Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its military presence in the Arctic.
The Arctic region is currently one of the world’s largest geopolitical hotspots due to shifting climate changes; melting Icecaps highlight the potentiality of new maritime trade routes, opportunities to access new oil reserves, and a rich plethora of rare earth minerals have made the Arctic a strategic of control for several of the world’s major superpowers. On Jan 5th, 2021, the U.S. Department of The Navy released *A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic*. They write, “In the decades ahead, rapidly melting sea ice and increasingly navigable Arctic waters – a Blue Arctic – will create new challenges and opportunities off our northern shores. Without sustained American naval presence and partnerships in the Arctic Region, peace and prosperity will be increasingly challenged by Russia and China, whose interests and values differ dramatically from ours.”

The land within the Arctic Circle is divided among the eight countries that were a part of the Arctic Council: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and The United States. For the last two years, Russia (which controls about 45% of the total Arctic land and waterways) sat in a chairmanship position on the Arctic Council. However, in 2022 the other 7 countries unanimously decided to formally suspend cooperation with Russia after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This May, Russia passed chairmanship to Norway. However, tensions remain high as the rest of the council continues its suspension of cooperation in Russia.
The melting of the polar ice caps has created what the United States Federal Government has referred to as “A Blue Arctic.” A Blue Arctic opens a plethora of opportunities for securing new maritime routes and natural resources. However, it is due to the geopolitical tensions surrounding the Arctic that we stand firm in our affirmation of the resolution, “Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its military presence in the Arctic.”

We start with Observation 1. Resolitional Analysis

1. Definitions
   1. First, Substantially Increase. According to the Collins Dictionary (last accessed July 30th, 2023 https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/substantial-increase-in) is an adjective/verb combination that means to make the amount of something larger in degree.

   2. Second, Military Presence. Military presence is a colloquial term used to describe the appearance of stationing of a country's armed forces in a given region.

   3. Third, The Arctic. The Arctic refers to the lands and waterways of the circumpolar north overseen and controlled by the 8 states of the Arctic Council: Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia, and The United States.

2. Judging Criterion.
   1. A topic such as this, rooted in geopolitical conversations, requires us to consider the impact of political decisions on a net-beneficial scale. As such, the judge should weigh the possible outcomes of the affirmative against the negative and vote for the team that provides the proves a net-positive for the resolution

We present two contentions to support our case: First, Arctic tensions with Russia prove to be a large security risk for the United States. Second, Securing maritime trade routes is vital for the US and Global economies
Contention 1: Russian Aggression in the Arctic

Subpoint A. Russia has a majority control over the Arctic Region


Russia accounts for nearly half of the Arctic’s population, over half of the Arctic’s coastline, and the majority of Arctic industry. It also dominates Arctic energy production, fishing, and shipping. Moreover, the Russian Arctic remains critical to addressing global environmental issues such as permafrost thawing and wildfire prevention. Without Russia in the Arctic Council, scientists will not be able to share data between weather observatories or monitor Siberian permafrost melt. Given Russia’s Arctic assets, any organization governing the region without Moscow would be attempting to oversee an area mostly outside its control.

Subpoint B. Tensions between Russia and the Arctic Council are high.


On May 11, 2023, in a much-anticipated ceremony, leaders from eight Arctic states and six Indigenous organizations assembled behind closed doors to witness a transfer of power. At first blush, it was routine Arctic Council business: this forum promoting northern cooperation rotates chairmanship every two years. But this had been no ordinary year, with no ordinary chair. The council—suspended since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year—resurrected only to witness Russia hand the chairmanship to its Norwegian successor. And a peaceful transfer was far from a foregone conclusion.

Since the Arctic Council’s unilateral refusal to cooperate with its largest geographical member last March, Russia has shown no sign of de-escalating its aggression against Ukraine. And the council’s 130-odd circumpolar projects—tackling issues from science, to shipping, to Indigenous youth suicide—have paid the price. For more than a year, this symbol of High North peace has fractured along territorial lines, awaiting a return to a status quo that seems increasingly impossible.

Subpoint C. Russia is increasing its military presence and dominance in the region


Russia now has 11 submarines capable of launching long-range nuclear weapons for use in an all-out nuclear war, eight of them based in the Arctic Kola Peninsula, according to the IISS. NATO has 22 between the United States, France and the UK.

In July, Russia’s navy took delivery of a new submarine, Belgorod, which can carry the Poseidon torpedo, a new, nuclear-armed stealth torpedo designed to sneak past coastal defenses by traveling along the seafloor. Russian state media have said Poseidon could cause a giant tsunami that would turn the coastline into a “radioactive desert.”
Moscow also has over the last two years tested a hypersonic glide missile, Zircon, which Putin said in 2019 can reach nine times the speed of sound, making it the world’s fastest. In February, it said the missile was launched in the Arctic waters between mainland Norway and Svalbard.


Never much for subtlety or nuance, Moscow has begun training troops that could be engaged in Arctic combat missions and increased the operational radius of its northern submarine fleet, according to one Russian general.

Plus, Russian long-range bombers have started flying sorties again in the region, after nearly two decades of post-Cold War peace. The Canadian military reports that there have been 50 Russian incursions in the last three years. The most recent of these unfriendly flights occurred late last month, when a pair of Russian Tu-95 bombers approached Goose Bay. They were greeted and escorted away by Canadian F-18s.

Many observers conclude that Russia's muscle-flexing is an effort to underscore its Arctic claims.

Subpoint D: Increasing US Military Presence is Key to regional stability


Since, the Arctic region is so self-evidently important to the United States both economically and militarily, we must assert ourselves to ensure that the region remains peaceful and is of benefit to all nations as part of the global commons. So, what can the U.S. military do to ensure this outcome?

First, we must ensure that we maintain and sustain a credible force in Alaska. Much recent discussion by senior political and military leaders has centered on cutting force structure in Alaska. In particular, the Army has considered drawing down the airborne brigade combat team posted at Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson. This would send the wrong message to potential adversaries that the United States is not committed to protecting either its own interests and claims, or Arctic security in general. This might encourage aggressive actions on the part of nations, most prominently Russia, seeking to seize and exploit opportunities within the Arctic region.

Second, U.S. forces must exercise frequently and visibly to demonstrate our capability to secure our interests in the Arctic. Such exercises should include joint forces and incorporate combined operations with Arctic partners. By conducting joint and combined exercises, we send a message to potential adversaries that we intend to secure our interests and those of our partners in the austere environment of the Arctic. Moreover, combined exercises demonstrate the interoperability of our forces with partner nations for a deterrent effect.

Third, U.S. military forces have to regain Arctic skills to enhance deterrence in the region. There is much work to be done. Over a decade of war focused on counterinsurgency in the desert environment of the Middle East and central Asia has left forces in Alaska with atrophied Arctic survival and tactical skills and antiquated equipment. Further, a major winter exercise in the Arctic targeted at the operational level of war has not occurred in several years. To have a credible deterrent to any nation's design for expansion in the Arctic, the United
States has to systematically rebuild and demonstrate its Arctic skills and refurbish or field new equipment to give U.S. forces in Alaska a robust capability to challenge aggressors.

Fourth, U.S. forces in the Arctic require technological and equipment modernization. In the same way that Arctic skills have atrophied over the past decade-plus, so also has the equipment available to the force become either obsolete or difficult to maintain due to age. For example, early-warning defense radar systems require modernization as software becomes out of date and the purpose for which they were designed has evolved. Additionally, ground mobility suffers from an aged system that is difficult to maintain, making it a challenge to move ground forces in deep snow or mud. The M973 Small Unit Support Vehicle (SUSV) is not viable since it is no longer a program of record, and a material solution is required to enable greater mobility for ground forces in the Arctic. These are just two examples of equipping needs among many. The bottom line is that U.S. forces will require investment in material that facilitates operating in the tough conditions of the Arctic. This is essential to demonstrate our commitment to security in the region.

To effect protection of our interests, the United States has to assert leadership using critical elements of national power, including the military. We must rebuild long-ignored Arctic military capabilities to provide a credible deterrent to any nation that may want to expand its territory outside of recognized international norms to exploit the tremendous resources of the Arctic. As human activity continues to increase in the Arctic, it will become more and more important for the United States to demonstrate its strength in the region. Failure to do so could allow the friction of human interaction to grow into needless regional confrontation with global implications. This is preventable with a commitment to leadership and peace in the region that stems from sufficient investment and preparation.

Contention 2: Global Econ

Subpoint A. Melting Arctic Ice Caps Increases Global Trade Opportunity


The advent of climate change has brought about a number of different changes in the Arctic, including increased accessibility to Arctic ports as well as the opening of new Arctic shipping lanes. With new trans-Arctic routes, including the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP), as well as newly built and refurbished ports from Russia, political and military interests are reevaluating the region as one of geopolitical competition. While the Arctic traditionally was characterized by cooperation and low tensions, that is changing. A report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS) on the Arctic notes that although there is still important cooperation in the region, the Arctic is increasingly seen as an area for geopolitical competition amongst the US, China, and Russia.

Subpoint B. United States Global Trade Power is Declining to Chinese Control


The global balance of power is shifting towards China. The American share of the global trade and GDP is declining. America is receding from its global commitments and is turning inwards, and China is increasingly challenging the US hegemony. The South China Sea is on the roll to become Chinese Sea. China is getting a stronghold of the major International Organizations. Beijing is fast bridging the military gap with
Washington and the world order is moving towards a bipolar, or better labeled, nonpolar world. With the shift of the strategic balance of power, China is getting both emboldened and assertive at the same time.

China has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” a designation it invented to push for a greater role in Arctic governance. It has dispatched research expeditions, sought to establish mining and gas operations, and envisioned a network of shipping routes crossing the Arctic, a “silk road on ice.” It describes itself as an “active participant, builder, and contributor in Arctic affairs,” one that has “spared no efforts to contribute its wisdom to the development of the Arctic region.” But in the Arctic, as in the rest of the world, the United States sees China as a potentially destabilizing force, with the economic and military power to try to bend the established order to its liking.

Subpoint C. Arctic Resources are Increasingly Important for Global Power

Today, pan-Arctic economic activity exceeds US $500 billion per year—larger than the economies of Belgium, Poland, or Thailand—and is responsible for a significant share of the world’s food, minerals, and energy.

Although not widely recognized, the Arctic is a leading region for biotechnology, cutting-edge scientific research, and meaningful and measurable success in sustainability for the entire planet—countries like Norway and Iceland can generate 100% of their electricity from renewable sources.

The simple truth is: The Arctic impacts people everywhere in their everyday lives. As climate change impacts the Arctic, the region will only grow in importance to the world, both environmentally and economically.

As the world adapts to a changing climate, the Arctic is discovering tremendous new opportunities. By 2040, the Northern Sea Route could be open year round, resulting in faster, more energy-efficient global trade routes. The Arctic of tomorrow is a new frontier of economic growth and global commerce, one with significant potential benefits to society.

   a. Move more of the global economy

       Arctic sea ice coverage is already 65% of what it was in 1979. In the future, the Arctic region will play a pivotal role in global trade, with more than 25% of Asia-Europe container trade expected to travel through the Northern Sea Route by 2030.

   b. Feed more of the world

       Over the next 40 years, warmer waters, sustainable aquaculture, and innovations in the “blue economy” could result in fishery catches 70% greater than today.

   c. Deliver more “green” products and innovations
Marine bioprospecting in the Arctic continues to discover and develop new biological applications for medicine, biofuels, health and wellness, and industrial use.

d. Help power the world with clean energy

While it is widely cited that the Arctic holds nearly one-quarter of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves, its greatest potential lies in renewable energy. The ability to generate and share energy from wind, hydro, tidal, geothermal, solar, and biomass makes the Arctic a meaningful leader in the future of clean energy. Subsea cables make it possible for the wealth of renewable energy in the Arctic to be exported to the world.

Subpoint D. Increased US Military Presence and Alliance Cooperation Key to Securing Arctic Resources.

Gilday, Braithwaite, and Berger (2021) A Blue Arctic: A Strategic Blueprint for the Arctic. Retrieved from https://media.defense.gov/2021/Jan/05/2002560338/-1/-1/0/ARCTIC%20BLUEPRINT%202021%20FINAL.PDF

Despite containing the world’s smallest ocean, the Arctic Region has the potential to connect nearly 75% of the world’s population—as melting sea ice increases access to shorter maritime trade routes linking Asia, Europe and North America. Today, 90% of all trade travels across the world’s oceans – with seaborne trade expected to double over the next 15 years. Arctic waters will see increasing transits of cargo and natural resources to global markets along with military activity, regional maritime traffic, tourism, and legitimate/illegitimate global fishing fleets. The Beaufort, Chukchi, and Bering Seas are experiencing rapid sea ice loss, enabling greater access to waters off America’s Alaskan shores. An opening Arctic brings the United States closer to our northern neighbors to provide mutual assistance in times of need, while also enabling like-minded nations to defend the homeland, deter aggression and coercion, and protect Sea Lines of Communication.

The White House (2022, Oct) National Strategy for the Arctic Region. Retrieved from

U.S. Government agencies will expand support for sustainable development of renewable energy, critical minerals production, tourism, and knowledge economy sectors in Alaska with the aim of creating sustainable growth and well-paying jobs in Alaska and responsibly developing alternative industries in Alaska to support a just energy transition, while protecting biodiversity and promoting co-ocean use. We will explore new programs to catalyze private sector investment in Alaska. We will seek to strengthen the resilience of U.S. supply chains by exploring the potential for sustainable and responsible critical mineral production in Alaska while adhering to the highest environmental, labor, community engagement, and sustainability standards. Development efforts will be carried out in partnership with the private sector; State of Alaska; Alaska Native communities; and stakeholders, including representatives of labor, impacted communities, and environmental justice leaders, and will be accompanied by assessments of their associated environmental impacts.

In the broader Arctic region, we will work with our allies and partners—including through the potential use of relevant U.S. Government mechanisms and development programs, such as the Export-Import Bank, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation, and U.S. Trade and Development Agency—to expand private sector-led investment and pursue sustainable economic development in the Arctic, including in critical minerals. We will explore methods to enable enhanced U.S. government support for strategic investments and to incentivize private sector investment in the Arctic. We will
strengthen capacity across the Arctic region to screen prospective investments based on national security, environmental sustainability, and supply chain resilience concerns. Across our development efforts, we will continue to employ the best practices that distinguish the United States and our partners from our competitors: transparency and accountability; high environmental, labor, community engagement, and sustainability standards; equity and ethics; and local partnerships supported by sound, sustainable financing.

The United States seeks to uphold international law, rules, norms, and standards; close potential gaps in governance; preserve freedom of navigation; and protect U.S. sovereign rights, including with respect to the extended continental shelf. The United States values the unique spirit of international cooperation that has generally characterized the Arctic since the end of the Cold War. Russia’s brutal war in Ukraine has made this cooperation in the Arctic virtually impossible in the Arctic at present. However, maintaining cooperation with our allies and partners in the near-term remains essential to advancing our objectives for the region. Over the past quarter century, the United States has been integral to the development of the governance architecture enabling this regional cooperation. The United States helped create the Arctic Council and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum and chaired negotiations that produced a series of international agreements pertaining to the Arctic region, such as the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO Fisheries Agreement).

As the Arctic becomes more accessible and as strategic competition intensifies, we will maintain our leadership role in the Arctic. We will sustain the existing multilateral fora and legal frameworks dedicated to solving shared challenges in the region, recognizing that Arctic countries have the primary responsibility for addressing these challenges. While emphasizing existing frameworks, we will remain open to developing new bilateral and multilateral partnerships as needed to advance scientific cooperation and other U.S. interests in the Arctic.
Increasing US militaristic involvement in a highly contested geopolitical zone like the Arctic more than we already have has the potential for devastating consequences on our security and on the environment. As such, we stand in our negation of today’s topic “Resolved: The United States federal government should substantially increase its military presence in the Arctic.”

We present two contentions to support our case: First, Increased US military presence in the Arctic puts at risk to backlash from a Russian Chinese Alliance. Second, the actions of the military exacerbate massive environmental damage contributing to global warming.

Counter-Contention 1: Russia/China Backlash

Subpoint A: Russian-Chinese relationships are already high.

Ellyatt, H (2023, March 21st) Russia and China are being driven together as the chasm with the West deepens. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/2023/03/21/russia-and-china-are-becoming-ever-closer-and-the-west-should-worry.html

China and Russia have long shared similar geopolitical aims, such as a desire to see what they call a “multi-polar world” and the curbing of NATO’s military might, that unite them. And perhaps the most significant shared viewpoint of all is their mutual, long-standing distrust of the West.

Hass, R (2023, March 17th) Fatalism is not an option for addressing China-Russian Relations. Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/articles/fatalism-is-not-an-option-for-addressing-china-russia-relations/

Over the past year, China has expanded trade links with Russia and amplified Russian propaganda. Chinese authorities have defended Russia’s actions and accused NATO and the West of fomenting war in Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, American and European public opinion of China has plummeted. China’s embrace of Russia throughout its invasion of Ukraine certainly contributed to this trend.

Even so, as Xi’s upcoming visit makes clear, Beijing remains firmly committed to growing its relationship with Moscow. Some ascribe this orientation to Xi’s strong personal bond with Putin. This may play a small role. Xi has, after all, described Putin as his “best friend.” Even so, in my personal experiences around Xi and my study of his leadership over the past decade, Xi has proven himself to be uniquely unsentimental. He is a cold-blooded calculator of his and his country’s interests above all else.

Subpoint B: China is Pushing into the Arctic with Russia’s help


With the exception of conventional Arctic nations, an increasing number of international organizations and non-Arctic nations—including China—are exhibiting amplified interest in
this region. China proclaiming itself a “near-Arctic” state and assuming the position of being the keenest observer in the region is leading various other significant stakeholders in the region, such as Russia and the United States, to take note of China’s emerging Arctic policies. This context makes it important to analyze China’s emerging policies and plans.

In 2018, China released a white paper titled China’s Arctic Policy describing its policy in the Arctic. The analysis reflected China’s confident and proactive policies related to the region. Outlining Beijing’s precise aims there, the paper explicated Chinese stakes, linking them to the growing Belt and Road (BRI) trade initiative through the “Polar Silk Road.” It can be said that Beijing’s aim is to build a Polar Silk Road in the Arctic region, thereby linking Asia and Europe through logistics and transportation channels traversing this region. Furthermore, China’s interests can be divided into two categories. First: Beijing’s close involvement in the domains of scientific research, resource survey (and the handling of this type of research), shipping, and maritime security. And second: the probable effects of climate change on the region, rightfully highlighted by China as a valid reason that warrants the concern of major players in Arctic matters. The thawing is producing a novel regional order for the practice of statecraft among Arctic and near-Arctic nations. As indicated by Chinese aspirations for its inclusion in the Arctic Council, China identifies the prospect that its participation in the growth and expansion of the Arctic’s new regional order will lead to increased opportunity for Beijing to mold the Arctic to its advantage and its national interests.


Arctic cooperation seems to be splitting. The landmark event is that on March 3, 2022, the Arctic 7 issued a joint statement, announcing the suspension of cooperation with Russia in the Arctic Council. In the view of many observers, this suspension will last for years or even decades. Russia did not pay much attention to the isolation of the seven countries in the Arctic, but focused on its own domestic Arctic affairs, sought to cooperate with China, and actively invited China to participate in Russia’s Arctic development projects. Facing Russia’s enthusiasm for seeking Arctic cooperation, China has also responded positively to Russia’s intention to deepen cooperation in the Arctic. It has not only further strengthened its energy cooperation with Russia, but also opened cooperation in various new areas, such as Arctic shipping. With regard to the suspension of the Arctic Council, China also publicly stated that it would not recognize the Arctic Council without Russia. Benefiting from the confrontation between Russia and the other seven countries in the Arctic, China has more opportunities to carry out Arctic cooperation with Russia than ever before.

Subpoint C. Russia/China overpower US in the Arctic


China and Russia have signed an agreement to work together in maritime law enforcement following a meeting that took place in a Russian city inside the Arctic Circle, not far from the border with new Nato member Finland.
China’s coastguard and Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) signed the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Tuesday, according to state media. The details of the agreement have not been disclosed.

State broadcaster CCTV said the agreement was the outcome of a two-day meeting between the Chinese coastguard and the FSB that concluded on Tuesday. Chinese coastguard chief Yu Zhong and Vladimir Grigorovich Kulishov, first deputy FSB director and head of its border service, represented the two sides at the signing ceremony.

According to CCTV, the two sides said they would “actively promote maritime law enforcement cooperation, join hands to build a maritime community of destiny, and make every effort to serve the comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation between China and Russia in the new era”.

The two sides said they would implement the consensus reached by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin at their meetings. The two leaders described the ties between the countries as a “no-limits” partnership in a joint statement signed in 2022.


Over recent years, NATO allies and Russia have scaled up military exercises in the region: Chinese and Russian warships conducted a joint exercise in the Bering Sea in September. Norway raised its military alert level in October. But the West trails Russia in military presence. Since 2005, Russia has reopened tens of Arctic Soviet-era military bases, modernised its navy, and developed new hypersonic missiles designed to evade U.S. sensors and defences. Four Arctic experts say it would take the West at least 10 years to catch up with Russia's military in the region, if it chose to do so.


Future Sino-Russian drills could also see the use of advanced drones, electronic warfare tests, artificial intelligence–enhanced systems, and employment of both militaries’ new hypersonic missiles. These emerging capabilities are priority areas for Chinese, Russian, and U.S. military research and development given their potentially revolutionary effects on future battlefields. In light of their cooperation on missile early warning systems, China and Russia might at some point even include joint nuclear tasks in future drills, perhaps as part of the nuclear phase of the Russian strategic drills.

U.S. missile defences are designed to defend against a limited attack from a rogue state, and the United States has expressed confidence in its ability to deter a nuclear attack by Russia or China. But insufficient visibility in the Arctic could limit U.S. response time in a crisis, a situation VanHerck and other officials want to avoid.

Counter-Conteension 2: Global Warming

Subpoint A. Global Warming Biggest Threat to Human Life and disproportionately affects marginalized communities

Human-induced climate change is the largest, most pervasive threat to the natural environment and societies the world has ever experienced, and the poorest countries are paying the heaviest price, a UN expert said.

“There throughout the world, human rights are being negatively impacted and violated as a consequence of climate change. This includes the right to life, health, food, development, self-determination, water and sanitation, work, adequate housing and freedom from violence, sexual exploitation, trafficking and slavery,” said Ian Fry, UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change, in a report to the General Assembly today.

“There is an enormous injustice being manifested by developed economies against the poorest and least able to cope. Inaction by developed economies and major corporations to take responsibility for drastically reducing their greenhouse gas emissions has led to demands for ‘climate reparations’ for losses incurred. The G20 members for instance, account for 78 per cent of emissions over the last decade.”

The Special Rapporteur’s report focuses on the topics of mitigation action, loss and damage, access and inclusion, and the protection of climate rights defenders.

“The overall effect of inadequate actions to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is creating a human rights catastrophe, and the costs of these climate change related disasters are enormous,” Fry said.

Those most affected and suffering the greatest losses are the least able to participate in current decision-making and more must be done to ensure they have a say in their future, including children and youth, women, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and minorities.

Subpoint B. US Military is a major contributor to Global Warming crisis.

De La Garza, A (2022, Feb 7th) to take climate change seriously, the US Military needs to shrink. Retrieved from: https://time.com/6148778/us-military-climate-change/

Military vehicles, along with the forces that use them and the industries that supply them, represent a huge climate problem, accounting for 5% of the world’s carbon emissions every year. And there’s no bigger actor in that space than the U.S. military, which sucks up more petroleum than any other institution on earth to fly jets, heat buildings, and ferry food and supplies to 750 bases spread across the world, a process that, all told, produces an emissions footprint greater than that of the entire country of Sweden.

The US military is the largest user of fossil fuels and energy in the US government. US military emissions are about 51 million metric tons, CO2 equivalent, annually in the last two years. This is a reduction from past military emissions, but still larger than the emissions of most countries. That does not include the emissions caused by the destruction of property—the burning of infrastructure, including cities—that the US may engage in when they make war.

Subpoint C. The only way to fight global warming is through a smaller military presence


Clearly, if you reduce [emissions from] the rest of the U.S. government but leave the military untouched or let them sort of go at their own pace — that’s not going to get you the kind of reductions that you want out of the U.S. government,” said Neta Crawford, co-director of the Watson Institute’s Costs of War Project and author of the study estimating U.S. military emissions.

The Defense Department has no decarbonization targets. It has counted on other sustainability policies to include climate benefits.

The Pentagon said in 2017 that about one of every five military bases was unnecessary. But Congress has locked in the existing number of bases, most recently through the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act. Likewise, the latest defense bill prohibits the military from retiring the A-10 Warthog, the attack plane first produced in the 1970s that can take over 3 gallons of fuel to fly 1 mile.


Today, with a more modest—but global—2 percent per year reduction in military spending, humanity would save over $1 trillion in just five years, compared to the spending that would result from current trends.

We propose that half of these savings remain at the disposal of national governments, which would undoubtedly find ways to use the funds for their domestic policies. Given the excellent research capacity of the military industry—and its outsized influence over defense policy—a meaningful use of these fresh resources could be to support the conversion of military R&D towards more productive uses. The other half should be allocated to a global fund dedicated to the fight against planetary emergencies such as pandemics, global warming and extreme poverty.