations. Japan feels that its security is threatened by actors such as China and North Korea. Many proponents view revising the constitution as a way to better secure Japan against these actors. Similarly, Japan’s relationship with the United States will be a factor in this decision. Increasing domestic offense capabilities could reduce reliance on the US for military support, which could help end problems experienced in areas surrounding US military bases, allow for better collaboration, and increase Japan’s power in negotiations. On the other hand, revising Article 9 could have a lot of negative implications for international relations. China may feel threatened by such an act, triggering conflict. This could increase tensions with former colonies of Japan, like South Korea. Finally, Japan’s national identity is rooted in pacifism, which could be harmfully challenged by a revision.

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# Pro

#### We stand in affirmation of the following:

Japan should revise Article 9 of its Constitution to develop offensive military capabilities.

### Definitions

#### Article 9

Chanlett-Avery, Campbell, and Williams 19

Emma Chanlett-Avery (Coordinator, Specialist in Asian Affairs for the Congressional Research Service), Caitlin Campbell (Analyst in Asian Affairs) and Joshua A. Williams (Research Associate), Congressional Research Service, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, June 13, 2019, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL33740

Despite the passage of new security legislation in September 2015, several legal factors restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the postwar occupation, which outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted the article to mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1992, has allowed the SDF to participate in noncombat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), including in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The 2015 security legislation adjusts the SDF rules of engagement (ROE) to allow more proactive missions and expands the scope for the SDF to operate in theaters where there is ongoing conflict, but not on the front lines. It also allows it to participate in nonU.N. PKOs in a similar capacity. The direct participation of the SDF in combat operations is considered to be unconstitutional unless there is a threat to Japan’s existence. The overseas dispatch of the SDF requires approval of Japan’s parliament, the Diet.

### Framework

#### Cost benefit analysis

The framing for today’s round ought to be cost benefit analysis. If we demonstrate that revising Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to develop offensive military capabilities produces more good than harm, we should win the round.

### Contention 1: Relationship with the U.S.

#### The US’s role as Japan’s main military force gives it a large amount of influence in Japan.

Sebata 12

Takao Sebata (Professor of International Relations at the University of Nagasaki), Journal of the Faculty of Global Communication, University of Nagasaki, “Pros and cons for keeping United States Forces in Japan (USFJ)”, 2012, http://reposit.sun.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10561/944/1/v13p199\_sebata.pdf

In the area of foreign policy, too, Japan is limited by the United States. For example, the United States intervened in Japan’s normalization process with the Soviet Union, China, or North Korea. The United States threatened Japan not to return Okinawa to Japan forever if Japan concluded a peace treaty with the Soviet Union in 1956 over the Northern Territories. Japan’s normalization with China was delayed because of the United States antagonistic policy toward China. Japan is one of the few major countries that have not recognized North Korea since the United States has not normalized her relations with North Korea. Thirdly, Japan would be under United States pressure to open her domestic market in trade negotiations. From the 1960s on, the United States government often put pressure on the Japanese government to concede in the negotiations of textiles, steel, automobiles, computers, color television sets, and other home electrical appliances. Since many Japanese people think that the United States defends Japan, Japan must give in to the United States demand in a trade area. The Japanese Ministry of Finance has faithfully followed United States economic and fiscal policies investing huge amount of the Japanese money in the United States and supporting the value of the American dollar.

#### Article 9 limits Japan’s ability to cooperate fully with the U.S. militarily.

Congressional Research Service 19

Congressional Research Service, “The US-Japan Alliance”, June 13, 2019, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/RL33740.pdf

Despite the passage of new security legislation in September 2015, several legal factors restrict Japan’s ability to cooperate more robustly with the United States. The most prominent and fundamental is Article 9 of the Japanese constitution, drafted by American officials during the postwar occupation, which outlaws war as a “sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” It stipulates that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.” However, Japan has interpreted the article to mean that it can maintain a military for self-defense purposes and, since 1992, has allowed the SDF to participate in noncombat roles overseas in a number of U.N. peacekeeping operations (PKO), including in the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. The 2015 security legislation adjusts the SDF rules of engagement (ROE) to allow more proactive missions and expands the scope for the SDF to operate in theaters where there is ongoing conflict, but not on the front lines. It also allows it to participate in nonU.N. PKOs in a similar capacity.28 The SDF’s direct participation in combat operations is considered to be unconstitutional unless there is a threat to Japan’s existence. Dispatching the SDF overseas requires the approval of Japan’s parliament, the Diet. For years, Abe has spoken of his desire to amend the security provisions of Japan’s constitution. This could include revising Article 9. Although Abe and others seem to prefer to make broad changes to Article 9, such as revising it to allow Japan to fully exercise the right of collective self defense per the U.N. Charter, Abe has taken cues from a cautious public and advocated instead for a more narrowly defined revision to enshrine the constitutional legitimacy of the SDF.29 Even as national support for changing the constitution appears to have incrementally increased in recent years, the amendment process is onerous, requiring approval by first a two-thirds majority of both houses of the Diet and then by a simple majority of a national referendum.30 Despite Abe’s political strength, his ability to push through an amendment, which has yet to be drafted, is limited during his remaining years in office (his term is scheduled to end in September 2021).

### Contention 2: China

#### The threat of a potential regional conflict, started by a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, makes increased military capabilities crucial.

Gale 22

Alastair Gale (Asia Security Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal), The Wall Street Journal, “Rising Threat From China Pushes U.S. and Japan to Deepen Military Cooperation”, January 2, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/rising-threat-from-china-pushes-u-s-and-japan-to-deepen-military-cooperation-11641138867

These were the first joint drills between the Marines and Japan’s Self-Defense Forces that practiced destroying maritime targets using surface-to-ship missiles, controlled by Japanese and American officers working alongside each other to direct missiles, aircraft, ships and radar from both sides. “In the Indo-Pacific region you’re talking about huge distances,” said Maj. Ben Reading, the officer coordinating the simulated missile strikes for the Marines. “We have to fight together with our allies with all the assets that we can bring to bear.” Concerns about regional conflict, most significantly if China follows through on threats to seize Taiwan, are driving the U.S. and Japanese militaries to deepen their integration. More broadly, American allies and friends in the Asia-Pacific region are playing a larger role in deterring Beijing. Australia is building up its defenses by spending more than $180 billion on high-tech defense programs, including long-range missiles, and acquiring nuclear-powered submarines that use U.S. technology, while Taiwan plans to increase military spending over the next five years on missiles, ships and other items. Japan has been concerned by Chinese moves over the past decade to lay claim to Japanese-controlled islands in the East China Sea. In 2018, it created its Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade, modeled on the Marines. In recent computer-based war-games separate from the field exercises in northern Japan, U.S. participants including Brig. Gen. Kyle Ellison said they saw advances in the Japanese brigade’s ability to deploy and engage the enemy quickly. “Part of our ability to deter is making it not about one versus one, but one versus two, or one versus three, or one versus four,” said Gen. Ellison, deputy commander of a Marine force that would likely be on the front line of any clash in the western Pacific that draws in the U.S. Preparing for island conflict in the Pacific is now the primary focus of the Marines. In any clash over Taiwan, Japan would be unlikely to fight outside its own territory because of restrictions imposed by its pacifist constitution. But leaders in Tokyo now assume that any Taiwan conflict would spill over to nearby Japanese islands, and say they need to work with the U.S. to prepare.

#### China’s ambitions to take Taiwan threaten Japan.

Sacks 22

David Sacks (Research Fellow at CFR), Council on Foreign Relations, “The United States and Japan Should Prepare for Chinese Aggression Against Taiwan”, January 18, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/united-states-and-japan-should-prepare-chinese-aggression-against-taiwan

There is a growing recognition in Japan that a Chinese occupation of Taiwan would fundamentally challenge its security. If China were to station People’s Liberation Army (PLA) forces on Taiwan, its military would be only 110 kilometers from Yonaguni Island, Japan’s westernmost point. Such an outcome would render it far more difficult for Japan to defend Yonaguni, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, and Okinawa. Given that China views the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as a part of “Taiwan Province,” China could attempt to seize them during a conflict over Taiwan. If China achieved its objectives in spite of U.S. intervention, Japan would see its ally severely weakened, which would force it to fundamentally reconsider its foreign policy and defense posture. A successful Chinese annexation of Taiwan would also undermine Japan’s economic security. Taiwan is Japan’s fourth-largest export market, and should China control Taiwan, it would be able to curtail Japan’s access to that market. Over 40 percent of Japan’s maritime trade passes through the South China Sea; with control over Taiwan and its military installations throughout the South China Sea, China would be in a position to force shipping bound for Japan to take more inefficient routes, hurting Japan’s economy. In addition, China would presumably gain control of Pratas Island (currently administered by Taiwan), a strategic island adjacent to the entrance to the South China Sea from the Philippine Sea, further cementing its hold on this critical maritime artery. Finally, given Taiwan’s proximity to the approaches to Japan’s ports, during wartime China could threaten Japan’s import-dependent economy. Faced with this potentially dire scenario, Japanese leaders have begun to link Taiwan’s security with Japan’s, which would enable the country to play a role in Taiwan’s defense. This past June, Japan’s defense minister stated “the peace and stability of Taiwan is directly connected to Japan.” One month later, Japan’s deputy prime minister argued that “if a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation.” Such assessments would enable Japan to respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan under the auspices of exercising collective self-defense. Japanese prime minister Fumio Kishida has not gone this far but has argued that “the front line of the clash between authoritarianism and democracy is Asia, and particularly Taiwan,” and that Japan “cannot respond except by cooperating with our ally, the United States.” Former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has gone the furthest to date, declaring in November, “A Taiwan emergency is a Japanese emergency, and therefore an emergency for the Japan-U.S. alliance. People in Beijing, President Xi Jinping in particular, should never have a misunderstanding in recognizing this.” The United States and Japan have also begun to signal that preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait is becoming a greater priority for the alliance. In April 2021, for the first time in five decades, the two countries included a clause on Taiwan in their leader-level joint statement. Two weeks ago, during a meeting between the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and their Japanese counterparts, the two sides “underscored the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and “resolved to work together to deter and, if necessary, respond to destabilizing activities in the region.” Strong statements notwithstanding, there remain questions regarding what level of support Japan would offer the United States during a conflict. Critically, at a minimum the United States would need to use it forces on Japan, but doing so would require prior consultation with Tokyo. This mechanism has never been invoked, and it could delay a U.S. military response with significant operational consequences. It is also unclear how much Japan would be willing to actively assist the United States. According to its constitution, Japan could only offer its broadest support, such as ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and combat operations alongside the United States, if it views a Chinese attack as representing a “survival-threatening situation.” While at first glance it might seem as though an attack on Taiwan would not meet this threshold, a Chinese takeover of Taiwan could be seen as posing a danger to Japan’s survival given its proximity to Japanese territory. In addition, the government’s advisory panel argued that a “survival-threatening situation” should include one in which “not taking action could significantly undermine trust in the Japan-U.S. alliance” or “the international order itself could be significantly affected.” A failure to assist the United States in coming to Taiwan’s defense could be seen as fatally weakening the U.S.-Japan alliance. Given Kishida’s statement that Taiwan is the front line of an ideological competition between democracy and authoritarianism, Japan could also be coming to the view that a Chinese attack would be considered a threat to international order.

#### In order to deter China, Japan must remove Article 9.

Kadota 21

Ryusho Kadota (Law Degree from Chuo University, author and journalist), Japan Forward, “U.S.-Imposed Article 9 of the Constitution Threatens the Lives of Japanese People”, May 18, 2021, https://japan-forward.com/u-s-imposed-article-9-of-the-constitution-threatens-the-lives-of-japanese-people/

It all started with the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” or the “Chinese Dream,” which President Xi Jinping has been proclaiming since 2013. His vision is to achieve global hegemony by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, and is strongly linked to the Sinocentric ideology boasted by successive Chinese dynasties. For China, the ideal world revolves around the Chinese empire to which barbarians must obey and pay tribute. The premise of the Chinese Dream is making right the injustices China perceives it suffered in its “century of humiliation” (roughly 1839-1949). The “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” can only be achieved if China dispels the humiliation that started with the Opium War, and included Western (and Japanese) concessions in its major cities, the founding of Manchuko, and continental rule by over a million foreign troops. It must not be forgotten that Japan is the main target of China’s resentment. And, yet, Japan has no means to counter a possible Chinese invasion, except to rely on the United States to save its neck. Europe founded the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 to counter the Soviet Union with the deterrent power of its collective self-defense. If a member state was attacked by the Soviet Union, it would be seen as an attack on the alliance as a whole and would provoke collective retaliation. This collective security system has protected Europe from Soviet and Russian aggression for 72 years. A Constitution That Secures Peace Through Deterrence Since 2000, the success or failure of becoming a NATO member has been a determining factor in the fate of several countries. The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania successfully joined NATO despite struggling with Russian intervention. In contrast, Ukraine and Georgia failed to join NATO because of strong domestic pro-Russian sentiment and their failure to sway public opinion. The fate of the two countries is still fresh in my mind. Ukraine suffered the annexation of Crimea, and Georgia had two of its regions declared independent. Their situations are eerily similar to that of Japan, with China encroaching on its politics, business, and mass media. Right to Collective Self-Defense The right to collective self-defense to secure the peace should be used as a deterrent — not by the United States alone, but by countries forming an alliance to create an Asian version of NATO to stop China’s attempts to alter the status quo by force. However, Japan is denied the right to collective self-defense under Article 9 of the Constitution. This is why the Constitution has become a threat to the lives of Japanese people. Acquiring the right to collective self-defense and constitutionalizing the Japan Self-Defense Forces are vital. With these two points in mind, I would like to offer an example of what an amendment to Article 9 of the Constitution should look like.

### Contention 3: American Military Bases

#### The presence of U.S. military bases in Japan is a result of Article 9.

Maizland and Cheng 21

Lindsay Maizland (Senior Writer/Editor) and Nathanael Cheng (writer), Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, November 4, 2021, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/us-japan-security-alliance

Signed in 1951 alongside the Treaty of San Francisco that formally ended World War II, the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty was a ten-year, renewable agreement that outlined how Japan, in light of its pacifist constitution, would allow U.S. forces to remain on its soil after Japan regained sovereignty. This early pact dovetailed with the Yoshida Doctrine—a postwar strategy crafted by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida that saw Japan rely on the United States for its security needs so the country could focus on rebuilding its economy. At the time, the United States was keen on using the alliance to bolster its strategic presence in East Asia. It faced a divided Korean Peninsula in the wake of the Korean War and a Cold War climate in which the Chinese and Soviet militaries were expanding their breadth and capabilities. Against this security backdrop, Yoshida’s government created the Self-Defense Force (SDF) in 1954, despite strong domestic objections based on Article Nine of the postwar constitution, which eschews the maintenance of military forces or the use of those forces to settle international disputes. In 1960, the U.S.-Japan agreement was revised, granting the United States the right to establish bases on the archipelago in exchange for a commitment to defend Japan in the event of an attack. The bases gave the U.S. military its first permanent foothold in Asia. Years later, the United States sparked protest in Japan by using the bases to support combat operations during the Vietnam War. In 1967, Prime Minister Eisaku Sato established the Three Non-Nuclear Principles—no possession, production, or introduction—in part to allay concerns that the nuclear arms on U.S. bases in Japan would expose the country to attacks. Since then, Japan has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter potential aggressors.

#### US military personnel in bases in Japan have a history of causing harm to local populations.

Mitchell 21

Jon Mitchell (Investigative journalist and author based in Japan), The Incercept, “NCIS CASE FILES REVEAL UNDISCLOSED U.S. MILITARY SEX CRIMES IN OKINAWA”, October 3, 2021, https://theintercept.com/2021/10/03/okinawa-sexual-crimes-us-military/

DESPITE THE SEVERITY of the offense, and the lax punishment, the sailor’s crime was not made public. It required a series of Freedom of Information Act requests, which I filed with the NCIS in 2018 and 2019 and wrote about for the Okinawa Times in August. (This is the first publication of the FOIA results in English.) According to the NCIS case files, between 2017 and 2019 there were at least seven other investigations into U.S. military personnel for sexual offenses against Japanese women in Okinawa — and none were made public. Perpetrators had not been punished under Japanese law nor had their cases appeared in the annual reports produced by the Pentagon’s Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office for the U.S. Congress. (The Intercept has revealed similar gaps in reporting sexual assaults committed by U.S. troops in Africa.) At the time of publication, United States Forces Japan had not provided comment on the apparent omission of these cases from the SAPRO reports. It is a pattern familiar to Suzuyo Takazato, co-chair of the feminist group Okinawa Women Act Against Military Violence and chair of the Rape Emergency Intervention Counseling Center Okinawa. “Both the U.S. and Japanese governments want to minimize people’s awareness of the number of crimes committed by U.S. service members on Okinawa. They think if this information becomes public, it will harm U.S.-Japan relations. They believe the U.S.-Japan relationship should take priority over the rights of Okinawans,” she said. Today, Okinawa prefecture is the reluctant host to 31 U.S. military bases, which occupy approximately 15 percent of the main island. Although the prefecture consists of less than 1 percent of Japan’s total land mass, it has 70 percent of the country’s U.S. facilities; 11 of the bases in Okinawa belong to the U.S. Marine Corps. Washington and Tokyo insist that these troops are needed to maintain stability in the region, but a majority of Okinawans have repeatedly expressed resentment toward the disproportionate burden placed on their prefecture. In a 2017 survey of residents conducted by Japan’s public broadcaster, NHK, 26 percent of respondents called for all U.S. bases to be removed from their island, and another 51 percent wanted them to be reduced to a level equivalent to mainland Japan. Packing so many military facilities onto Okinawa concentrates many of the problems there: aircraft accidents, environmental contamination, and crime, particularly against women.

### Extra Cards:

#### If the US defends Taiwan when China invades, Japan could be left without much help.

Yoshitomi 22

Nozomu Yoshitomi, War on the Rocks, “HOW JAPAN CAN HELP SAVE TAIWAN: SECURING THE FIRST ISLAND CHAIN”, March 23, 2022, https://warontherocks.com/2022/03/ukraines-lessons-for-japan-securing-the-first-island-chain/

There is a big difference in the defense posture between the Southwest Islands and the Luzon Strait. Regarding the Southwest Islands, Chinese operational behavior in the waters around the Senkaku Islands in the western part of this island chain has been challenging Japanese territorial sovereignty. For example, the Japan Coast Guard reported the number of Chinese government vessels intruding into Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands was 108 in 2021. Against the backdrop of this tension in the Southwest Islands, the military has been enhancing Japan’s defense posture. The Ground Self-Defense Force is now deploying anti-ship missile batteries, air defense batteries, infantry units, support units, and intelligence units on some islands. New electromagnetic units will be deployed in the near future. The Air Self-Defense Force has doubled the number of fighter aircraft on the airbase on Okinawa Island. And the Maritime Self-Defense Forces around the Southwest Islands seem to be activated recently. On the other hand, too little is being done to enhance the defense posture of the Luzon Strait. Meanwhile, it was recently reported that India has decided to supply the Philippines with the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile system. This missile system has an estimated 160 nautical mile range (290 kilometers). If the Armed Forces of the Philippines install these missile systems — and also develop the required sensor and communication architecture to effectively employ them — in the northern part of the Philippines, they can cover all waters of the Luzon Strait. However, the Philippines’ capabilities for air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and electromagnetic warfare are known to be extremely limited. Therefore, the PLA would likely still have a relatively easy passage into the Pacific Ocean going through the Luzon Strait when compared to the Southwest Islands option. The PLA’s recent provocative flight through the southern part of Taiwan’s air defense identification zone might be an indication that Beijing currently believes the Luzon Strait entrance into the Pacific Ocean is vulnerable. Given the gap in defense posture between the Southwest Islands and the Luzon Strait, the latter is a weakness. Therefore, the U.S. Marine Corps would do better to allocate its limited resources for expeditionary advanced base operations to the Luzon Strait. If the U.S. Marine Corps were to deploy its littoral regiments in this area, along with the service’s F-35B and forthcoming MQ-9 maritime surveillance squadrons, it would enhance the sea-denial posture on the south side of Taiwan. Fortunately, the Philippines’ Batanes Islands and the Babuyan Islands are located in the Luzon Strait. Those islands and the northern part of Luzon Island are suitable to enable the establishment of partnered expeditionary advanced bases alongside the Philippines armed forces. If the U.S. Marine Corps focuses primarily on the Luzon Strait, Japan’s forces will likely have to conduct sea-denial operations against the PLA mostly if not exclusively on their own. What changes should they make to ensure they are properly prepared for such a situation? In the initial phase of a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the PLA will likely attack military assets and facilities in and around Japan to prevent the Japan Self-Defense Forces from cooperating with U.S. forces. This attack would likely be sudden, massive, and conducted in a sophisticated manner by air, naval, missile, drone, electromagnetic, cyber, and special operations. Unfortunately, it would be difficult for Japan to prevent this attack and keep air and maritime superiority around the Southwest Islands. Therefore, its forces need to find ways to conduct sea denial in this situation. The current Japanese strategy to defend the Southwest Islands consists of three phases. The first phase is deterrence by units located in the Southwest Islands in peacetime, the second phase is reinforcement by units from Japan’s mainland to enhance the defense posture, and the last phase is retaking the islands, should the PLA successfully invade them. In the last phase, the Amphibious Rapid Deployment Brigade located on the mainland would attempt to conduct an amphibious assault with support by the air and maritime forces. However, considering the PLA’s likely air and maritime superiority around the Southwest Islands in time of war, such an assault, including a long voyage and flight from Japan’s mainland, would be very dangerous and likely lead to thousands of casualties. This is a serious challenge for the Japan Self-Defense Forces.

#### Japan’s self-defense group has begun to address cybersecurity.

The Japan Times 22

The Japan times, “Japan's Self-Defense Forces launch new cyberdefense unit”, March 17, 2022, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2022/03/17/national/sdf-cyberdefense-unit/

The Self-Defense Forces launched a newly reorganized cyberdefense unit on Thursday to enhance the country’s response to attacks in cyberspace, a security domain that has played an increasingly important role in global conflicts. The group, composed of around 540 personnel, is tasked with developing human resources, supporting practical training and managing information and communication networks. The government sees the fields of outer space, cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum as key pillars in the military balance among nations and in boosting Japan’s defense capabilities. The establishment of the new cyber unit at the Defense Ministry headquarters in Tokyo reflects the urgent need to improve the SDF’s capabilities in cyberspace. “The threat of cyberattacks has been increasing and becoming more sophisticated day by day. As we face an urgent task to appropriately respond to it, the reorganization of the defense unit is a major step forward,” Defense Minister Nobuo Kishi said in a ceremony to mark the launch of the unit. The new unit combines cyber departments that had been dispersed among the Self-Defense Forces and will centralize cyber countermeasures.

#### Article 9 complicates Japan’s approach to cybersecurity.

Council on Foreign Relations 18

Council on Foreign Relations, “How Japan’s Pacifist Constitution Shapes Its Approach to Cyberspace”, March 23, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/how-japans-pacifist-constitution-shapes-its-approach-cyberspace

According to a recent government consultation document, Tokyo is looking to focus a significant portion of its revised national defense strategy on deterring adversaries in cyberspace—a first for the country. As over thirty countries develop offensive cyber capabilities, Japan seeks to specifically deter cyber operations that can disrupt Japan’s national security or threaten the lives or rights of Japanese citizens. The document also notes that Tokyo will use all of its diplomatic, economic, and technological means to achieve its deterrence aims, though it interestingly never references the use of the SDF as part of its deterrent. Japan’s emphasis on deterrence is consistent with discussions it has had with the United Kingdom and the United States. So far, there has been little discussion on how exactly Japan will deter adversaries. There are generally two approaches to deterrence: by punishment or by denial. Under the first approach, Japan would threaten adversaries with a punishment so severe that they would refrain from attacking it. Effectively punishing adversaries in cyberspace requires a lot of preparatory work, much of which needs to be done before an attack occurs. For example, if Japan wanted to shut down an adversary network in response to an attack against it, Japanese cyber operators will need to have already identified which networks are important to the adversary, what software they run and vulnerabilities it might have, and exploited them. This preparatory work should ideally take place before Japan is attacked if it is to punish its attacker a timely manner and send the signal it wants to send. Under the constraints of Japan’s constitution, it’s unclear whether any of these offensive operations to prepare the battlefield, even in support of deterrence approach or to respond to an armed attack, would be legal. The second approach, deterrence by denial, requires Japan to improve its cyber defenses to the point where any prospective adversary would simply not bother attacking it given that the costs of attack outweigh any benefit. That would require that Japan understand the cyber threats it faces, and make the necessary strategic investments in cybersecurity technologies and professionals across the Japanese government and business. That may prove challenging because the Japanese employment system and intelligence community differ completely from those in the United States or the United Kingdom. Japan still largely depends on a lifetime employment system, where an employee will start with one company and remain there until he or she retires. As a result, cybersecurity experts that have cut their teeth in the Japanese government or intelligence communities rarely move to the private sector. The lack of cross-pollination between the government and private sector also makes it challenging for government to understand the threats business face and how to protect them. Deterrence by denial won’t work if Japan does not avail itself of all of the tools at its disposal to increase the costs to prospective attackers.

#### The US’s military presence in Japan is large.

Craft 22

Lucy Craft (journalist), CBS, “Japan approves 5 years more funding for U.S. military presence as China, Russia and North Korea threats loom large”, March 25, 2022, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/japan-us-military-host-nation-budget-china-north-korea-russia-threats/

Japanese government spending to cover the cost of hosting American troops — an issue which became contentious during the Trump administration — has been finalized by Japan's parliament. The new $8.6 billion, five-year, host-nation support budget takes effect in April and runs through 2027. It reflects a growing emphasis on integration between the two countries' forces and a focus on joint response and deterrence amid rising threats from China, North Korea and Russia. The budget approved on Friday represents a more moderate increase on the previous funding package, with almost $616 million more allocated over the five years, but it is also notable for its attempt to shift the focus to bilateral defense. Once known as a "sympathy" budget, host-nation support has been controversial in Japan, with public uproar over spending on things like golf courses and bowling alleys, and more broadly on the impact of the large American troop presence on Japanese communities. But Tokyo has stopped calling it a "sympathy" and now refers to the cost-sharing as an important element of deepening the bilateral alliance. Japan frequently cites a 2004 U.S. Department of Defense report which calculated that Tokyo covered nearly 75% of the cost of stationing U.S. troops in the country, compared to the 40% of costs covered by South Korea to keep American forces in that country. As China pursues territorial claims in the East China Sea, site of the disputed Japanese-controlled Senkaku islands (known in China as Daioyu), Japan has ramped up joint training not only with the U.S., but with Australia, Britain and other partners. The U.S. has about 55,000 troops deployed in Japan, stationed at more than half a dozen bases and other facilities.

#### To help Ukraine, Japan had to go through the US.

Reuters 22

Reuters, “U.S. begins flying Japanese non-lethal military aid to Ukraine”, March 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/us-begins-flying-japanese-non-lethal-military-aid-ukraine-2022-03-16/

A U.S. Air Force cargo jet began shipping on Wednesday helmets and other non-lethal military kit donated by Japan to Ukraine, marking the first time an American aircraft has carried Japanese Self Defense Force gear to another country. A C-17 transport jet flew from the United States to touch down at the Yokota air base near Tokyo, and pick up three truckloads of plastic-wrapped boxes. Japan's government declined to list the equipment inside. "We won U.S. military support to use their planes so we are sending them on those aircraft so the equipment can arrive as soon as possible," said Makoto Oniki, Japan's vice minister of defence. He spoke at the U.S. military's Asian air transport hub as ground crews behind him loaded the cargo onto the C-17, which can carry about 77 tons. Japan has followed its ally, the United States, and other Western industrialised nations in imposing tough sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine.

#### Russia has sailed military transports near Japan, hinting at a threat.

Reuters 22

Reuters, “Japan spots four Russian amphibious transports sailing from Far East”, March 16, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/japan-spots-four-russian-amphibious-transports-sailing-far-east-2022-03-17/

Japan's military said on Thursday that it had spotted four large Russian amphibious warfare ships sailing close to its islands as they traveled west, possibly towards Europe. Pictures of the amphibious transports, typically used for landing expeditionary forces ashore, published by Japan's defence ministry showed what appeared to be military trucks loaded onto the deck of one of the vessels. We don't know where they are heading, but their heading suggest it is possible," a Japanese defence ministry spokesman said. Asked if they could be bound for Ukraine, he said "it is possible". A Japanese Self Defense Force maritime patrol first detected the Russian vessels, which can carry dozens of tanks other military vehicles and hundreds of troops, on Tuesday and monitored them as they passed West from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of Japan through the narrow Tsuruga Strait separating Japan's main Honshu island from Hokkaido island on Wednesday. It is unusual for Russian ships to pass through the strait so close to Japanese territory, the military spokesman said. Armed with anti-tank weapons supplied by the United States and other countries Ukrainian fighters have taken a heavy toll on Russian armour and fuel trucks, meaning Moscow, which describes its attack as a "special operation," may need to reinforce its forces with new equipment. NATO allies, which have already supplied 20,000 anti-tank and other weapons to Ukraine, on Wednesday said they would keep helping the country resist the Russian attack.

#### The relationship between Russia and Japan is heating up.

Elliott 22

Philip Elliott (Washington Correspondent for TIME), Time, “Why the End of Japan and Russia’s World War II Peace Negotiations May Matter More Than You Think”, March 23, 2022, https://time.com/6160029/japan-russia-wwii-ukraine/

Frustrated by Japan’s sanctions of Russia for its aggression in Ukraine, the Foreign Ministry in Moscow on Monday of this week notified its counterparts in Tokyo that World War II peace treaty talks are over for now. On Tuesday, Japan reacted as expected, declaring such an end to talks “completely unacceptable,” about as strong as you get in diplo-speak. You see, the Soviet Union and Japan never actually signed a peace treaty after World War II ended in 1945, much like the United States still technically remains at war with North Korea despite active fighting ending in 1953. Moscow and Tokyo signed a declaration of peace in 1956, which allowed cultural and economic exchanges to continue while diplomats hammered out a deal on a series of four remote islands the Soviets had seized in the final days of the war. In Russia—and the Soviet Union before—they are the Kurils; in Japan, they’re the Northern Territories. Russia clearly doesn’t have the military bandwidth to launch a second front in its quest to rebuild the former Soviet Union—if not the Russian Empire itself. But it knows it has just enough juice to rattle analysts in Tokyo and beyond. Technically, post-World War II Japan isn’t allowed to have a military and nominally relies on foreign might. But Western resistance to a Japanese military force faded over time, and Tokyo has built up its capabilities for a defensive posture with a guiding hand from the West. All of which means an errant Russian attack on Japan could force the United States into a live-fire war that Biden has pledged not to join with American troops. It could coerce Washington to back up with force its rhetoric that Moscow is engaging in “war crimes” (language that is unhelpful, both sides concede, because it ultimately demands international action). None of that reassured Japan last week, though, when two waves of Russian warships navigated Japan’s Tsugaru Strait—as is allowed and in plain view of Japan’s officials—as Moscow seemed to move backup forces toward Ukraine. According to DefenseNews, the four ships are the entirety of Russia’s Pacific Command’s amphibious fleet, which suggests Moscow is realizing it needs backup over in Vladivostok. Which is why Russia’s decision to warn Japan that its de facto peace is at risk brought with it a screech on the diplomatic record player. Russia clearly has plenty on its plate as it moves forces for backup and faces down a unified Europe gathering at NATO headquarters this week. Japan’s sanctions have been escalating, and following the West’s lead, Japan revoked Russia’s trading loophole and said it would start taking Ukrainian refugees. But there’s always a risk for Washington, especially when it is distracted. Most of D.C.’s political class are watching Judge Jackson’s hearings with a mix of pride, disgust, and disbelief that elected Senators are dealing in such different worlds, temporarily drawing some attention away from Ukraine. You’re seeing strategists in both parties tell clients that the results of this fall’s U.S. elections will not hinge on Ukraine. Inflation is slamming American families, and they’re looking for someone to blame. Interest in the war seems to have hit its peak in the U.S., at least for now. Yet on the Eastern Front of the former Soviet Union, Russian President Vladimir Putin may have one more move to make. And that is to draw the United States into another World War, one that it’s obligated to join. Decades-old detente is attractive for the liberal post-war world, but if the last months have taught us anything, it’s that Moscow has little appreciation for that stasis. Washington would do well to watch the corner of the Pacific that Russia and Japan share.

#### Japan has been taking action against Russia.

Aljazeera 22

Aljazeera, “Japan to freeze assets of 25 more Russians over Ukraine invasion”, March 25, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/3/25/japan-to-freeze-assets-of-further-25-russian-individuals

Japan will freeze the assets of 25 more Russians and prohibit exports to 81 Russian organisations in response to Moscow’s war in Ukraine, the country’s foreign ministry said on Friday. The move comes after Prime Minister Fumio Kishida said on Thursday Japan will take steps to revoke Russia’s “most favoured nation” trade status and prevent domestic cryptocurrency exchanges from carrying out transactions with sanctioned entities. Tokyo has unveiled a raft of punitive measures against Russia in recent weeks, including sanctions focusing on the deputy chiefs of staff for President Vladimir Putin’s administration, the head of the Chechen Republic, and executives of companies with close ties to the Kremlin. The East Asian country has also targeted Russia’s central bank, restricted the country’s access to the SWIFT international payments system, and banned exports of Russia-bound oil refinery equipment. Leading Japanese firms including Toyota, Honda, Nintendo and Sony have also halted exports to Russia, citing concerns about logistics, supply chains or safety. Japan, one of the United States’s closest Asian allies, has adopted a tougher line against Moscow than other countries in the region, most of which have declined to assign blame for the conflict. Apart from Japan, only South Korea, Singapore and the self-ruled island of Taiwan have announced sanctions against Moscow.

#### Removing Article 9 will not lead to needless Japanese involvement in overseas conflicts.

Hornung 18

Jeffrey W. Hornung, War on the Rocks, “REVISING JAPAN’S PEACE CONSTITUTION: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING”, March 21, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/revising-japans-peace-constitution-much-ado-about-nothing/

Critics’ biggest concern is that this revision will loosen important constraints on the SDF that could lead to it being used in combat operations overseas. The most vociferous domestic critics have been the Japanese Communist Party and the Social Democratic Party, which have enshrined their anti-revision views into their campaign manifestos. Externally, China and South Korea fear that revision will upset the liberal order and usher in a return to a more aggressive Japan. But these concerns are unfounded. Because the current restrictions stemming from the existing Article 9 would remain in place, critics are wrong to fear that adding the SDF to the provision will lead directly to an expansion of Japan’s forces or changes in their rules of engagement, weapons use standards, or ability to use force. The proposed revision does not establish a basis for the SDF to be deployed on combat missions abroad or to use force outside of a specific defense operation. For changes like these to occur, Japan would have to pass new legislation that outlines broader mission sets and revisions to the SDF Law. But these do not require constitutional revision. In fact, many changes relating to these areas were already passed in a batch of security laws in 2015. Notably, these laws only led to slight changes in the SDF’s operations and combat authorities, keeping in place a myriad of constraints that favor defensive activities.

#### Removing Article 9 has positive diplomatic implications.

Atlantic Council 20

Atlantic Council, “How the coronavirus impacts Japan’s prospects for constitutional revision”, May 20, 2020, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/how-the-coronavirus-impacts-japans-prospects-for-constitutional-revision/

For Japan’s US ally and European partners, any more solid legal footing for the 2015 peace and security legislation that might be provided by constitutional revision can only be a net positive. Although there is still little practical understanding in Europe of the benefits of the SDF’s new authorities for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, the potential impact, including on future NATO operations, is not insignificant. China and North Korea both reacted negatively to Japan’s peace and security legislation, with China accusing Japan of endangering regional peace and security. A related constitutional change would thus likely be spurned by Japan’s competitors, but given that the lid on regional tensions did not come off when the legislation was passed and entered into force, a far more dramatic shift from the status quo in practical terms, then the notion that it would do so as the result of a constitutional referendum is unfounded. It is for Japan’s people and no one else to decide how they feel about adding language to Article 9. Opinions on the issue are not consistent across recent polls, with a 2020 Asahi Shimbun poll finding 65 percent opposed to amending Article 9 and a 2020 Kyodo poll finding 49 percent in favor. Whether or not the Japanese public will face such a choice in the near future now seems inextricably tied with the coronavirus; either it will scuttle efforts to hold a constitutional referendum before the end of Abe’s term or it will be the impetus for an accelerated effort.

# Con

#### We stand in negation of the following:

Japan should revise Article 9 of its Constitution to develop offensive military capabilities.

### Definitions

### Framework

#### Cost benefit analysis

The framing for today’s round ought to be cost benefit analysis. If we demonstrate that revising Article 9 of Japan’s constitution to develop offensive military capabilities produces more harm than good, we should win the round.

### Contention 1: China

#### China will be unhappy with this constitutional change.

Yongtao 17

Gui Yongtao (associate professor at the School of International Studies and assistant president of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at Peking University), Council on Foreign Relations, “A Chinese View: The Risks of Changing Japan’s Peace Constitution”, May 11, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/chinese-view-risks-changing-japans-peace-constitution

The future of Japan’s peace constitution also has significant implications for the China-Japan relationship. When the two governments mended their soured relations and committed themselves to promote a “strategic relationship of mutual benefit” in 2008, China made it clear in the joint statement that it “takes a positive view of Japan pursuing a path of a nation striving for peace and making contribution to world peace and stability through peaceful means over the past sixty years since the end of World War II.” This evaluation of Japan’s past connotes the Chinese hope that Japan continues to pursue the path of a peaceful country in the future. Such hope is indeed a critical element in determining China’s overall assessment of Japan, since average Chinese still have deeply rooted apprehensions about Japan repeating its militarist mistakes. As public opinion plays an increasingly larger role in shaping China’s foreign policy, Chinese people’s trust in Japan’s adherence to pacifism becomes essential for any improvement of the bilateral relationship. The risk is that Abe may be tempted to exaggerate China’s threat so as to justify his policy and prevail in domestic debates. In other words, he will have little incentive to improve relations with China as long as he focuses his political agenda on constitutional revision. This will deepen the mistrust between the two countries and create new obstacles to regional cooperation.

#### Remilitarization will threaten China, potentially causing conflict.

Rodriguez 21

Gabriel Rodriguez (data scientist and freelance author with a master’s degree in sociolinguistics from Georgetown University, where he studied the political underpinnings of language endangerment with a focus in East Asia), Jacobin Magazine, “No, Japan Should Not Remilitarize”, October 24, 2021, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2021/10/japan-jsdf-remilitarization-article-9-us-foreign-policy-biden-asian-pivot

Before and during World War II, the Japanese military committed some of the worst atrocities in recorded history, of which the Rape of Nanjing is probably the most infamous. The enslavement of hundreds of thousands of primarily Korean women (euphemistically termed “comfort women”) for sexual exploitation was so violent and widespread that it continues to be the defining event for a generation of women in Korea. The testing of biological weapons on coastal Chinese cities killed hundreds of thousands in man-made bubonic plague epidemics. Precise numbers are almost impossible to come by due to the wholesale destruction of the Japanese archives, but scholarly estimates of the number of civilians deliberately killed during the official period of Japanese fascism reach into the millions. Considering this history, it’s not surprising that Japan’s neighbors — particularly Korea and China — have objected to any form of rearmament. The Japanese military has increasingly pushed for long-range strike capabilities with missiles that could reach Chinese and Korean cities, supposedly to destroy North Korean missile launchers as a form of preemptive defense. China and both Koreas have understandably viewed this as a provocation. Chinese state media has been abundantly clear that China emphatically rejects any move by Japan to remilitarize. Chi Wang, who was an honorary consultant on US-China trade for the H. W. Bush administration, has argued that China should be more afraid of the Japanese military than the American one. North Korea’s belligerent stance toward Japan obviously has not been assuaged by the expansion of its military, and there are indications that South Korea, nominally Japan’s ally, views a resurgent Japan as a greater threat to its national security than China or even North Korea. In one of the worst-case scenarios, Japan’s acquisition of offensive-strike capabilities triggers a North Korean or Chinese preemptive attack. For that reason, international proponents of remilitarization tend to agree that Japan should reassure its neighbors that it is exclusively building defensive capabilities, if only as a matter of strategic optics. But Japan’s actions belie the claim: in 2020 the JSDF pushed for more investment in long-range missiles and force-projecting aircraft carriers. Even bearing in mind the potential downsides, there are still arguments for developing Japan’s defensive military capacities that are not prima facie unreasonable. Building Japan’s military independence could reduce US involvement in the region, and despite the risks of destabilization, it is not impossible that, if managed correctly, it could discourage “aggression” on the part of China and North Korea. But this leads us to the problem with the Anglo-American arguments. If there is a cost-benefit analysis to be made weighing the benefits of remilitarization against the rise of reactionary politics in Japan and the East Asian response to remilitarization, no one in “the Blob” appears to have done it. In fact, the glibness with which Washington experts dismiss the discomfort Japan’s neighbors feel toward its growing military assertiveness is remarkable, as is the absence of concern about the rise of the Japanese far right. In the New York Times, Ian Buruma ultimately concludes that South Korea’s objections are somewhat irrational and driven by “historical passions.” In the Wall Street Journal, Patrick McCabe, an employee of US Indo-Pacific Command, the agency in charge of the military’s Pacific operations, claims that Japanese remilitarization is nothing more than “Beijing’s narrative.” Perhaps most notably, an article written in Foreign Affairs in 2014 by Biden’s Asia czar Kurt M. Campbell and his top Asia advisor in the Pentagon, Ely Ratner, claims that “characteriz[ing] Japan’s constitutional reinterpretation and military modernization as reactionary or militaristic” is “Chinese propaganda.” They acknowledge some of Abe’s more offensive gestures, but wave them off as unfortunate public relations blunders rather than an indication of what lies beneath the surface of Japanese remilitarization.

### Contention 2: International Relations

#### This will have negative implications for international relations.

Mason 21

Ra Mason (Lecturer in International Relations and Japanese Foreign Policy, University of East Anglia), The Conversation, “Japan: pressure from populist right to scrap ‘peace constitution’ after 75 years”, November 8, 2021, https://theconversation.com/japan-pressure-from-populist-right-to-scrap-peace-constitution-after-75-years-171333

This has serious implications. Domestically, it reflects the rise and dominance of revisionist conservatism, and the decimation of more progressive, liberal opposition forces. Internationally, it will send alarm bells ringing across the Asia-Pacific. Any indication that Japan might revise its constitution is likely to spark angry reactions from Japan’s former colonies and victims of militarist wartime aggression. This risks worsening relations with two of Japan’s biggest trading partners in China and South Korea, as well as damaging its regional image as a trustworthy leader of peaceful economic and investment regimes. It could also further isolate Tokyo amid an already tense security environment. Japan’s relations with both Koreas remain strained. And close alignment with its sole alliance partner, the United States, perpetuates tension with a more muscular China. This includes the issue of Taiwan. Meanwhile Japan, China and Taiwan all claim the disputed Pinnacle Islands, which are referred to respectively as Senkaku, Diaoyu and Diaoyutai. Recent reinterpretations of Article 9 already allow Japan to operate various forms of collective defence with allied countries in exceptional circumstances. Tokyo also regularly dispatches the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) overseas. In this regard, with American backing and a flexible interpretation of “self defence”, there is little practical need to formally revise a constitution that has served Japan so well during peacetime.

#### Due to Japan’s military history, revising article 9 will spark backlash from China and South Korea, who it depends on economically.

Tollefson 18

Julie Jo Tollefson (MA in International and Comparative Politics from Wright State University), Wright State University CORE Scholar, “Japan's Article 9 and Japanese Public Opinion: Implications for Japanese Defense Policy and Security in the Asia Pacific”, 2018, https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3075&context=etd\_all

The Asia Pacific is a subtle, churning miasma of regional tensions, territorial disputes, and arms races. Territorial disputes exist between China, Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the South and East China Seas. South Korea and China remain unsatisfied by Japan’s apologies for war crimes during World War II. Comfort women from South Korea demonstrate uncompromising behavior towards Japan, although Japan had offered an apology and financial compensation in 2015. A statue representing these WWII victims was erected outside of the Japanese embassy in South Korea in early 2017. Even expectations for Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe to address the Korean comfort women issue at the 2018 winter Olympics were present, despite the 2015 agreement (Kim and Seig 2018). Military buildup in China and Japan causes ripples of tension throughout Asia Pacific. Both countries have yet to reach an agreement concerning bilateral relations though as of early 2018, Prime Minister Abe and President Xi Jinping have publically declared interests in improving ties (Suruga 2017). Actors not native to Asia Pacific such as the United States have also contributed to the distress in the region. The installation of the United States’ Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system in South Korea as well as Japan’s consideration of purchasing THAAD have triggered ruptures in Sino-Korean, Sino-Japanese and Sino-U.S. relations. (“South Korea’s Lotte” Jourdan and Lee) What is the justification for these undesirable conditions? Much of the genesis of conflict in the Asia Pacific can be traced back to 1910 and later during the First World War when China and the Korean Peninsula quickly became victims of Japanese colonialism. Therefore, this research will analyze Japan’s history as well as its present actions in order to unpack regional tensions in the Asia Pacific. Since Imperial Japan was a militaristic state and most war crimes in Japan’s colonial territories were committed by the Japanese military, this research specifically examines Japanese defense policies. Most importantly, this research will focus on the debate surrounding Article 9 of the Japanese constitution established in 1947. An amendment to the Japanese constitution requires a public referendum therefore this research will also analyze Japanese public opinion data in order to determine the possibility of Article 9 being revised and consequently, a major rebalance in the Asia Pacific security environment. Post-World War II Japan exhibits the world’s first successfully externally imposed democracy. Compared to neighboring China, Vietnam, the Korean Peninsula, and the Philippines, Japan has exhibited nearly seven decades of peaceful, westernized democratic rule. Other aspects of the Japanese state further differentiate the island nation from its neighbors. Post-WWII Japan is the only state in the Asia Pacific with a military purely for the purpose of defense, in accordance with Article 9 of the constitution. Japan exhibits more constraints concerning military development and utility than any other Asia Pacific state. Examples of defense constraints include the Arms Export Ban, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 constitution, and constitutional caps on either domestic or foreign defense spending. In comparison to China, Japan’s contributions to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations is incommensurable (United Nations Peacekeeping 9-10). South Korea can spend a larger percentage of their GDP on defense but Japan is constitutionally limited to 1% of their GDP (Khan 2010). Additionally, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has an international presence, especially in Africa (Albert 2017). Conversely, the Japanese Self Defense Forces cannot deploy independently outside of Japanese territory without an extensive debate within the Japanese parliament. Japan exists as one of the leading democratic world economies with a high standard of living, yet it is confined by anti-militaristic policies. Japan is the least corrupt country in the Asia Pacific after Singapore in Southeast Asia and New Zealand in Oceania (Transparency International 2017). The state is culturally eastern, but also considered western, as Japan’s 1947 constitution was instituted by a western power and Japan presently hosts the most U.S. military bases in Asia Pacific. If Japanese imperialism is to blame for many of the security concerns in Asia Pacific, especially the distrust between Japan, China, and the Korean Peninsula, a close examination of Japan's government, military, and democratic practices must be executed. Democracy is present, but is Japan’s democracy functioning as it should? Could Japan remilitarize without public support? What role does public opinion play in Japanese democracy and security policy? If Japan remilitarizes, how will other Asia Pacific states react? These conundrums are what makes Japan a unique and interesting player in the Asia Pacific. They are also pivotal in order to understand the origins and future of conflict in Asia Pacific and in the Japanese state itself. Although Japan is a beacon of democratic stability in Asia Pacific, Japan’s democracy is not immune to shortcomings. This proffers vast ramifications. For example, if Japan’s post-WWII pacifist stance is removed and Japan begins to utilize the Japanese Self Defense Forces offensively, it is likely neighboring China and South Korea will protest these actions as both neighbors are still haunted by Japanese colonization during WWII. North Korea regularly condemns Japan but more so for Japan’s deeply embedded connection with the U.S. However, since North Korea is an outlier in the international community due to its human rights violations, totalitarianism and rejection of other international norms, North Korea’s reactions to Japanese constitutional revision is a lesser priority. Furthermore, North Korea does not share economic ties with Japan, unlike China and South Korea.

### Contention 3: National Identity

#### Pacifism is an important part of Japan’s national identity.

Shibata 18

Ria Shibata (PhD from the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Otago), Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, “IDENTITY, NATIONALISM AND THREATS TO NORTHEAST ASIA PEACE”, December 2018, https://www.jstor.org/stable/48603229?seq=1

Since the end of the Second World War, pacifism has been at the heart of Japan’s national identity and foreign policy. Many Japanese citizens proudly identify Japan as a peace-loving and pacifist nation. This commitment flows from having suffered the horrors of atomic warfare and is closely linked to and embodied in Article 9 of the country’s postwar constitution. This is the war-renouncing clause that was inserted by the Allied Occupation. Today, under the leadership of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Japan’s pacifism stands at a critical juncture. Shinzo Abe is known to be the most conservative leader in Japan’s postwar history. His nationalist rhetoric and historical revisionism have consistently irked Japan’s neighbors, especially those who were victims of its acts of war aggression. Abe’s vision to rebuild Japan into a strong ‘beautiful nation’ with restored national pride is spelled out in his book.

#### The public supports article 9 remaining unchanged.

Walton 20

David Walton (Adjunct Fellow in the Meiji Centre, Western Sydney University), The Interpreter, “Japan: Article 9 conundrum rears its head again”, February 24, 2020, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/japan-article-9-conundrum-rears-its-head-again

Even if the above political conundrums are resolved, the major obstacle to amendment is the extraordinary emotional responses Article 9 generates from the public. For many Japanese, Article 9 is an unambiguous statement that Japan will never again be an aggressor nation. The fact that the 2015 Peace and Security legislation, that allowed SDF forces to assist allies in certain circumstances, sparked mass protests on a scale not witnessed since the 1970s, does not bode well for even a minor amendment to a referendum. Opponents would view such an attempt as a precedent for a more substantial amendment in the future and therefore would resist with substantial, high profile public protest. Polling, which is always problematic, demonstrates the difficulty in gauging the results of a referendum. In a public opinion poll by Sankei Shimbun and the FNN (Fuji News Network), in January this year, for example, 44.8% of respondents answered in favour of the constitutional amendment by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and 40% were opposed. A month later, a telephone poll conducted by the Mainichi Shimbun suggests that 56.5% expressed opposition while 33.3% were supportive.

### Extra Cards:

#### Japan and South Korea have a rocky relationship due to Japan’s militarized past.

Botto 20

Kathryn Botto (senior research analyst in the Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace with an MA from Yonsei University), Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Overcoming Obstacles to Trilateral U.S.-ROK-Japan Interoperability”, March 18, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/03/18/overcoming-obstacles-to-trilateral-u.s.-rok-japan-interoperability-pub-81236

For decades, Japanese and South Korean national security has been inextricably linked by common threats and both countries’ alliances with the United States. But lingering animosities between Seoul and Tokyo dating back to before World War II have long made cooperation uneasy. Those tensions have burst back into the open in recent years, threatening to erode the basis of cooperation even as common rivals in North Korea and China are becoming more formidable. But policymakers in Tokyo and Seoul must remain mindful of the enduring need for a common defense, because any weakening of cooperation could have severe ramifications if a sudden crisis or outright war were to test the limits of their relationship. At the start of the Korean War, when the North Korean military crossed the thirty-eighth parallel and invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, no foreign troops were on the peninsula to aid the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) fledgling military. In the spring of 1949, the few remaining U.S. troops had withdrawn at the direction of U.S. president Harry Truman, despite warnings from numerous intelligence and defense institutions that withdrawal would trigger an invasion by North Korea.1 Still, even with only 500 U.S. advisers physically on the peninsula, the United States was able to respond more quickly than any other nation due to its military presence in Japan supporting the U.S. occupation there. Truman committed air and naval forces to the defense of South Korea on June 27, the very day the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 83 recommending member states provide assistance to South Korea. The first foreign ground troops, U.S. Task Force Smith, arrived from Japan on July 1, 1950.2 Just as during the Korean War, U.S. and ROK readiness for conflict on the peninsula today is partially a function of Japanese contributions. During the Korean War, Japan’s geostrategic location made it vital to the U.S. response. Today, Japan’s ability to respond defensively and of its own volition in support of U.S. and ROK efforts is important to the defense of South Korea and Japan alike. Trilateral cooperation is more than a force multiplier—it is integral to ensuring the United States, South Korea, and Japan can prevent catastrophic conflict, loss of life, and widespread destruction on all sides. But South Korea’s and Japan’s negative perceptions of each other inhibit closer trilateral cooperation. Differing positions on Japan’s colonial past, Japan’s military goals, and appropriate approaches to China and North Korea often prevent the two countries from coming together over their common interest in promoting peace in the region. More than just disagreements, these issues make the two countries view one another as unreliable security partners. This divergence was acutely felt in 2019 when Seoul and Tokyo’s disagreements over historical issues snowballed to impact their economic and security relationship, leaving ROK-Japan relations at their lowest point in decades. A major catalyst of this deterioration occurred in October 2018, when the South Korean Supreme Court ordered the Nippon Steel Corporation to pay compensation to South Koreans forced to work in its factories during Japanese colonization. A similar verdict was handed down to Mitsubishi Heavy Industries of Japan in November. Amid this escalating legal battle, Japan removed South Korea from its trade whitelist in August 2019, although Tokyo claimed that it did so due to national security concerns over South Korean exports of highly sensitive materials rather than in retaliation for the Supreme Court decisions. Seoul responded in kind by removing Japan from its own trade whitelist and subsequently threatened to withdraw from the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), an intelligence-sharing pact with Tokyo. These disagreements were punctuated by a December 2018 dispute over whether or not an ROK Navy destroyer directed its fire-control radar at a Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol aircraft.3 South Korea then accused a Japanese surveillance plane of making “provocative” flights over its naval vessels.4 Unable to resolve their differences, the two countries suspended port calls and canceled senior-level defense exchange programs. Throughout 2019, the lines between Japanese and Korean history, security, and economic issues were entangled. This marks a departure from the two countries’ approach to one another over the past decade. Though hostile domestic political rhetoric has always persisted, both nations largely have allowed security and economic cooperation to increase incrementally but substantially over the past few decades without resolving lingering historical issues. This is not to say that these issues have never intersected. But since the normalization of relations in 1965, neither country had previously allowed domestic politics to seep into the security realm to the extent they did in 2019.

#### Revising Article 9 will also trigger tensions with North Korea.

Impelli 21

Matthew Impelli (journalist), Newsweek, “North Korea Condemns Japan Over Move to Revise Constitution, Calls It 'Declaration of War on Humankind'”, May 19, 2021, https://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-condemns-japan-over-move-revise-constitution-calls-it-declaration-war-humankind-1592877

North Korea recently condemned Japan over the country's move to revise its pacifist constitution and called it an "open declaration of war against humankind." North Korea's state-run news agency, Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), published an article on Wednesday stating that, "The Japanese politicians' projected constitutional revision is not merely an internal affair of a country but an international one as it is a frontal challenge to the efforts for ensuring global peace and an open declaration of war against humankind." The criticism from North Korea comes amid moves in Japan to revise its pacifist constitution, with Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga expressing support for changes including wording that would explicitly state the need for Japan to have self-defense forces. "Japan should have responded to the humankind's call for peace with its honest observance of core articles specified in its constitution," the KCNA article said. "But Japan has made desperate efforts to turn itself, which renounced war, into a war-capable country, remaining unchanged in its wild ambition for launching reinvasion to avenge the past defeat." The KCNA article also said "the Japanese people and the international community strongly oppose the projected constitutional revision, condemning it as a design for reviving a war state." In the final line of the article, North Korea warned Japan that "If Japan fails to draw a lesson from its past defeat, such tragedy will repeat."

#### Militarization would devote more resources to military spending.

Beattie 21

Andrew Beattie (writer covering financial topics since 2003 with a bachelor’s degree from the University of Alberta), Investopedia, “How Military Spending Affects the Economy”, August 30, 2021, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/072115/how-military-spending-affects-economy.asp#:~:text=The%20economic%20cost%20of%20defense,better%20fighter%20planes%20and%20weapons.

The guns and butter curve is a classic illustration of how there is an opportunity cost to every expenditure. If you believe a standing military is a necessity for a nation, the size of that military can be disputed but its existence cannot. The economic cost of defense spending shows up in the national debt and in a dislocation of potential jobs from the private sector to the public. There is an economic distortion of any industry that the military relies on as resources are diverted to produce better fighter planes and weapons. All of these costs are necessary for a nation to bear if they are to defend themselves. We give up some butter to have guns.

#### Japan’s self-defense force is fully capable without removing article 9.

Michishita 20

Narushige Michishita (Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS) in Tokyo), Wilson Center, “Myths and Realities of Japan’s Security Policy”, February 18, 2020, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/myths-and-realities-japans-security-policy

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Japan was the world’s ninth largest spender on defense in 2018.[1] It has cutting-edge military equipment such as F-35 fighters, sea- and ground-based ballistic missile defense systems, and air-independent propulsion submarines. However, the Japanese government maintains that the Self-Defense Force is not a military force. Why does the Japanese government keep lying about the nature of its armed forces? It is because Article 9 of the Japanese constitution stipulates that Japan shall not possess land, sea, and air forces.[2] Moreover, in order to maintain this internal logic that the Self-Defense Force is somehow not a military force, the Japanese government continues to use idiosyncratic names for the Self-Defense Forceʼs organizations and equipment. For example, infantry units are called “ordinary units (普通科)”; artillery units are called “special units (特科)”; engineer units are called “facility units (施設科).” Similarly, a 3,000-ton Hatsuyuki-class combatant ship and a 20,000-ton Izumo-class combatant ship are lumped together as “escort ships (護衛艦)” in Japanese; in English, both of them are called “destroyers.”[3] However, professional observers understand the reality. The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies based in London, categorizes JS Izumo as an aircraft carrier equipped with helicopters, or CVH.[4] This deceptive naming is problematic in at least two ways. First, it undermines effective civilian control in Japan. In order for Japan to maintain effective civilian control, the Japanese people must know what kind of military capabilities their country has and does not have. However, few Japanese citizens are aware that “ordinary units” are in fact infantry units, and that their country actually possesses carriers. Second, this use of misleading terminology undermines the transparency of Japanese defense policy. When one Chinese general noted that Japan had constructed a light aircraft carrier, but called it a “helicopter-equipped escort ship,” he accused Japan of engaging in a covert military buildup.[5] Unfortunately, there was some truth to what he said. Despite the untruthful characterization of Japan’s armed forces and the use of the misleading names, Japan’s defense policy is quite realistic. Japan thinks it necessary to possess the minimum force necessary for self-defense, and the Japanese government acknowledges that while the Self-Defense Force is not a military force under Japanese law, it is regarded as a military force under international law.[6] There are people who are making efforts to fill the gap between the myth and the reality. For example, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has proposed to clarify Japan’s position by revising Article 9, and say that Japan possesses armed forces called the Self-Defense Forces for the purpose of self-defense. However, it is not clear whether he will revise the misleading names that the Self-Defense Forces uses. Nor is it clear whether he can make the revision of the constitution happen during his tenure, which will end in September 2021.

#### Under Article 9, Japan can still legally take action to defend Taiwan.

Kuhn 21

Anthony Kuhn (Writer for NPR), NPR, “After Being Silent For Decades, Japan Now Speaks Up About Taiwan — And Angers China”, August 2, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/07/26/1020866539/japans-position-on-defending-taiwan-has-taken-a-remarkable-shift

The Japanese Constitution rejects using force to resolve international disputes. But after 2015 reforms, Japanese law allows the military to use force when an attack on a foreign country threatens Japan's survival. The law also would let Japan deploy its forces to provide logistical support to foreign militaries ensuring Japan's security. In early July, Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso reiterated that any crisis over Taiwan should be resolved through dialogue. But speaking at a fundraising event, he said, "If a major problem took place in Taiwan, it would not be too much to say that it could relate to a survival-threatening situation" for Japan. The Defense Ministry issued a white paper in July that said, "Stabilizing the situation surrounding Taiwan is important for Japan's security." It said Japan should monitor the situation "with a sense of crisis." These statements signal that Japan is building an argument that an attack on Taiwan could meet Japan's conditions for activating its military, analysts say. "It's that public connection now with Taiwan — that is the part that's new," says Jeffrey Hornung, a political scientist at Rand Corp. Japan's official policy still recognizes the authorities in Beijing, not Taipei, as China's legitimate government. And China and Japan are major trading partners. That has not changed. But Japan's new messaging has irked Beijing, which has criticized it as dangerous. The Chinese Foreign Ministry has repeatedly said that China won't let anyone stand in the way of its efforts to unify with Taiwan.

#### Japan and China have been butting heads over the Senkaku islands.

Patalano 20

Alessio Patalano (Commentator for the Texas National Security Review), War on the Rocks, “WHAT IS CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THE SENKAKU ISLANDS?”, September 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/what-is-chinas-strategy-in-the-senkaku-islands/

Chinese operational behavior in the waters around the small group of islands under Japanese administrative control known as Senkaku, and claimed by Beijing under the name Diaoyu, has entered a new, dangerous phase. In an unprecedented move, Chinese coast guard cutters in early July started to operate inside the islands’ territorial waters in a fashion that would suggest Beijing is there to exercise law-enforcement powers. It appears China no longer seeks to just showcase its “presence” in the waters around the islands. It is now starting to actively challenge Japanese control. For Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s successor, reviewing Tokyo’s approach to the management of this contest with Beijing will be a strategic priority. The stakes are high, as a war game recently indicated that escalatory behavior around the Senkaku islands takes the risk of war between Asia’s two largest economies, and America’s most consequential ally in the Indo-Pacific, one step closer. China’s recent moves are destabilizing, and Japan clearly stated as much in a newly released defense white paper. In the report, the Japanese government presents the nature of the Chinese challenge to its security — especially to the Senkaku islands — in the strongest terms yet. Chinese authorities are in fact described as “relentlessly” pressing their claims to the islands with ever-increasing levels of maritime activities undermining the status quo. Japanese Defense Minister Taro Kono made clear that further intensification of activities might trigger the intervention of Japanese military assets. In response to Japanese concerns, the commander of U.S. military forces in Japan has stated that the United States would help monitor the situation. Every successful step Beijing takes in undermining the status quo around the Senkakus through coercion and force is a direct challenge to the credibility of the U.S.-Japanese alliance and, crucially, to the principles informing the maritime rules-based order centered on the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. While the United States is not party to this treaty, both China and Japan are, and Abe has clearly articulated why China’s actions around the Senkakus fundamentally undermine the principles enshrined in the convention. What is new then about these recent events, and why do they matter to the stability of the East China Sea and, more broadly, to the wider Indo-Pacific? They matter because they highlight a shift toward what I would argue is the second phase of Beijing’s three-pronged attrition strategy toward the Senkakus: normalizing Chinese presence; exercising law-enforcement rights; and taking over exclusive control. China’s objective is to reverse the current situation — controlling the islands at Japan’s expense — while trying to avoid, if possible at all, an armed conflict. This, in turn, matters because it sets a precedent on dispute management that undermines the law of the sea and the maritime order it represents. Since the islands remain uninhabited, the main focus of Chinese action is the ability to exercise maritime law-enforcement rights inside the islands’ territorial waters, especially in regards to the monitoring of fishing activities. By keeping this contest for control firmly within the realm of the exercise of law-enforcement rights, Beijing retains the initiative to challenge the status quo, limit the risk of war, or at least put Japanese authorities in the difficult position of pacing responses that may invite more escalation. Japan is economically dependent on China.

#### The population is divided on revision.

Flores 17

Esteban Flores, Harvard International Review, “THE JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT: NATIONAL DEFENSE OR A RETURN TO JAPANESE MILITARISM?”, Fall 2017, https://www.proquest.com/docview/2124693263?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true

Currently, Japan is very divided over the amendment, with the population split almost equally in favor and in opposition. According to a survey conducted by The Japan Times, 49 percent of Japanese voters support a revision of Article 9, while 47 percent oppose such an action. The taut tension can be felt on the streets of Japan. College students protest the Abe government on campus, holding up signs that sometimes go so far as to label him a fascist. Meanwhile, supporters of the amendment are found at train stations handing out fliers to commuters. But despite the heated disagreement, surveys show there is one thing both sides can agree upon: 83 percent of Japanese citizens believe that the pacifist Article 9 has assured Japan's peace and security since World War ?. Furthermore, 57 percent oppose any change to the pacifist part of Article 9 that renounces war. For Japan, the debate is not over whether Article 9 should be completely rewritten or whether Japan should be allowed to wage war with other nations-a national poll revealed a record level of support for Article 9 this past year. Hence, the controversy revolves strictly around the JSDF and whether its powers in the Constitution should be enumerated, limited, or expanded. While almost nobody currently advocates removing the renunciation of war from Article 9, almost half of Japanese citizens believe the need for a provision in the Constitution that specifically legitimizes the JSDF's existence.

#### Revising the constitution without public support could have consequences.

Tollefson 18

Julie Jo Tollefson (MA in International and Comparative Politics from Wright State University), Wright State University CORE Scholar, “Japan's Article 9 and Japanese Public Opinion: Implications for Japanese Defense Policy and Security in the Asia Pacific”, 2018, https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3075&context=etd\_all

Although Japan is a beacon of democratic stability in Asia Pacific, Japan’s democracy is not immune to shortcomings. This proffers vast ramifications. For example, if Japan’s post-WWII pacifist stance is removed and Japan begins to utilize the Japanese Self Defense Forces offensively, it is likely neighboring China and South Korea will protest these actions as both neighbors are still haunted by Japanese colonization during WWII. North Korea regularly condemns Japan but more so for Japan’s deeply embedded connection with the U.S. However, since North Korea is an outlier in the international community due to its human rights violations, totalitarianism and rejection of other international norms, North Korea’s reactions to Japanese constitutional revision is a lesser priority. Furthermore, North Korea does not share economic ties with Japan, unlike China and South Korea. If such a decision is made with disregard to public opinion, there are poor implications for domestic Japanese democratic practices. Similarly, if Japanese democracy consistently ceases to adhere to public opinion, Japan’s relation with the U.S. may be weakened and the resurgence of military power would send alarm throughout China and South Korea. Evidence exists of Japanese policy swaying against public opinion. Prime Minister Shinzō Abe has already lifted Japan’s Arms Export Ban policy since 2014 and proposed significant changes to Article 9 of the 1947 Japanese constitution. These actions have been met with protests throughout Japan, including selfimmolation (“Man burns himself” Kyodo). As these changes have also been received negatively throughout the Asia Pacific (“Protests as Japan” BBC), it is imperative for Japan’s circumstance to be examined.

#### Article 9 protects Japan from the security dilemma.

Seigel 05

Michael T. Seigel (Professor at Nanzan University), Nanzan University Institute for Social Ethics, “Some Considerations Regarding Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution”, September 2005, http://rci.nanzan-u.ac.jp/ISE/ja/publication/book/article9-seigel-e.pdf

The above indicates that there is already a significant degree of tension between Japan and its neighbours, and that this tension derives in part from Japanʼs own actions. Nevertheless, Japanʼs Peace constitution has acted as a brake on this tension. Because Japan is prevented by its peace constitution from carrying out military activities against its neighbours, it has been able to build up a tremendously powerful military, the second most powerful in the world, without this military constituting a major immediate threat to its neighbours. For this reason Japan has been, at least to some degree, protected from the security dilemma. It may therefore be the case that Japanese tend to be less aware of the security dilemma as an issue. However it is clear from what has been said so far that a change in the peace clause of Japanʼs constitution would have an immediate and profound impact on the meaning that Japanʼs military strength has for neighbouring countries. Regardless of Japanʼs own intentions, it will be seen as a more threatening power by neighbouring countries. In terms of the security dilemma, a change in the constitution would be equivalent to an overnight arms build-up of massive proportions. It would almost definitely precipitate an arms race (or, more accurately, accelerate one that is already under way), signifi cantly enhancing military tension in the region. In fact, Article 9 has not provided a restraint on Japanese military expenditure and development and therefore it does not make sense to argue that Japan needs to change Article 9 in order to build up its defence capability. Depending on how military spending and defence capability are measured, it can be argued that Japan currently has the second largest defence capability in the world. In terms of military expenditure Japan is spending about fifty billion US dollars annually, substantially greater than Chinaʼs expenditures. Further, there is already an arms race under way. The Asian proportion of world defence expenditure went from about fi fteen per cent at the end of the 1980s to over 40 per cent around 1997. About 85% of that is spent in North East Asia (Japan, China, South Korea, and Taiwan). Clearly, if the principle element of an arms race is actionreaction dynamics, reciprocal developments in one country following developments in another country, then there is already a very vigorous arms race underway in northeast Asia. Factors such as this should be a crucial part of the public discourse regarding Article 9 of the Constitution. Further, the increase in military tension that would result from a change in Article 9 would take place precisely in the context of two of the world's most infl ammable situations, namely the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. A change in Article 9 would not only affect Japanʼs relations with its neighbours but the whole stability of the region, exacerbating the tension and thereby increasing the risk of confl ict. Japan has a great deal of responsibility for the impact it has on these two hot spots. In Japan, some politicians speak of constitutional change as if it were a purely domestic issue. It should be clear that it is a far more complex matter. The question of Article 9 must be considered in relation to the security dilemma and that dilemma must be considered in terms of the real and concrete relations that exist in northeast Asia at the present time. To simply dismiss international perspectives on constitutional change as infringements on sovereignty is misguided. Domestic politics can no longer be carried on without reference to the international context. Domestic issues of all kinds and even our very identity are bound up in a web of international relations. To consider a change in the constitution without considering comprehensively its impact on all international relationships would be myopic and unrealistic. A change in the constitution will have a substantial international impact and that impact will rebound on Japan. It is incumbent on Japanʼs decision makers that they take that fact into consideration. Additionally, the increased tensions between China and Japan that would almost definitely result from a change in Article 9 would create a dilemma for Japanʼs allies, for many of whom China is an important trading partner. This is certainly the case for Australia, although Australia like Japan is so integrated into the US system that it is fairly certain that in an ultimate confrontation the alliance would stand. This does not dispel the dilemma however, and it is likely to affect many of Japanʼs other allies as well. The impact that this dilemma could have on Japanʼs international relationships should also be an important consideration in the debate about constitutional change.

#### Civics textbooks in Japan depict the country as pacifist, leading to wide opposition to changing to constitution.

Hagstrom and Isaksson 19

Linus Hagstrom (Professor of Political Science at the Swedish Defence University) and Erik Isaksson (Outreach coordinator and junior research fellow at the Insitute for Security and Development Policy), The Journal of Japanese Studies, “Pacifist Identity, Civics Textbooks, and the Opposition to Japan's Security Legislation”, Winter 2019, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/717648

This article has sought to further our understanding of the large-scale opposition to new security legislation across Japan in the summer of 2015. As stated in the introduction, this opposition is puzzling as it contradicts the notion of Japan's "normalization" and "remilitarization" and seems to have been unaffected by the threats that are so often believed to explain why Japan's security policy is changing. There is wide agreement among scholars that both remilitarization and threat construction involve, and are closely intertwined with, changing processes of collective self-formation away from pacifism in Japan. Nonetheless, here we find a process of collective self-formation that cherishes pacifism in a strikingly similar manner in 2012 to that in 1990. While most of the existing literature has focused on elite discourses, which have arguably enabled the string of changes in Japanese security policy in recent decades, we have sought to address the lingering strength of grassroots opposition by analyzing how self and other emerge in the civics textbooks used by Japanese students in the third grade of junior high school. We have demonstrated that the Japanese self that emerges in the textbooks from 2012 has distinct similarities to the self that was constructed in the textbooks from 1990. The prevailing trend in both years is for a pacifist and democratic Japanese self to appear through temporal othering of Japan's prewar and wartime belligerence and authoritarianism.

#### Japan is economically dependent on China.

Aoyama 21

Rumi Aoyama (PhD, Professor at the Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies at Waseda University), East Asia Forum, “Japan walks on a tightrope with its China policy”, May 20, 2021, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/20/japan-walks-on-a-tightrope-with-its-china-policy/

While the Japanese government is still considering possible scenarios, these discussions may spur further debate on the role of Japan as a ‘shield’ and the United States as a ‘spear’ in US–Japan security relations. The possibility of deploying land-based conventional intermediate-range missiles in Japan to complement the US Pacific Deterrence Initiative raises concerns about it being drawn more deeply into tensions between the United States and China. Japan’s economy is increasingly dependent on China, which is now Japan’s largest export destination, replacing the United States. In fiscal year 2020, China accounted for 22.9 per cent of Japan’s total exports, exceeding 20 per cent for the first time. But with 74 per cent of respondents in a poll conducted by The Nikkei in favour of Japan’s intervention in the Taiwan Strait, the Japanese government is more likely to expand its role in deterring China. China is now adopting a wait-and-see approach. On the one hand, China is sensitive about cooperation among Quad nations and harshly denounced it as an ‘Asian NATO’. For China, Japan’s commitment to Taiwan and the deployment of missiles are alarming and unacceptable. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi warned as much to Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi over the phone. On the other hand, with the hope of driving a wedge between Japan and the United States, China is still refraining from launching a national propaganda campaign against Japan. Most importantly, Japan has a pivotal position in China’s strategy of confrontation with the United States. Just as the United States is pursuing a targeted decoupling strategy, China is determined to establish a self-centred supply chain in Asia and among Belt and Road Initiative countries. As a neighbouring country with substantial global influence, Japan must be embraced to fulfil China’s strategic vision. By taking a tougher stance against China while deepening economic interdependence, Japan is walking a tightrope. The success of Japan’s China policy is far from guaranteed, and it is not easily replicated.